程朱「理一而分殊」的論述以二元形上學為前提，「理一」和「分殊」的關係是以超越的同一性涵攝經驗的差異化。戴震的氣一元論則肯定「分理」作為陰陽之氣的個體化原理，經驗的差異化區分同時就是道生成變化的內在法則。戴震的「分理」說預設了一套由氣的論述所構成的內在的形上學。「一氣」和「分理」並非形上實體和經驗理則的區分，「分理」的個體化原理就是「一氣」變化流行的內在理路。然而戴震氣一元論的「分理」論述，雖然更重視差異性與歷史性，他的詮釋策略卻是保守的復古主義。他主張在詮釋儒家經典時不能摻雜佛老，強調經典詮釋的純正性與文本的客觀意義。戴震想要排除在歷史過程中所產生的語言與哲學的影響，返回儒家經典的「原意」。

Cheng-Zhu's doctrine of “particular principles (manifestations) subject to the universal principle” defines “empirical differentiations” in terms of metaphysical dichotomy which presupposes transcendental identity. That the universal principle is superior to particular principles (manifestations) means differentiations are subject to transcendental identity. Dai Zhen’s organic holism of Qi Theory, nonetheless, argues that the notion of particular principle as principle of individualization belonging to Ying and Yang, which can explain the empirical differentiations and is precisely the principle immanent to the becoming of Dao. This is what Dai Zhen calls “particular principle,” which presupposes an immanent metaphysical system. The distinction of “Universal Qi” and “particular principles” is not a dichotomy of metaphysical substance and empirical entities; for him, particular principles are the immanent principles of becoming of Universal Qi. Although Dai Zhen’s notion of particular principle emphasizes difference and historicity, his interpretative strategy bears traits of conservative archaism. He asserts that interpretations of Confucian classics must not mix up with Buddhism and Daoism. He emphasizes that interpretations of classics must be pure and objective; hence for him, to retrieve the “original meaning” of Confucian classics, it is necessary to expel the influences of language and philosophy that emerge in the historical process.