

THE UNCANNY AND FICTIONAL DREAMS

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I

Every reader of Dante's *inferno* will perhaps agree that the scene in Canto 33 where count Ugolino recounts the starvation to death of his children and himself in the "tower of hunger" vies well with the scene where the unfortunate lovers Francesca and Paolo appear in Canto 5 as the most moving episode of the book. The most apparent contributing factors to the emotional appeal of the episode are naturally the horror and pain inherent in the starvation itself and the narrative tour de force employed to convey such horror and pain. However, there is yet another important contributing factor which is generally overlooked, namely the use of an uncanny dream.

The episode begins, we remember, as the shade of Count Ugolino, who has been gnawing at the brain of his one-time associate Archbishop Ruggieri, interrupts his grisly act to tell the story of his imprisonment and gruesome death. He sums up the pain by way of an introduction:

You want met to renew a grief
so desperate that just the thought of it,
much less the telling, grips my heart with pain.¹

This sets the tone for the remainder of his account, which is not to dwell on his rage over being betrayed by his former associate but to convey the cruelty of the circumstances surrounding his death engineered by his betrayer.

The account is characterized by its fast tempo. After a brief reference to the circumstances of Ugolino's imprisonment, it goes directly to the description of an ominous dream:

Through a narrow slit of window high in that mew
(which is called the tower of hunger, after me,
and I'll not be the last to know that place)

I had watched moon after moon after moon go by,
when finally I dreamed the evil dream
which ripped away the veil that hid my future.
(Dante, p. 271)

The dream proper is composed of the subsequent three stanzas:

I dreamed of this one here as lord and huntsman,
pursuing the wolf and the wolf-cubs up the mountain
(which blocks the sight of Lucca from the Pisans)

with skinny bitches, well trained and obedient;
he had out front as leaders of the pack
Gualandi with Sismondi and Lanfranchi.

A short run, and the father with his sons
seemed to grow tired, and then I thought I saw
long fangs sunk deep into their sides, ripped open.
(Dante, pp. 271-72)

To a great degree the dream manages to convey a reasonably convincing "affect" (in the psychological sense of the term). It is characterized by the vividness of the images and the drama which can be explained as the projection of the dreamer's waking experiences (particularly the conscious or unconscious intimation he has of the fate awaiting him and his children). Typical of a dream experience, he identifies with the wolf (at least to the extent that he understands that it symbolizes him) but is also detached enough to be the observer of its horrible fate. Then, typical of one awaking from a strongly affecting dream, Count Ugolino uses the carry-over effects from the dream to interpret what he observes immediately after he wakes up (notice especially the sentence in the parentheses which is uncanny the way it is put):

When I awoke before the light of dawn,
I heard my children sobbing in their sleep
(You see they, too, were there) asking for bread.
(Dante, p. 272)

Ugolino's tendency to see the dream and its effects as shared is even more prominent in the next stanza:

And then they awoke. It was around the time
they usually brought our food to us. But now
each one of us was full of dread from dreaming.
(Dante, p. 272)

Actually, if we need to rationalize this stanza, we can consider that each one has his own dream, or that each one of the children is believed by the father to share his dream. However, the very suggestion of the dream as shared, even though it can be explained away, is "literarily" significant for it inevitably imparts a sense of the uncanny to the dream. But what seems most uncanny is the prompt fulfilment of the prophecy of the dream signaled by the sealing up of the tower as described in the stanza that follows:

then from below I heard them driving nails
into the dreadful tower's door; with that,
I stared in silence at my flesh and blood.
(Dante, p. 272)

(after this stanza, we remember, the poem goes on to describe very movingly how each of the prisoners drops dead.) Yet, just as one can rationalize why it is likely for Ugolino to have a foreboding dream at this critical moment of his life, the uncanny fulfilment of the dream's prophecy with such promptitude can also be rationalized as a matter of coincidence rather than supernatural machinations.

We can draw a few tentative points from our analysis of the presentation of Ugolino's dream. First of all, in order for it to be uncanny it has to be to some extent realistic, that is, in this particular dream, its strangeness can be rationalized. If a dream is utterly supernatural, it will become a fantasy and we will comprehend and evaluate it against a norm reserved for fantasy. Something becomes uncanny only when it is scrutinized against our logical, everyday norm. Second, the eerie effects produced by the presentation of, say, Ugolino's dream are by no means diminished by our rationalizations. This is a somewhat more complex problem, for the fact that Ugolino's dream appears to us as uncanny is owing to two different sources: presentation (for example, the choice of diction and the sequence of the stanzas play a role in the effect) and reality (that is, the mystique carried by dreams tends to impart the uncanny effect

to certain kinds of dream). What we need to point out briefly here is that if certain dreams (in life or in fiction) impress us as strange, mysterious, or ominous, our intellectual interpretation and reinterpretation of their deep meanings generally do not affect our initial impression of their surface strangeness as dreams. As far as Ugolino's dream is concerned, it sums up and anticipates vividly and concretely the terror of death in the offing in the haunting image of the skinny bitches mangling the wolves. That the dream is an "evil dream" and that it is powerful enough to rip away the "veil" that has beclouded the vision of Ugolino suggest something mysterious and sinister in the dream, and hence in the whole episode.

If the precondition for a fictional dream to generate the uncanny effect is for it to be to some extent realistic, the uncanny dream depends as much on our belief systems for its presentation as does the realistic dream. Clearly, we need to investigate what we believe to be "the uncanny," how it is produced, and how it is related to our beliefs about dreams. A tenable way to make explicit our beliefs is to examine the intellectual formulations of the beliefs. As written documents, intellectual formulations assume a physical existence. Besides, as articulations of our beliefs, they tend to be by far more systematic, clear and refined, and hence more accessible to our study. Even though they are systems of beliefs (or at best, versions of reality) and not *the* reality, each of them still commands our allegiance of varying degrees. As authoritative presences of sorts they are undeniably the basis for our perception, and representation, of uncanny dreams.

We are going to examine some important intellectual, especially psychologists', discourses on the uncanny and dreams. Obviously, the uncanny also derives from many other sources than dreams, and dreams are not always uncanny. However, as our study to be begun in the following sections will make abundantly clear, the uncanny and dreams are closely involved with each other. Many expert disquisitions on the uncanny are illustrated by using dreams as examples. Similarly, the expert expositions of dreams often directly or indirectly point up their uncanniness.

