In XunZi, “T’ien” calls for “nature,” and the relationship between nature and human nature (Hsing) is “human nature is what T’ien produces.” Accordingly, Hsing in XunZi is natural and neutral in value. As we know, He claims “Hsing-er Sang-wei”, and views morally good action as resulting from mind’s (Hsin’s) directing and correcting Hsing with Li-Yi, which is made by the sage, not innate in our mind or nature. It is in terms of Hsin’s knowing Li-Yi and its directing and correcting Hsing according to Li-Yi that human has moral performance. Since so, Hsin is the foundation of morals in some sense. Hsin is given by nature. In this sense, it is Hsing (human nature). And Hsin can do these two works, for XunZi, because its essential function is to know things and it is at the same time the T’ien-Chung. But, according to XunZi, Hsin has to practice Hsi-Yi- Ching, otherwise it cannot really know Li-Yi and actually do what it can and should do as the T’ien-Chung. No matter as the knowing subject or as the T’ien-Chung, it is very hard to say that Hsin in XunZi is a moral being or carries out any moral sense itself (this is determined by its being Hsing). Thus, XunZi has to face the following problem in his moral theory: How is it possible for a non moral being to be the foundation of morals and carry out itself with moral value? In this paper, though deeply and carefully analyzing XunZi’s views about how human succeeds in doing morally, I conclude: The motivation and purpose of Hsin’s exercising Hsi-Yi- Ching, knowing Li-Yi, and directing and correcting Hsing with Li-Yi are all due to a moral purpose — acting morally and thereby becoming a sage, a man perfect in morals. Being so, we cannot say that XunZi’s Hsin (especially from the point of view that it’s functioning its essential functions, no matter as a knowing mind or as T’ien-Chung) does not carry out any moral sense at all though it is nor a moral being in itself.