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我們對動物的責任 |
Our Responsibilities for Animals |
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作者 |
柯志明 |
Author |
Chih-Ming Ke |
關鍵詞 |
永恆、
苦樂感知、
間接義務、
動物倫理、
責任、
動物權 利、
敬虔、
道德利益
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Keywords |
Animal Ethics,
Animal Rights,
Eternity,
Immanuel Kant,
Indirect Duty,
Moral Interests,
Piety,
Responsibility,
Sentience,
Subject-ofa- Life,
Tom Regan
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摘要 |
本文從批判Peter Singer與Tom Regan的動物倫理返回Immanuel Kant之見,再從Kant的倫理學探入永恆界域,通過剖析人與自然以及動物的存在關係,指陳人對動物應有的道德責任,立定人正確對待動物的永恆基礎與意義。反對Singer與Regan之見,本文否定動物與人具有平等的道德地位與權利。本文主張:動物與人有著本質差異,沒有平等的道德地位,故不應平等對待;但由於人對自然以及動物沒有主權,卻長久領受動物直接或間接所提供的種種好處,故不應任意傷害牠們,更不應無故惡待牠們;然而,為了圓滿實現人性以及超越的永恆價值,人應在道德上被容許可利用動物,但必須按動物的存在地位與特質相稱地對待牠們,如不虐待或無故使之受苦,並為此負責。究極而言,自然與動物對人皆屬奧秘,人必須懷敬虔之心,謹慎對待,且須接受難免有無知之過。 |
Abstract |
This article returns from the criticism of Peter Singer and Tom Regan's animal ethics to Immanuel Kant’s viewpoints. Through analyzing the existential relationship among human beings, nature, and animals, this article points out the moral responsibility of human beings for animals, and establishes the eternal foundation and meaning of people's correct treatment of animals. Opposing Singer and Regan's viewpoints, this article denies that animals and people have equal moral status and rights. This article argues that animals and human beings are essentially different and do not have equal moral status, so they should not be treated equally. However, since people have no sovereignty over nature and animals, and they have long received the benefits provided by animals directly or indirectly, so they should not hurt them arbitrarily, and they should not treat them maliciously without reason. However, in order to achieve the eternal value of humanity, people should be ethically allowed to use animals, but they must be treated in accordance with the existential status of the animals and their traits. For example, they should not be maltreated or we should not make them suffer for no reason, and we should be responsible for this. Ultimately, nature and animals are mysteries to human beings. We must treat them with piety and caution, and accept the possibility that we will commit the inevitable wrongs on them. |
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