II

The uncanny feeling occurs fairly often in our daily life. For example, if same situations, things, or events keep recurring to such an extent that one recalls a sense of helplessness occasionally felt in dreams, one can then be regarded as having experienced an uncanny feeling. Freud provides the following example from his own experience:

Once, as I was walking through the deserted streets of a provincial town in Italy which was strange to me, on a hot summer afternoon, I found myself in a quarter the character of which could not long remain in doubt. Nothing but painted women were to be seen at the windows of the small houses, and I hastened to leave the narrow street at the next turning. But after having wandered about for a while without being directed, I suddenly found myself back in the same street, where my presence was now beginning to excite attention. I hurried away once more, but only to arrive yet a third time by devious paths in the same place. Now, however, a feeling overcame me which I can only describe as uncanny, and I was glad enough to abandon my exploratory walk and get straight back to the piazza I had left a short while before.²

Involuntary repetition, indeed, tends to impart an uncanny effect to what other-

wise would be completely innocent. We are often tempted to see coincidences of certain kinds as imbued with a secret meaning, and consequently we may sense something ominous and inevitable where we normally would think of "chance." Again, Freud provides an illustration:

For instance, we of course attach no importance to the event when we give up a coat and get a cloakroom ticket with the number, say, 62; or when we find that our cabin on board ship is numbered 62. But the impression is altered if two such events, each in itself indifferent, happen close together, if we come across the number 62 several times in a single day, or if we begin to notice that everything which has a number—addresses, hotel-rooms, compartments in railway-trains—always has the same one, or one which at least contains the same figures. We do feel this to be 'uncanny', and unless a man is utterly hardened and proof against the lure of superstition he will be tempted to ascribe a secret meaning to this obstinate recurrence of a number, taking it, perhaps, as an indication of the span of life allotted to him. ("The Uncanny," pp. 144-45)

To explain the uncanny phenomena in terms consistent with his overall psychological insights, Freud resorts to his famous idea of repression. The uncanny effect occurs, he argues, whenever the "familiar" that has been repressed recurs and asserts itself. The repressed in this connection falls into two principal categories, namely our infantile complexes and the remnants of our primitive beliefs. Ultimately his view on the uncanny is tied to his postulated principle of the repetition-compulsion, which, of course, is most fully expounded in his *Beyond the Pleasure-Principle*. Briefly, the repetition-compulsion is believed to exist in the unconscious and it is closely related to the instincts. The principle of the repetition-compulsion is more powerful than the pleasure principle, and it accounts for the demonic character in some aspects of the mind. Freud is of the opinion that "whatever reminds us of this inner *repetition-compulsion* is perceived as uncanny" ("The Uncanny," p. 145).

Two prominent infantile complexes are the castration-complex and the womb-complex, which we as adults have outgrown and banished into the unconscious. Freud's analysis of E. T. A. Hoffmann's "The Sandman" well illustrates his idea of how the recurrences of the repressed castration-complex accounts for the tale's prevailing uncanny effect. The recurrence of the repressed womb-complex, nonetheless, establishes an uncanny feeling akin to the sense of the *déjà vu*:

It often happens that male patients declare that they feel there is something uncanny about the female genital organs. This *unheimliche* place, however, is the entrance to the former *heim* [home] of all human beings, to the place where everyone dwelt once upon a time and in the beginning. There is a humorous saying: 'Love is home-sickness'; and whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to himself, still in the dream, 'this place is familiar to me, I have been there before', we may interpret the place as being his mother's genitals or her body. ("The Uncanny," pp. 152-53)

However, important as the infantile complexes are in generating the uncanny feeling, the uncanny experiences in real life thus caused are relatively rare. Most cases of the uncanny in real life, according to Freud, result from the recurrence of the repressed primitive beliefs. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud expounds the "omnipotence of thought" (that is, our "fantasy" of the mental power to think things into happening or

existing) against the background of the evolutionary human consciousness:

If we accept the evolution of man's conceptions of the universe mentioned above, according to which the animistic phase is succeeded by the *religious*, and this in turn by the *scientific*, we have no difficulty in following the fortunes of the "omnipotence of thought" through all these phases. In the animistic stage man ascribes omnipotence to himself; in the religious he has ceded it to the gods, but without seriously giving it up, for he reserves to himself the right to control the gods by influencing them in some way or other in the interest of his wishes. In the scientific attitude towards life there is no longer any room for man's omnipotence; he has acknowledged his smallness and has submitted to death as to all other natural necessities in a spirit of resignation. Nevertheless, in our reliance upon the power of human spirit which copes with the laws of reality, there still lives on a fragment of this primitive belief in the omnipotence of thought.³

Nowadays we no longer believe, as our primitive forefathers did, in the omnipotence of thought, instantaneous wish-fulfillments, the return of the dead, or the magical power in general. We, in our scientific age, have outgrown such ways of thinking. However, we are never entirely sure of our new ways of thinking. The vestiges of our old beliefs still lurk in the unconscious, ready to seize upon any opportunity to reassert themselves. As soon as something happens in our lives that seem to confirm our banished old beliefs, we have a sense of the uncanny. This, for example, accounts for the almost supernatural awe we may feel when we come across a certain number--innocent in itself several times in a day.

It is noteworthy that in his view of the psychological basis for the uncanny Freud demonstrates a strong strain of positivism and progressivism. Despite his pronounced value neutrality, both infantile complexes and primitive beliefs are in effect regarded as something less than desirable and something best to be repressed or surmounted. To Freud, infantile complexes and primitive beliefs, as a matter of fact, are closely related: "Finally, we must not let our predilection for smooth solution and lucid exposition blind us to the fact that these two classes of uncanny experience are not always sharply distinguishable. When we consider that primitive beliefs are most intimately connected with infantile complexes, and are, in fact, based upon them, we shall not be greatly astonished to find the distinction often rather a hazy one" ("The Uncanny," p. 157). Obviously, in Freud's thinking, what is in common between infantile complexes and primitive beliefs is that they both partake of immaturity. Consequently, since the uncanny feeling is triggered by the recurrence of either infantile complexes or primitive beliefs, it is symptomatic of a regression to the immature state.

As far as we are concerned, Freud's exposition on the uncanny, astute as it is, at best points to a version of reality and not necessarily the reality. C. G. Jung's view on the uncanny, for example, remarkably differs from that of Freud's. Since Jung does not build his theory on the assumption of repression and his overall theoretical outlook is free from scientific progressivism, his attitude toward the uncanny is generally sympathetic.

The difference between Jung and Freud begins where they view the unconscious. Freud sees the unconscious as the locale where whatever is banished from the conscious is collected; submerged in the unconscious are what we are ashamed of (all those infantile complexes) and what cause us too much pain to be conscious of (the

traumatic experiences we want to forget). Instead of regarding the unconscious as a dumping-ground, Jung believes that as the conscious has just the enough room for storing whatever is immediately relevant to our daily functioning for survival, lots of our experiences have to be kept in the unconscious. At proper times, what is kept in the unconscious may force its way into our conscious. What further differentiates the two psychologists is that Jung sees the unconscious as composed of two kinds. In addition to Freud's—we may call it personal unconscious, he posits the existence of the collective unconscious which keeps our racial memory and primordial experiences. The collective unconscious has the positive function of maintaining the psychic equilibrium. Thus, in clear contrast to Freud's negative view of the "omnipotence of thought" of the animistic phase, Jung is of the opinion that in our scientific age our racial experiences in the collective unconscious may perform the task of balancing our rational aridity.

