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第 63  期

Special Issue

A Comparative Study on Monopoly Policies of the Taiwan and Chosen Governments-General—With a Focus on Differences in Socioeco- nomic Legacies and “State” Capacities
作者 文明基
Author Myung-Ki Moon
關鍵詞 日治朝鮮日治臺灣專賣政策社會經濟遺産國家能力
Keywords colonial Korea, Chosen, colonial Taiwan, monopoly policy, Japanese colonial rule, socioeconomic legacy, state capacity
摘要 本文對臺灣‧朝鮮總督府專賣政策之觀察提供幾項重要啓示:兩個總督府財政能力之差異由於專賣收入之差異而發生。而且專賣收入差異有多種原因:殖民地特殊的社會經濟條件,殖民地化以前之産業傳統,經濟水準之差異以及殖民政府「國家」能力之差異等。筆者要强調兩點:産業、消費傳統對日治時代財政能力的影響,還有殖民政府所具備的「國家」能力之差距。日治臺灣可以說「弱民强官」。不過朝鮮不能說「强官」也不能說「弱民」:朝鮮總督府,跟臺灣總督府不一樣,不能壓倒朝鮮「社會」。筆者的討論暗示以下:把朝鮮總督府等同於「强有力的國家」的解釋架構需要一些修正,特別是過度强調殖民政府「國家」能力的一些理論(殖民地近代化論與殖民地近代性論等)。
Abstract Previous studies on the financial history of Taiwan and Korea (Chosen) under Japanese rule have commonly observed that the financial conditions of the Taiwan Government-general were much better than those of the Chosen Government-general. Some reasons for this difference are as follows: distinct sources of tax revenue, differential financial assistance by the Japanese central government to each Government-general in the early stage of colonial rule, mainly caused by different political situations in Japan at the time of colonization, etc. I argue there is an additional, significant cause: different monopoly policies and differences in the size of monopoly incomes significantly affected the total annual revenue.
If we also take into consideration the respective sizes of population and territory, my observation on the monopoly policies and the size of monopoly incomes gives us some suggestions. First, the difference between the financial abilities of the two Governments-general was basically due to the size of monopoly incomes and efficiency of monopoly policies. Second, the difference in the incomes derived from multiple historical legacies, like the unique socioeconomic conditions of each colony (ginseng vs. camphor monopoly), industrial traditions (tobacco monopoly), consumption patterns (opium monopoly), and differential levels of economic development before colonization. It also derived from the differential ‘state’ capacity (as seen in the liquor monopoly) of the Governments-general.
I emphasize that from the viewpoint of ‘state’ capacity, colonial Taiwan was close to the “strong state and weak society” type, whereas colonial Korea is harder to categorize. Colonial Korea might be said to have a “strong state” albeit with an asteroid, but it is difficult to say that its society was a “weak society.” Therefore a sensitive observer like Hagen Koo (1994) insisted that colonial Korean society was a “contentious society.” Moreover, some grand theories like those of colonial modernity and colonial modernization, as well as Korean-style dependency theory (the so-called theory of “colonial plunder”) have something in common, in that they all implicitly presuppose a “strong state.” My observation on the monopoly policies of the two Governments-General suggests the need to modify some of the premises underlying these broader theories.
/ 李力庸    Li-yung Lee
/ 林文凱    Wen-Kai Lin
/ 洪紹洋    Sao-Yang Hong
/ 林桶法    Tung-Fa Lin
/ 張曉威    Siou-Wei Chong
Artaud et Adamov : du théâtre de la cruauté au théâtre de la séparation
/ 朱鴻洲    Hung-Chou Chu
/ 婁振業    Chun-Yip Lowe
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