作者
陳伊琳
Author
Yi-Lin Chen
關鍵詞
摘要

本文從品德教育觀點切入,探討與「欣賞」這項品格長處息息相關的敬畏之情,並選擇以心理學家Keltner與Haidt的敬畏觀作為檢視對象。本文指出這個敬畏觀與當前盛行的(西方)日常敬畏觀雷同之處在於:敬畏既無「敬」也無「畏」。他們以「知覺上的巨大」及「認知調適的需要」刻劃下的敬畏觀,以及將敬畏視為正向道德情緒的做法,一則無視於對敬畏對象所體現之偉大價值的崇敬(敬),二則認定敬畏是全然感覺良好的情緒,恐懼並非必要成份。再者,Keltner與Haidt的敬畏觀著眼的是,敬畏衍生的心理效應所具有的道德價值。惟McShane 與Coates都指出,這些心理效應不必然皆為道德上善的,Coates尤其指出,敬畏的本有價值在於它能正確辨認、評價真正偉大的對象,並對之心存敬意以及潛在的畏懼。

Synopsis

This study begins by examining character education and investigating the emotion of ‘awe’, which is believed to be integral to the character strength of ‘appreciation’. Specifically, it critically examines Keltner and Haidt’s conception of awe. Their concept aligns with the (Western) common notion of awe as lacking reverence and fear. They define awe as having two conditions: a perceived vastness and the need for cognitive accommodation. Awe is usually regarded as a positive moral emotion that does not require fear. However, the present study argues that this popular conception of awe has two shortcomings. First, it lacks ‘reverence’, which acknowledges the considerable and inherent value of an awe-inspiring object. Second, it disregards ‘fear’ as an integral element underlying the power of such objects by portraying awe solely as a positive emotion. Keltner and Haidt emphasise the psychological effects of awe and their subsequent moral value. McShane and Coates suggest that these effects are not always morally favourable. Coates emphasises that awe is intrinsically valuable due to its role in recognising and appreciating the considerable value of an awe-inspiring object through reverence and fear.