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對Callicott非人類中心主觀內在價值論的反思 Rethinking Non-anthropocentric Intrinsic Value Theory of Callicott

作者
林恩志
Author
En-Chih Lin
摘要

當代環境倫理學在論述到內在價值時,以Holmes Rolston,III為主的環境倫理學者主張,自然環境所擁有的內在價值是一種客觀,不受人類偏好影響的價值。J. Baird Callicott選擇採取與這群客觀內在價值論者截然不同的方式,認為內在價值是一種主觀,且由人類所產生的價值。即便如此,Callicott相信透過他的主觀內在價值論,他得以創造一套非人類中心主義環境倫理學。不過,我認為Callicott的論證是有瑕疵的。

在這篇文章當中,我將首先介紹Callicott的非人類中心主觀內在價值論。其後論證,Callicott所宣稱的非人類中心式價值論,實際上是一種弱義人類中心的價值論。最後嘗試證明,藉由道德社群的概念,我們可以迴避非人類中心主義面臨的困境,並建立一套相對完善的弱義人類中心主義環境倫理學。

Abstract

There has been a long discussion regarding modern environmental ethics. That nature has objective intrinsic value and won’t be affected by human preference is holding by Holmes Rolston, III and fellow environmental ethicists. However, J. Baird Callicott takes an alternative approach. He believes that the source of all value depended on human consciousness, which leading to subjective intrinsic value theory. Nevertheless, Callicott argued that he can still hold a nonanthropocentric position.

In this article, I will firstly introduce the nonanthropocentric subjective intrinsic value theory of Callicott. Second, I will argue that the nonanthropocentric subjective intrinsic value theory which Callicott claimed, which is actually a form of weak anthropocentric value theory. Finally, I will argue that we can contribute an environmental ethic base on the theory of Callicott by simply following the approach of weak anthropocentrism and the concept of moral community.