According to Jung, whenever we are able to confront the collective unconscious we sense the uncanny. We are brought face to face with the collective unconscious, and hence the uncanny, chiefly through the agency of a special kind of artistic works which Jung calls "visionary," to be distinguished from "psychological." Take literary works for example. Most existent literary works are psychological. They derive their materials from conscious human experience and neither their subjects nor their artistic expressions are beyond the pale of psychological intelligibility. They depict the foreground of life: "Even the basic experiences themselves, though non-rational, have nothing strange about them; on the contrary, they are that which has been known from the beginning of time—passion and its fated outcome, man's subjection to the turns of destiny, eternal nature with its beauty and its horror."⁴ The visionary literature, on the contrary, is characterized by a compelling fascination that grips us in spite of its apparent lack of psychological intelligibility. In a hieratic language reminiscent of Nietzsche, Jung tries to convey the uncanny power inherent in the visionary literature:

The experience that furnishes the material for artistic expression is no longer familiar. It is a strange something that derives its existence from the hinterland of man's mind that suggests the abyss of time separating us from pre-human ages, or evokes a super-human world of contrasting light and darkness. It is a primordial experience which surpasses man's understanding, and to which his is therefore in danger of succumbing. The value and the force of the experience are given by its enormity. It arises from timeless depths; it is foreign and cold, many-sided, demonic, and grotesque. A grimly ridiculous sample of the eternal chaos—a *crimen laesae majestatis humanae* ['treason against humanity'], to use Nietzsche's words—it bursts asunder our human standards of value and of aesthetic form. The disturbing vision of monstrous and meaningless happenings that in every way exceed the grasp of human feeling and comprehension makes quite other demands upon the powers of the artist than do the experiences of the foreground of life. (Jung in Lodge, p. 178)

Jung makes no distinction between the uncanny in life and in literature. In fact, literature is an important instrument by which the uncanny in life is brought about. Jung is vivid in giving his version of the source of the uncanny, but he refrains from giving a tenable account of the features of a literary work capable of effecting the uncanny. In this connection Freud is more concrete and hence easier to follow. Above all, even though Freud frequently resorts to literary works in his exposition on the uncanny (for example, his use of Hoffmann's "The Sandman"), he cautions against

confusing the uncanny in life with the uncanny in literature.

Generally speaking, what appears as uncanny in literature will remain uncanny if it should appear in life. But the converse is not necessarily true. Here the basic premises of the literary work—that is, the author's intention, the tone of the work, the genre it belongs to—become important. A fairy tale never conveys the uncanny effect, but should the events in the tale take place in life they certainly will strike one as uncanny. Freud is persuasive when he argues that the uncanny in literature results from the imitation and magnification of the uncanny in life:

The situation is altered as soon as the writer pretends to move in the world of common reality. In this case he accepts all the conditions operating to produce uncanny feelings in real life; and everything that would have an uncanny effect in reality has it in his story. But in this case, too, he can increase his effect and multiply it far beyond what could happen in reality, by bringing about events which never or very rarely happen in fact. He takes advantage, as it were, of our supposedly surmounted superstitiousness; he deceives us into thinking that he is giving us the sober truth, and then after all oversteps the bounds of possibility. We react to his inventions as we should have reacted to real experiences; by the time we have seen through his trick it is already too late and the author has achieved his object. . . . (“The Uncanny,” p. 159)

Freud's points here are a refinement of Jentsch's observation concerning Hoffmann, which he has earlier quoted:

In telling a story, one of the most successful devices for easily creating uncanny effects is to leave the reader in uncertainty whether a particular figure in the story is a human being or an automation; and to do it in such a way that his attention is not directly focussed upon his uncertainty, so that he may not be urged to go into the matter and clear it up immediately, since that, as we have said, would quickly dissipate the peculiar emotional effect of the thing. Hoffmann has repeatedly employed this psychological artifices with success in his fantastic narratives. (“The Uncanny,” p. 132)

Thus we can sum up the uncanny in literature as follows: The work persuades us to maintain a logical, normal outlook, against which something that will normally be judged as impossible, absurd, or grotesque is so presented as to make us unable to exercise our normal judgement out of hand; the very uncertainty exudes a compelling fascination of an extraordinary force. Our summary is very similar to Tzvetan Todorov's observation on the genre of the uncanny: “In works that belong to this genre, events are related which may be readily accounted for by the laws of reason, but which are, in one way or another, incredible, extraordinary, shockingly singular, disturbing or unexpected, and which thereby provoke in the character and in the reader a reaction similar to that which works of the fantastic have made familiar.”⁵ In other words, in an uncanny work we typically experience the effacing of the distinction between the real and the imagined, the rational and the irrational, the conscious and the unconscious, the supernatural and the ordinary, which shocks us into the uneasy feeling that the world is perhaps not as comfortably “prosaic” as our rational knowledge has assured us.

In short, when a literary work conveys the uncanny effect, its narrative is predictably “dream-like,” but the story narrated is expected to be accepted as an “actuality.” The literary world thus created aptly fits Novalis' remark: “The world becomes the

dream, and the dream becomes the world.”⁶

If the uncanny in the literary work tends to be characterized in terms of the work’s dream-like quality, the dream in real life is often noted for its uncanny features. This last point is what we want to investigate in the following section.

III

The following observation on dreams by Paul Valery well sums up one significant paradox inherent in dreams:

In any case, our memories of dreams teach us, by frequent and common experience, that our consciousness can be invaded, filled, entirely absorbed by the production of an existence in which objects and beings seem the same as those in the waking state; but their meanings, relationships, modes of variation and of substitution are quite different and doubtless represent, like symbols or allegories, the immediate fluctuations of our *general* sensibility uncontrolled by the sensitivities of our *specialized* senses.⁷

The paradox is twofold. First, to the dreamer a dream has the fullness of a real existence, but apparently a dream lacks the requisite physicality we associate with a real existence. No matter how exciting the events in the dream are, they leave no traces in the physical world to mark the fact they once “happened.” Second, what appears to the dreamer, in the dream, as logical, reasonable, intelligible, and hence as a real existence, often becomes a jumble of confusions and contradictions upon his waking. But there is a catch here. Even if the dream becomes opaque, he normally has a strong sense that it means something relevant to him.

It is exactly because of this kind of paradox, dreams appear as something both intimate and alien, easily comprehensible and mysterious, ordinary and awe-inspiring. Thus in *The Symbolism of the Dream* Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert calls the language of dreams a “hieroglyphic language,” that is, a language capable of expressing the profundities from the depths of the soul:

The series of events in our lives seem to be joined approximately according to a similar association of ideas of fate, as the pictures in the dream; in other words, the series of events that have occurred and are occurring inside and outside of us, the inner theoretical principle of which we remain unaware, speaks the same language as our soul in a dream. Therefore, as soon as our mind speaks in dream language, it is able to make combinations that would not occur to us when awake; it cleverly combines the today with the yesterday, the fate of distant years in the future with the past; and when the future occurs we see that it was frequently accurately predicted. Dreams are a way of reckoning and combining that you and I do not understand; a higher kind of algebra, briefer and easier than ours, which only the hidden poet knows how to manipulate in his mind.⁸

Even though Schubert’s remark is clearly pre-Freudian in its employment of such “unscientific” terms as “soul” and “fate,” it actually anticipates the modern psychological insights into dreams, particularly in its suggestions of the dream logic and the predicting function of dreams.

Schubert’s remark encapsulates the traditional ideas of the mystique, and hence the uncanniness, of dreams. Despite terminological differences, modern psychological views of dreams are not in substance markedly different from Schubert’s (indeed one

can, with some qualifications, substitute the unconscious for the "soul"). Modern scientific studies of dreams, as we will show, reinforce and sharpen our awareness of the uncanniness of dreams instead of diminishing it. The Jungian school's interpretations of dreams, in particular, support and strengthen the mystique we intuitively feel about dreams, regardless of whether the emphasis is on the symbolic function of dreams, the dreams' influence on daily life, or the texture of dreams.

The uncanniness of a dream has much to do with its function as a "symbol." The psychological sense of "symbol" is put by Jung as follows: "Thus a word or image is symbolic when it implies something more than its obvious and immediate meaning. It has a wider 'unconscious' aspect that is never precisely defined or fully explained. Nor can one hope to define or explain it. As the mind explores the symbol, it is led to ideas that lie beyond the grasp of reason."⁹ A dream is a symbol that man unconsciously and spontaneously produces so as to represent concepts lying beyond the range of human comprehension. A dream typically gets its material from the unconscious. The subliminal material can comprise "all urges, impulses, and intentions: all perceptions and intuitions; all rational or irrational thoughts, conclusions, inductions, deductions, and premises; and all varieties of feeling" ("Approach to the Unconscious," p. 37).

