隨著明清氣學的研究日益熱絡，王廷相與戴震的氣學也相對受到學界所重視。在氣學的光譜上，王廷相與戴震屬於同一陣營。二者皆反對宋儒，尤其是朱子以形而上與形而下，二分理氣的觀點。不承認在存有論上，理有優先於氣的超越性。相對者，二者均將氣上抬為第一序的存有論概念。主張「理」是「氣之條理」。然而，在人性論上，二者卻有明顯的差異。王廷相主張性有善惡說，戴震則重新詮釋孟子性善論。在理欲關係上，王廷相採取嚴格的道德主義，認為成德之教起於澄思寡欲，甚至是無欲。但是， 戴震卻主張達情遂欲，肯定滿足人之情欲，在實踐道德上，有其必要性。依此，本文從三方面展開討論：首先，指出二者對程朱以理言性說的共同批判。其次，辨析二者在性有善有惡論與性善論之分歧。最後，探討。何者更能在氣學的基礎上，安頓人性的道德面，由此承接儒門成德之教。

With the growing interest in the studies of Qi in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the theories of Qi proposed by Wang Tingxiang and Dai Zhen's have garnered academic attention. Both Wang and Dai were critical of Song Confucianism, particularly Zhu Xi's dualism of metaphysical Li and physical Qi. They rejected the notion that Li transcends Qi ontologically. Instead, they considered Qi as the ontologically first-order concept and argued that Li serves as the pattern and order of Qi. However, Wang and Dai diverged in their understanding of human nature. Wang suggested that human nature encompasses both goodness and badness, while Dai reinterpreted Mencius' notion of innate goodness. Concerning the relationship between the Li and natural desires, Wang adopted a position of strict moralism, arguing that the cultivation of virtues begins with purifying one's thoughts, suppressing desires, or even eliminating them. In contrast, Dai suggested that satisfying desires is necessary for the practice of morality. In this paper, the author aims to approach this topic by 1) highlighting the shared criticism of Wang and Dai towards Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi's interpretation of the operation of Li in understanding human nature, 2) identifying the discrepancies between Wang's argument on the duality of human nature and Dai's perspective on the innate goodness of human nature, and 3) discussing whether Wang or Dai could contend adequately with the moral aspect of human nature on the basis of their studies of Qi and effectively continue the Confucian teaching of realizing virtues.