The subliminal material can be classified into two types: the inherent (such as the "anima," our racial memory, etc.) and the acquired (the unconscious aspect of our perception). We will first of all examine a documented dream prompted by the working of the "anima," that is, the female element in every male; the illustration is made by Jung. A patient of Jung's dreamed of a drunken and unkempt vulgar woman. In the dream she seemed to be his wife even though in real life his wife was a completely different kind of woman. On the surface of it the dream then appeared to be a nonsensical dream. But since a dream is by definition a "symbol," it is expected to carry some meaning, to convey something. What was the dreamer's unconscious trying to tell him? The following is Jung's interpretation of the dream:

In the Middle Ages, long before the physiologists demonstrated that by reason of our glandular structure there are both male and female elements in all of us, it was said that "every man carries a woman within himself." It is this female element in every male that I have called the "anima." This "feminine" aspect is essentially a certain inferior kind of relatedness to the surroundings, and particularly to women, which is kept carefully concealed from others as well as from oneself. In other words, though an individual's visible personality may seem quite normal, he may well be concealing from others or even from himself the deplorable condition of "the woman within."

That was the case with this particular patient: His female side was not nice. His dream was actually saying to him: "You are in some respects behaving like a degenerate female," and thus gave him an appropriate shock. (An example of this kind, of course, must not be taken as evidence that the unconscious is concerned with "moral" injunctions. The dream was not telling the patient to "behave better," but was simply trying to balance the lopsided nature of his conscious mind, which was maintaining the fiction that he was a perfect gentleman throughout.) ("Approach the Unconscious," p. 31)

Now we come to what we call the acquired subliminal material. Here we are dealing with the unconscious aspects of our perception of reality. In the first place, whenever we react to real phenomena, our sense perceptions are somehow translated from the

realm of reality into that of the mind. The physical or sensory events become psychic events, which carry an indefinite number of unknowable factors. Those unknowable factors remain and work in the unconscious. Second, since our conscious perception is unable to take note of all the aspects of events, those aspects which have escaped our conscious perception may be absorbed subliminally. We are aware of them only when they well up from the unconscious. The unconscious is revealed to us most commonly in the form of dreams. In fact, it was the study of dreams that led psychologists to posit the existence of the unconscious. But the unconscious aspects of our perception can also be illustrated by phenomena other than dreams. Again we can conveniently use an example given by Jung concerning a coincidence in Nietzsche's *Thus Spake Zarathustra*:

I myself found a fascinating example of this in Nietzsche's book *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, where the author reproduces almost word for word an incident reported in a ship's log for the year 1686. By sheer chance I had read this seaman's yarn in a book published about 1835 (half a century before Nietzsche wrote); and when I found the similar passage in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, I was struck by its peculiar style, which was different from Nietzsche's usual language. I was convinced that Nietzsche must also have seen the old book, though he made no reference to it. I wrote to his sister, who was still alive, and she confirmed that she and her brother had in fact read the book together when he was 11 years old. I think, from the context, it is inconceivable that Nietzsche had any idea that he was plagiarizing this story. I believe that fifty years later it had unexpectedly slipped into focus in his conscious mind. ("Approach the Unconscious," p. 37)

If Jung's interpretation of the circumstances surrounding Nietzsche's passage in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* is correct, it is then evident that the way the unconscious works can turn out to be literally uncanny. What had been dormant in the unconscious for decades could spontaneously crop up to influence one's writing. Indeed, spontaneity is an important characteristic of the unconscious and is most prominent in dreams. Dreams show unconscious contents which either have lost their original relationship with the consciousness or never have had any relationship with the consciousness. It may reveal some aspects of the personality of the dreamer unknown to him until then; it means that the unconscious can keep track of the development of the dreamer's personality in the course of time. All this points to the fact that "there is an autonomous factor at work in dreams which has great freedom in portraying facts of the past, present and future, and is capable of showing things the conscious mind cannot possibly know or may have forgotten completely."¹⁰

The autonomous factor in dreams accounts for the predicting capabilities of dreams. That dreams can predict has frequently been noticed in literature and it no doubt adds to the mystique of dreams. There are nevertheless convincing psychological explanations for it: "Many crises in our lives have a long unconscious history. We move toward them step by step, unaware of the dangers that are accumulating. But what we consciously fail to see is frequently perceived by our unconscious, which can pass the information on through dreams" ("Approach the Unconscious," p. 51). That a dream can predict is tied to its general function of restoring our psychological balance. One who has personality deficiencies tends to have compensatory dreams. Such dreams in fact warn him of the dangers in his present course of life. Thus, in a roundabout way, dreams predict by warning, as illustrated by a case involving the death of one of

Jung's clients:

I remember the case of a man who was inextricably involved in a number of shady affairs. He developed an almost morbid passion for dangerous mountain climbing, as a sort of compensation. He was seeking "to get above himself." In a dream one night, he saw himself stepping off the summit of a high mountain into empty space. When he told me his dream, I instantly saw his danger and tried to emphasize the warning and persuade him to restrain himself. I even told him that the dream foreshadowed his death in a mountain accident. It was in vain. Six months later he "stepped off into space." A mountain guide watched him and a friend letting themselves down on a rope in a difficult place. The friend had found a temporary foothold on a ledge, and the dreamer was following him down. Suddenly he let go of the rope, according to the guide, "as if he were jumping into the air." He fell upon his friend, and both went down and were killed. ("Approach the Unconscious," p. 50)

The very idea that dreams can anticipate future developments gives a suggestion of the uncanny. In case there should be some coincidence in timing added to the predictive accuracy, a dream will appear decidedly uncanny. A case in point is a dream observed by Jung and reported by Carl A. Meir; the dreamer was a middle-aged American woman:

This dream came with surprising suddenness, its meaning only became clear later. The dreamer was alone in a house, it was evening and she began to close all the windows. Then she went to lock the back porch door, but there was no lock to the door, so she tried to push pieces of furniture against the door in order to block it against intruders. The night grew darker and darker and more and more uncanny. Suddenly the back porch door was flung open and a black sphere came in and move forward until it had penetrated her body. The house was the patient's aunt's house in America. She had visited her aunt in that house more than twenty years before the dream. The family was completely disrupted because of a conflict between its various members, especially with the aunt. The patient had not heard anything about the aunt for twenty years. The striking fact was that about ten days after the dream the patient received a letter from America informing her that the aunt had died at exactly the time of this dream. (Meir, p. 55)

The American woman's dream as reported by Meir, furthermore, is an example par excellence of the dream texture. The images are eerily vivid. Narratively, it lacks logical coherence. It has a powerful emotional appeal (to such an extent that it is disturbing) but it lacks immediate psychological intelligibility. All this, in effect, adds to the uncanny effect of the dream. The uncanniness of dreams is partly owing to the dream texture, which is diametrically different from our modes of ordering reality in waking life. In dreams images are mixed, contradictory, and often absurd. Our normal sense of time is lost. Commonplaces assume strong psychic significance. Why is the dream texture as it is? Consistent with his theory of repression, Freud argues that dreams adopt deliberate disguises so as to be acceptable to the censor. Jung takes another view. To him the language of dreams is very similar to poetic language: "The images produced in dreams are much more picturesque and vivid than the concepts and experiences that are their waking counterparts. One of the reasons for this is that, in a dream, such concepts can express their unconscious meaning. In our conscious thoughts, we restrain ourselves within the limits of rational statements -state-

ments that are much less colorful because we have stripped them of most of their psychic associations" ("Approach the Unconscious," p. 43).

If psychologists disagree as to the function of the peculiar texture of dreams, they generally agree that dreams have the following features which contribute to the peculiarity of their texture: contamination, condensation, multiplication, and concretization.¹¹ Contamination happens when something in a dream, which is normally insignificant, becomes emotionally disturbing to the dreamer owing to the fact that it stirs up his complexes. In the case of condensation, a character in a dream may appear to the dreamer simultaneously as her husband, neighbor, and dentist. In contrast to condensation, multiplication means that in a dream the same dream figure appears in large numbers. Concretization refers to the tendency of dreams to turn abstract concepts and psychological inner facts into concrete images and dramas.

In conclusion, dreams appear to us in our waking lives as senseless but also pregnant with meaning, as illogical but with its own concealed purposiveness, as absurd but also emotionally fascinating. As a mode of discourse beyond the pale of reason, dreams are, in a sense, inherently uncanny. Lionel Trilling's discussion of Freud well sums up the fact that dreams are illogical, vivid, and purposive:

Freud showed too how the mind, in one of its parts, could work without logic, yet not without that directing purpose, that control of intent from which, perhaps it might be said, logic springs. For the unconscious mind works without the syntactical conjunctions which are logic's essence. It recognizes no *because*, no *therefore*, no *but*; such ideas as similarity, agreement and community, for example, are expressed in dreams imagistically by compressing the elements into a unity. The unconscious mind in its struggle with the conscious always turns from the general to the concrete and finds the tangible trifle more congenial than the large abstraction. Freud discovered in the very organization of the mind those mechanisms by which art makes its effects, such devices as the condensations of meanings and the displacement of accent.¹²

IV

Our investigations into the phenomena of the uncanny and dreams ready us for advancing some observations apropos of fictional dreams and the uncanny. We argue that owing to the intrinsic features of dreams—real or imagined—fictional dreams can be effectively used to impart an uncanny atmosphere to the literary universe. On the contrary, if no dreams are employed in a story but the story is uncanny, it is almost predictable that the uncanny effect derives from the dream-like qualities that characterize the presentation of the story. In both cases, the literary universe is characterized by the collapse of the boundaries between the real and the imagined, the rational and the irrational, the conscious and the unconscious, the supernatural and the ordinary.

In this connection we want to point out that Lockwood's dream of the homecoming of Catherine is a perfect example of the uncanny dream. The dream, as our previous analysis has established, is realistic, a point reinforced by our study of dreams in this chapter. The dream is an excellent illustration of "concretization" at work. The psychological factors—the impressions Lockwood has had of *Wuthering Heights* through his interactions with its inhabitants, his exposure to the landscape, and his reading of Catherine's journals—are translated into concrete and vivid images and

dramas of tremendous emotional appeal resonant with the unconscious undertone. But, above all, the dream is “true.” The haunting image of Catherine gripping the arm of Lockwood with her ice-cold hand and importuning him to allow her in says a lot. It accurately indicates her despair, melancholy, stubbornness. More important, it suggests to Lockwood that she is long deceased but still maintains a diabolical sway over the place. However, more than anything else, it provokes a strong sense of fear and, concomitantly, cruelty. An indication of the uncanny effect of the dream is the emotional extremity it stirs up in Lockwood, and the readers too. When Lockwood, who is normally gentle to the point of being vacuous, reacts in the dream with great cruelty under the pressure of fright, he seems able to make us feel identified with him. All in all, the dream is a projection of the “real world” of *Wuthering Heights*, and it is just as “real” as the real world of *Wuthering Heights* in its emotional appeal, its capability to reflect the essences of *Wuthering Heights*, and its evil power of contamination. In this sense the dream and the waking life of *Wuthering Heights* are continuous with each other and it is therefore uncanny.

We have attempted to establish Lockwood’s dream as a realistic dream that generates an uncanny effect. In the course of our analysis we have made use of psychological insights. However, we are aware throughout that a dream like Lockwood’s is distinct from a real-life dream, and its uncanniness is never identical with the uncanny in life. We remember Freud’s argument that the uncanny in life is different from the uncanny in literature. Moreover, we want to repeat, a realistic fictional dream is different from a dream in life. Earlier, we have pointed out that owing to the very nature of literary works, a fictional dream has to be presented as structurally complete and self-evident in meaning. In life, dreams are rarely so self-contained. Psychologists often find it impossible to analyze a single dream satisfactorily. They have noticed that dreams have a way of circumambulating about a problem and so it is necessary to study a series of dreams of the same dreamer:

There are important reasons for this: A series of dreams is usually not a sequence where one dream is the result or product of a preceding one, in such a way that A of necessity produces B and B of necessity produces C, and so on. But the arrangement in a series—if there is any—is a concentric one; the various single dreams of a series deal with one and the same central problem and thus group themselves around this problem. Moreover, a series of dreams give a number of different aspects of one and the same situation in such a way that one dream gives one aspect and another dream another, so that through the series the situation becomes clear. Under analytical conditions the interpretation of dream A may have been quite good and still not absolutely satisfactory or convincing. Then dream B may well add whatever has been overlooked in the interpretation of dream A and thus make up for the lack of completeness. (Meir, p. 55)

As Lockwood’s dream is clearly not to be confused with a dream in life, when, in places, we discuss it in psychological terms, it simply means that its presentation makes use of real-world beliefs about dreams so as to appear effectively realistic and uncanny. If Lockwood’s dream threatens to cause some confusion between the “real” and the “realistic,” it is because it stands at the polar extreme of realistic fictional dreams. Ugolino’s dream in *Inferno*, on the contrary, will conceivably be less problematic. We intuitively regard the dream as less likely to occur in life, that is, it is not as realistic as Lockwood’s dream. The difference lies in presentation. First, it has to do with the

degree of elaboration on the circumstances of dreams. In *Wuthering Heights* much space has been devoted to the justification and explanation of why Lockwood should dream as he does. The same can not be said of Ugolino's dream. Second, the meaning (or significance) of Lockwood's dream is deliberately presented as diffusive as the meanings of dreams usually are, but Ugolino's dream unambiguously points to one fact, namely his imminent starvation to death. However, even if Ugolino's dream is less realistic, it is still realistic enough to impress us with a decidedly uncanny effect. Even though the description of the circumstances leading to the dream is admittedly scant, we at least have no reason to refute the possibility that the general harshness of his prison life conveys to Ugolino an intimation of starvation being used as an ultimate punishment. His unconscious then dramatizes the anxiety in the form of a dream, and the dream then functions to anticipate a future happening. On the basis of this degree of realism, the dream exudes uncanniness in its vividly imagistic (and hence emotionally fascinating) presentation of the hungry hounds biting into the wolf and wolf-cubs and, most importantly, in its predictive accuracy. The description of the dream's fulfilment follows close behind the description of the dream, which has a stirring effect of a literary nature. Thus the uncanny feeling issuing from the predictive accuracy coincides with a more general literary effect and is apparently thereby strengthened.

Ugolino's dream, more than Lockwood's dream, unequivocally shows the "literariness" of uncanny fictional dreams, precisely because it is less realistic. In fact, the uncanny effect of some fictional dreams is so overwhelmingly the result of literary manipulation that its connection to our real-world beliefs of dreams may be less obvious. A case in point is the dream Bard Bracy has in Part II of "Christabel."

From the inception "Christabel" strikes one as eerie and ominous, which gains in intensity after the title character meets at her prayer in the dark wood the strange woman Geraldine and takes her home. A kind of moral ambiguity, a strange mixture of fascination and threat, characterizes the relationship developed between the two women thereafter. The chamber scene toward the end of Part I exemplifies the inexpressible threat and ambiguity; here, lying in bed, Christabel is too excited to go to sleep and what happens is as follows:

So half-way from the bed she rose,
 And on her elbow did recline
 To look at the lady Geraldine.
 Beneath the lamp the lady bowed,
 And slowly rolled her eyes around;
 Then drawing her breath aloud,
 Like one that shuddered, she unbound
 The cincture from beneath her breast:
 Her silken robe, and inner vest,
 Dropt to her feet, and full in view,
 Behold! her bosom and half her side
 A sight to dream of, not to tell!
 O shield her! shield sweet Christabel!

Yet Geraldine nor speaks no stirs;
 Ah! what a stricken look was hers!

Deep from within she seems half-way
 To lift some weight with sick assay,
 And eyes the maid and seeks delay;
 Then suddenly, as one defied,
 Collects herself in scorn and pride,
 And lay down by the Maiden's side!—
 And in her arms the maid she took,
 Ah wel-a-day!
 And with low voice and doleful look
 Theses words did say:
 "In the touch of this bosom there worketh a spell,
 Which is lord of thy utterance, Christabel!
 Thou knowest to-night, and wilt know to-morrow,
 This mark of my shame, this seal of my sorrow;
 But vainly thou warrest,
 For this is alone in
 Their power to declare,
 That in the dim forest
 Thou heard'st a low moaning.¹³

In Part II, Christabel introduces Geraldine to her father Sir Leoline. The old man is visibly attracted by the strange woman. After Geraldine confesses that she is the daughter of Roland de Vaux, Sir Leoline's friend-turned-enemy, the old man is eager to renew his friendship with Roland de Vaux. Consequently he orders his retainer Bard Bracy to go to Roland de Vaux and rekindle the friendship between them. However, Bracy is reluctant to go because of an evil dream of the previous night:

Yet might I gain a boon of thee,
 This day my journey should not be,
 So strange a dream hath come to me,
 That I had vowed with music loud
 To clear yon wood from thing unblest,
 Warned by a vision in my rest!
 For in my sleep I saw that dove,
 That gentle bird, whom thou dost love,
 And call'st by thy own daughter's name—
 Sir Leoline! I saw the same
 Fluttering, and uttering fearful moan,
 Among the green herbs in the forest alone,
 Which when I saw and when I heard,
 I wonder'd what might ail the bird;
 For nothing near it could I see,
 Save the grass and green herbs underneath the old tree.

And in my dream methought I went to search out what might there be found
 And what the sweet bird's trouble meant,
 That thus lay fluttering on the ground.
 I went and peered, and could descry
 No cause for her distressful cry;
 But yet for her dear lady's sake

I stooped, methought, the dove to take,
 When lo! I saw a bright green snake
 Coiled around its wings and neck.
 Green as the herbs on which it couched,
 Close by the dove's its head it crouched;
 And with the dove it heaves and stirs,
 Swelling its neck as she swelled hers!
 I woke; it was the midnight hour. . . .
 (Perkins, p. 420)

Realistically speaking, Bracy's dream is an utterly improbable dream. As Geraldine was unknown to Bracy, to say nothing of what went on between the two women, until well after his dream occurs, the dream lacks a realistic basis for it to take place. In this sense the dream is "supernatural." However, if it is supernatural, it is no more so than the waking experiences depicted throughout the poem. There is some paradox here. As soon as we accept the supernatural as the norm for this particular literary universe, the dream qua dream assumes some realism. It is a concretization of all the threat, fascination, and moral ambiguity that characterize the interactions between Christabel and Geraldine, particularly as exemplified by the chamber scene. It is interesting to point out that what is already quite vividly and concretely presented in the chamber scene becomes even more so when the two women, in accordance with the dream logic, assume the identities of a dove and a snake. We can perhaps conclude that even though the uncanny effect of Bracy's dream largely results from literary manipulation and is not remarkably different from the overall uncanniness of the poem, the dream qua dream does increase the uncanny effect.

The involved relationship between the uncanny, literary manipulation, and the associations going with dreams can be illustrated by the depiction of how elusively, fleetingly, but certainly with significance, the two women react to Bracy's account of his dream:

A snake's small eye blinks dull and shy;
 And the lady's eyes they shrunk in her head,
 Each shrunk up to a serpent's eye,
 And with somewhat of malice, and more of dread,
 At Christabel she looked askance!
 One moment—and the sight was fled!
 But Christabel in dizzy trance
 Stumbling in the unsteady ground
 Shuddered aloud, with a hissing sound;
 And Geraldine again turned round,
 And like a thing, that sought relief,
 Full of wonder and full of grief,
 She rolled her large bright eyes divine
 Wildly on Sir Leoline. (Perkins, p. 421)

To describe Geraldine's eyes as momentarily turning serpentine is of course a literary decision, for there is no compelling reason why they should appear so except to continue the image of the snake brought up in Bracy's dream. However, the literary decision makes Bracy's dream become, in a sense, a dream that accurately anticipates a

future happening. The dream thus gains in its uncanniness.

V

So far we have been studying the uncanny effects emanating from fictional dreams that have been unambiguously marked off in the texts as dreams. The nature of dreams being such, there are literary works that exploit the potentials of dreams by establishing the uncanny effect not so much by presenting dreams for their interior uncanniness but by other means. Typically, an uncanny effect is produced when a literary work leaves us uncertain as to whether it is presenting a dream or not. Another typical means of producing the uncanny effect is by presenting waking experiences in such a way that they assume the character of dreams. In either case, the uncanny effect derives from the fact that the real and the fantastic are treated as if they were on the same plane. E. T. A. Hoffmann's professed masterpiece, "The Golden Pot," provides superb illustrations of both cases.

The subtitle for Hoffmann's story written in 1812 is "A Modern Fairy Tale." There is of course a touch of irony in branding the story a fairy tale, even though it is rife with the fantastic elements. Far from being an innocuous fairy tale, this modern "fairy tale" intentionally provokes a sense of fascination and terror, in short, the uncanny, as pointed out by the narrator:

Gentle reader, make an effort while you are in the fairy region full of glorious marvels, where both the highest rapture and deepest horror may be evoked, where the earnest goddess herself lifts her veil so that we think we see her face, but a smile often glimmers beneath her glance, a playful, teasing smile that enchants us just as that of a mother playing with her dearest children. While you are in this region that is revealed to us in dreams at least, try, gentle reader, to recognize the familiar shapes which hover around you in the ordinary world. Then you will discover that this glorious kingdom is much closer to you than you ever imagined. It is this kingdom which I now strive with all my heart to reveal to you through the extraordinary story of Anselmus.¹⁴

The seventh vigil of the story, which describes the night adventure of Veronica, well illustrates how Hoffmann manages to make the marvelous and the prosaic merge. Earlier in the story, infatuated with the story's protagonist Anselmus, Veronica has gone to seek help from an old fortune-teller (who turns out to be her old nurse Liese). Old Liese makes Veronica agree to see her again on the night of the equinox and promises to offer her help at that time. When the seventh vigil begins it is the night of the equinox. Even though a rain storm is raging, Veronica's heart is filled with courage and hope as she sets out to see old Liese. Up to this point in the vigil what is presented is a prosaic everyday world. However, as soon as Veronica meets the old woman, we are confronted with a strange world, and the strangeness increases with the progress of the story.

When Veronica meets old Liese, the old woman unaccountably turns out to be a witch. Even though we are still ignorant of what they are going to do, a suggestion of mystery, even evil, about their prospective undertaking is evident in the following description:

"Now we will go and do what is proper to do and thrives in the night, which is favorable to

our work." Thus speaking, the crone seized the shivering Veronica with her cold hand and gave her the heavy basket to carry while she herself took out a little cauldron, a three-legged iron stand, and a spade. By the time they reached the open field, the rain had stopped, but the wind had grown stronger. It howled all about them with a thousand voices. A horrible, heart-piercing wailing seemed to resound from the black clouds which rolled together in their speedy flight and veiled everything in the world in densest darkness. (Hoffmann, p. 53)

Now that the dominating tone of mystery is set, what is commonplace can easily be depicted as full of extraordinary significance. The line between the ordinary and the marvelous is demolished. For example, the light in a cat's eyes and the wails of the cat are presented as though they were something mysterious and frightening; and in its particular context the presentation seems convincing:

But the hag quickly stepped forward and in a shrill harsh voice cried, "Light! Light, my boy!" Then blue gleams quivered and sputtered before them like forked lightning, and Veronica saw that the sparks were coming from the cat and were leaping forward to light the way while his doleful and ghastly wails punctuated the momentary pauses of the storm. Veronica's heart almost stopped beating. It was as if icy talons were ripping into her soul; but, with enormous effort, she composed herself and, pressing closer to the old hag, said, "It must all be done, come what may!" (Hoffmann, pp. 53-54)

When the story proceeds to the part where the practice of witchery is vividly described, the writer subtly, but unmistakably, arouses in us a sense of uncertainty. He changes the narrative perspective. The narrator addresses the reader, wishing that he had been travelling to Dresden on that night so as to witness the torment Veronica goes through, and perhaps to manage to rescue her. It is in such a narrative context that the following vignette of the witch's work is put:

Now you can clearly see the dainty, gentle child who, in her thin white night dress, kneels by the cauldron. Her braids have been untied by the storm, and her long, chestnut brown hair flies freely in the wind. Her angelic face hovers in the dazzling light cast by the flickering flame under the trivet, but in the icy terror which has overcome it, the face is as stiff and white as death; and you realize her fear, her complete horror, from the eyebrows which are drawn up, and from the mouth, vainly opened to emit the shriek of anguish that cannot find its way from a heart oppressed with indescribable torment. She holds her soft, small hands aloft; they are pressed together convulsively as if in prayer to her guardian angel to spare her from the monsters of Hell, which, obedient to this all-powerful spell, are about to appear. She kneels there, as still as a marble statue. Opposite her, cowering on the ground, is a tall, shriveled, copper-colored crone with a peaked hawk-nose and glittering cateyes; her bony naked arms stick out from the black cloak which is pulled around her, and she stirs the hellish brew while laughing and shrieking through the roaring, bellowing storm with her croaking voice. (Hoffmann, p. 55)

Somehow, by the shift of narrative perspective, the narrator creates the impression that vivid as the vignette is, he is really reporting it not as an eye-witness and hence is not held responsible for its factuality. The hedging becomes even clearer when he goes on to tell us that not even Veronica is a witness to what has transpired. In fact, literally no one has witnessed the black magic allegedly practiced that night:

Alas, gentle reader, neither you nor anyone else drove or walked this way on the twenty-

third of September during that stormy night so favorable to witches; and Veronica was forced to stay by the cauldron, overcome with terror, until the work neared its completion. She did indeed hear all that howled and raged about her, all kinds of despicable voices which bellowed and bleated and howled and hummed, but she did not open her eyes because she felt that the very sight of the abominations which encircled her might drive her into an incurable, devastating insanity. (Hoffmann, p. 56)

So has something extraordinary happened? It becomes difficult to determine. The uncertainty is increased by the fact that at the climactic point of the magical work Veronica loses her consciousness. When she regains her senses, she finds herself in bed and it is bright daylight. Her solicitous sister tells her that she has been moaning for an hour, as if in a fever. But as soon as she starts to rationalize that the whole thing has been a wild dream, her sister produces her rain-drenched coat. The new evidence of course goes against her rationalization. But her sister has a rational explanation for the coat: "Last night's storm blew open the shutters and knocked over the chair upon which your coat was hanging, and the rain came in and drenched it" (Hoffmann, p. 57). Even though Veronica decides to hold on to the belief of her having been in the company of a witch, her sister's explanation does leave us readers ultimately uncertain as to whether the whole thing is an actuality or a dream. Owing to this uncertainty, the vigil remains uncanny.

If the uncanny of the seventh vigil derives from the inability to determine whether something unusual happens in real life or it is merely a dream, the first vigil is uncanny because what unmistakably takes place in real life approaches the character of a dream. In this vigil great care has been taken to establish a semblance of factuality: All the places are historical, in and around Dresden; it is the afternoon on Ascension Day. The story begins with a most ordinary incident. A somewhat uncouth youngman by the name of Anselmus bumps into a basket of apples and cakes. The old woman attending it reacts quite expectably by screaming some vulgarisms (in this case, "Murder!"¹⁵). What becomes inexplicable is what happens after Anselmus pays for the damages and shamefacedly attempts to run away in a hurry. He hears the old woman shouting after him a kind of conundrum: "Yes, run! Run, you spawn of the Devil! Run into the crystal which will soon be your downfall—run into the crystal!" (Hoffmann, p. 14). Why does the old woman shout this? Or has she? In any case, her curse has caused everyone around to become serious and quiet. The old woman's curse, as our later study will show, proves to be extremely significant in the uncanny of the vigil.

After the incident, we are back in the everyday world. Anselmus is taking a walk to the Elbe. He feels very dejected because of the incident. The memory of many clumsy things he has done comes to torture him even more. In his frame of mind characterized by self-reproach and self-pity, he pays no attention to the festivities around him. At last he finds a quiet resting place and sits down there. He continues to take inventory of all the opportunities missed owing to his clumsiness. Then something eerie takes place:

Suddenly the soliloquy of the student was interrupted by a singular rustling and crackling which began near him in the grass, but which soon glided up into the leaves and branches of the elder tree spreading over his head. First it seemed as if an evening breeze were shaking the leaves, then as if little birds were twittering on the branches, their small wings mischievously fluttering to and fro. Then a whispering and a lisping began, and it seemed as if the sound of little crystal bells was coming from the blossoms. Anselmus listened and listened.

which is topsy-turvy, one in which madness is the only sanity, because the world is itself a lunatic asylum. ("Introduction," *Hoffmann*, xvii)

Our study of "The Golden Pot," we believe, should alert us to the uncanny dimension in "Young Goodman Brown," one of Hawthorne's most anthologized stories. The deceptively simple tale has many aspects to it that vie for our attention. Above all, it is, of course an allegorical tale. However, if "The Golden Pot" is not a fairy tale pure and simple, "Young Goodman Brown" is also demonstrably different from conventional allegory. Reading the tale by the standards of conventional allegory, F.O. Matthiessen complains that Hawthorne's "literal insistence on that damaging pink ribbon obtrudes the labels of a confining allegory and short circuits the range of associations."¹⁶ Such a view is not generally shared. Richard Harter Fogle's perceptive reading of the tale represents a more popular view;

In "Young Goodman Brown," then, Hawthorne has achieved that reconciliation of opposites which Coleridge considered the highest art. The combination of clarity of technique embodied in simplicity and balance of structure, in firm pictorial composition, in contrast and climactic arrangement, in irony and detachment with ambiguity of meaning, as signalized by the "device of multiple choice," in its interrelationships produces the story's characteristic effect. By means of these two elements Hawthorne reconciles oneness of action with multiplicity of suggestion and enriches the bareness of systematic allegory. Contrarily, by them he avoids lapsing into mere speculation without substance or form. The phantasmagoric light and shadow of the rising and falling fire, which obscures and softens the clear, hard outline of the witch-meeting, is an image which will stand for the essential effect of the story itself, an effect compacted of ambiguity and clarity harmoniously interfused.¹⁷

While concurring with Fogle's reading we want to add that the creation of an uncanny effect is also among the tale's intentions. Toward the end of the story the narrator, seemingly gratuitously, raises the question: "Had Goodman Brown fallen asleep in the forest and only dreamed a wild dream of a witch-meeting?"¹⁸ Immediately he suggests that the question is not important: "Be it so if you will; but, alas! it was a dream of evil omen for young Goodman Brown" (Hawthorne, p. 68). That is to say, be the experience a dream or an actual happening, it will exert the same evil influence on Goodman Brown. In other words, in terms of allegorical meaning, the question of whether it is a dream or not is insignificant and hence the question is gratuitous. The question is significant only when it is regarded as a means of underscoring the uncanniness that characterizes the whole story with perhaps the exception of the very last three paragraphs (the question, and what immediately happens to Brown after the "dream," and what happens to him in the rest of his life).

The uncanniness of the story of course derives from its obvious mixtures of the ordinary and the extraordinary, the probable and the improbable. Among its many strange occurrences, the improbability varies in degree and conspicuousness. The scenes at the witches' sabbath are clearly and enormously fantastic. But the following scene is also very fantastic even though it is not as immediately apparent: "Though their figures brushed the small boughs by the wayside, it could not be seen that they intercepted, even for a moment, the faint gleam from the strip of bright sky athwart which they must have passed" (Hawthorne, p. 60). In fact there is even a sense of the eerie when

Faith begs her husband to put off the journey: "a lone woman is troubled with such dreams and such thoughts that she's afraid of herself sometimes. Pray tarry with me this night, dear husband, of all nights in the year" (Hawthorne, p. 53). Faith's request suggests an urgency that reveals an intuitive, hence inexplicable, grasp of the significance of Brown's journey. One peculiarity about the story is that if one decides to regard parts of the story as a dream, one will find it very difficult to determine where the dream begins, even though a clear borderline exists to indicate where the dream ends. Paradoxically, the very difficulty to put one's finger on the beginning point of the dream is itself an indication of the prevalent dream-like quality of the story.

Finally we want to point out an ultimate paradox. The story's dream-like quality suggests that the story is not a pure allegory for good reason. However, it is the fact that the story is *also* an allegory that enables it to be as it is. In his preface to *The House of the Seven Gables* Hawthorne makes a distinction between the novel and the romance:

When a writer calls his work a Romance, it need hardly be observed that he wishes to claim a certain latitude, both as to its fashion and material, which he would not have felt himself entitled to assume had he professed to be writing a Novel. The latter form of composition is presumed to aim at a very minute fidelity, not merely to the possible, but to the probable and ordinary course of man's experience. The former--while, as a work of art, it must rigidly subject itself to laws, and while it sins unpardonably so far as it may swerve aside from the truth of the human heart--has fairly a right to present that truth under circumstances, to a great extent, of the writer's own choosing or creation. If he think fit, also, he may so manage his atmospherical medium as to bring out or mellow the light and deepen and enrich the shadows of the picture. He will be wise, no doubt, to make a very moderate use of the privileges here stated, and, especially, to mingle the Marvellous rather as a slight, delicate, and evanescent flavor, than as any portion of the actual substance of the dish offered to the public. He can hardly be said, however, to commit a literary crime even if he disregard this caution. (Hawthorne, p. 562)

Thus in its attempts to reveal "the truth of the human heart," "Young Goodman Brown" also creates the uncanny.

VI

We have investigated the relationships between the uncanny and dreams in life and in literature. If the uncanny and dreams are closely related in life, so are they in literature. Our study, nonetheless, also makes clear that just as realistic fictional dreams are different from real dreams, the uncanny in literature is distinguishable from the uncanny in life. Literary representations of the uncanny need to conform, at least to a certain degree, to our beliefs, but they also attempt to make us adjust to the "reality" they present. Menachem Brinker is convincing when he says: "Serious fiction, then, will always contain some amount of play and tension between cognition and illusion, between contested and reaffirmed beliefs."¹⁹

We want to point out too that our response to a literary work is heavily influenced by the critical apparatus available to us. We see what we are able to name. The predilection for thematic criticism is in part a result of the easy access of a relatively large number of conceptual tools for thematic discrimination. However, since it is a recog-

nized fact a literary work provokes a complex of responses, it is our responsibility to try to develop descriptive and analytical tools for diverse responses. Consequently, in this study of ours, we are in effect groping for a way to describe and analyze the uncanny and dreams in literature. Even though our study inevitably forces us to make excursions into non-literary fields, we ultimately treat our subject of study as an aesthetic phenomenon.

Notes

1. Dante, *Inferno*, trans. Mark Musa (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1971), p. 271.
2. "The Uncanny," *On Creativity and the Unconscious*, ed. Benjamin Nelson (New York: Harper, 1958), pp. 143-44.
3. *Totem and Taboo* in *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud*, ed. A. A. Brill (New York: Modern Library, 1938), p. 875.
4. C. G. Jung, "Psychology and Literature," in David Lodge, ed., *20th Century Literary Criticism* (New York: Longman, 1972), p. 178.
5. *The Fantastic: A Structuralist Approach to a Literary Genre*, trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1975), p. 46.
6. "Introduction," *Tales of E. T. A. Hoffmann*, ed. and trans. Leonard J. Kent (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969), xii.
7. "Poetry and Abstract Thought," in *Critical Theory Since Plato*, ed. Hazard Adams (New York: Harcourt, 1971), p. 818.
8. "Introduction," *Hoffmann*, xiii.
9. "Approach the Unconscious," in *Man and His symbols*, ed. C. G. Jung et al (London: Aldus Books, 1964), pp. 20-21.
10. Carl Alfred Meir, *Jung's Analytical Psychology and Religion* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1977), p. 55.
11. For a fuller treatment of this topic see Meir, pp. 51-52.
12. "Freud and Literature," in Adams, p. 956.
13. "Christabel," in David Parkins, ed., *English Romantic Writers* (New York: Harcourt, 1967), p. 417.
14. "The Golden Pot," in Hoffmann, pp. 32-33.
15. Hoffmann, p. 14.
16. Quoted in James K. Folsom, *Man's Accidents and God's Purpose* (New Haven: College and University Press, 1963), pp. 18-19.
17. *Hawthorne's Fiction: The Light and the Dark*, rev ed. (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1964), p. 32.
18. Nathaniel Hawthorne, *The Portable Hawthorne*, ed. Malcom Cowley (New York: Viking, 1948), p. 68.
19. "Verisimilitude, Conventions, and Beliefs," *New Literary History*, 14, No. 2 (1983), 267.