"ALLEGORY" IN USE IN THE WESTERN TRADITION

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A meaningful investigation into formal allegory should begin with the question: what has "allegory" generally meant as applied to a literary text? Aiming at some degree of universality, we deliberately want to begin by tracing how a reader trained in the Anglo-American tradition will possibly respond to a French poem in which "allegory" functions as one of the informing factors.

Baudelaire's "Un Voyage à Cythère" (A Voyage to Cytherea) is noted for its patterned contrasts, a structural trait conspicuous from the very first two stanzas and running through the whole poem. The first stanza tells us that the heart of the I-narrator, who is on a sea voyage, "as a bird, hovered joyfully/And soared carefreely around the rigging."[1] The second stanza begins with a line that signals an abrupt change in mood: "What is this isle sad and dark? — It is Cytherea." In the subsequent four stanzas the narrator's reverie poses the romantic association about this land of Venus as internalized in the Western consciousness against the brutal fact that Cytherea is actually "a rocky wasteland troubled by bitter cries." In Stanzas 7—10, the narrator relates to us an obnoxious scene of mutilation which he witnesses as his ship gets close to the island. He sees a corpse hanging from a three-branched gallows being devoured by a swarm of relentless birds and beasts. The following stanzas depicting the birds preying on the corpse is an exercise in foregrounding sordidness and rottenness:

> The ferocious birds perched on their pasture
> Destroyed with rage a hanged corpse already gone rotten,
> Each planting its impure beak, as a tool,
> Into all the bloody corners of this rot;
>
> The eyes were two holes, and from the broken abdomen
> Weighty intestines flowed down the thighs,
> And its tormentors, gorged with hideous delicacies,
> With attacks of beak, had left it absolutely castrated.

So far the mutilating and its witnessing have been presented as an actual happening, that is, as opposed to a vision or a fantasy. Chronologically, the episode is continuous with the preceding episode where the meditation on the Island of Cytherea is presented; in other words, it is as well situated in time as the act of meditating, or for that matter, the very voyage itself. There is even a physical reason given to account for the clarity with which the narrator witnesses the scene: the ship comes so close to the shore that its sails disturb the birds. Further, Stanzas 7—10 stand out as the only part of the poem with a detailed presentation of exterior action. Framed by anterior and posterior stanzas with the main purpose of depicting the narrator's reverie, the action is endowed with a striking sense of actuality.

Reading the episode within the framework of an actuality, one is inevitably disturbed by Stanza 11, where, unaccountably, the narrator proceeds to account for the suffering of the hanged man, which, as he puts it, is "In expiation of your infamous rituals/ And the sins that denied you a grave." Equally disturbing will be Stanza 12, where, again unaccountably, the narrator identifies himself with the corpse: "Ridiculous hanged man, your sorrows are mine!" If up to Stanza 10 the poem has been adhering to the model of making the narrator react and report in a way consistent with our general sense of probability, beginning in Stanza 11 it shows the adoption of a new model in which the narrator is empowered to have a superhuman capability of ascribing personal history and hidden motive in an event which he observes from the outside and for a nonce. This, in effect, amounts to a violation of the logical coherence of the text. Stanza 14 begins with a description that sharply brings into focus the very problem of logical coherence: "... the sky was charming, the sea smooth; For me all was dark and gory from then on." The description of the sky and the sea as they appeared at a given moment has the effect of reinforcing the actuality of the sea voyage by placing it in a specific time and place. However, the witnessing of the mutilation scene is equally actual, for it works as a watershed in the moods of the narrator, and its being a point in the linear time is accentuated by the word "désormais" (since). How then can the shift of the model be accounted for? What is the poetical justification for the change in the posture of the narrator, or for his enunicated rapport with the scene?

The poetical incoherence is resolved when it is explicitly pointed out in the last two lines of Stanza 14 that the scene of mutilation witnessed by the marrator is an allegory: "Alas! and I, as in a thick winding sheet,/ Had shrouded my heart in this allegory."Once the scene of mutilation is privileged as an allegory, it inevitably creates a pressure to retroactively transform the sea voyage into an allegory, for if up to Stanza 10 they both lend themselves to be construed as representations of actualities, the shift of one to an allegory entails a similar shift in the other. Then, as the last stanza (Stanza 15) makes clear, the experiences of the voyage all point to another order of meaning:

In your isle, O Venus! all I found was
A symbolic gallows where my image was hanging...
-- Ah! Lord! Give me the strength and courage
To contemplate my heart and body without disgust!

Baudelaire's use of the term "allegory" may well be contested by those who understand the term in light of another framework. One who can only think of personification allegories as the legitimate referent of the term, for example, will no doubt regard Baudelaire's usage as a case of abuse. It however remains a fact that the very dubbing of some parts of the poem as allegory somehow brings a new order to the relationships between various parts of the poem and thus justifies the very structure of the poem.

A concept like "allegory" is meaningful only when it occupies a slot in a general system of literature. Ordinarily, one is willing to conceive of "allegory" as positioned

in a literary system, even though he is equally willing to allow the meaning and the usage of the term to remain vague, that is, to allow the "semantic boundaries" of the term to remain volatile and amorphous. A work that proclaims itself an allegory, as in the case of "Un Voyage à Cythère," inevitably enters into a relationship with that order of literature regarded as allegory, and inevitably brings the constitutive parts of the work within the framework of allegory. The question, nonetheless, remains: what is the ordinary meaning and usage of the term "allegory"?

Over the years "allegory" has been used in four major senses. It has been used to designate a work that 1) exhibits a second-order meaning paralleling a first-order meaning, 2) foregrounds argumentative or expository mode in the context of narrative, 3) partakes of the characteristics of metaphor, and 4) uses personification. The four senses are often invoked in a loose, haphazard way, and the fact that they belong to concerns of different levels and natures seems not to have deterred critics from moving from one sense to another in their application of the term.

According to Pépin, "allegory" in Greek was a transformation of an old concept known as "conjecture."[2] The latter supposes a relation between two mental contents of different nature. On the one hand a concrete given is presented to the senses; on the other, the given suggests an idea, posed in the form of a conclusion or hypothesis, that points to a future event or a transcendental reality. "Conjecture" designates an often quite elementary operation that moves from a perceived given to a surmised idea. An illustration is found in Euripides's *The Phoenician Women*. Before the Argives besiege Thebes, Capaneus, one of the attackers, has been noticed with a shield with figured ornamentation in the form of a giant shouldering an entire town which he has wrenched away from its foundations. To the messenger who reports on this sighting, the image is the "symbol" of the fate reserved for his town, that is, the visual image refers to the imminent destruction of Thebes.

It is, however, Quintilian's remarks on allegory that have most visibly influenced the later generations, even to the extent of similar phraseology. He says: "*Allegory*, which is translated in Latin by *inversio*, either presents one thing in words and another in meaning, or else something absolutely opposed to the meaning of the words. The first type is generally produced by a series of metaphor."[3]

Quintilian's influence is evidenced, for instance, by the affinity between his remarks and those on allegory from the lexicographers and the rhetoricians of 17th-century England.[4] In John Minsheu's *The Guide into the Tongues* (1617), allegory is defined as "a figure whereby one thing is spoken, and another thing signified."[5] In Edward Phillips's *The New World of English Words* (1658), it is defined as "a mysterious saying, wherein there is couched something that is different from the litteral sense;" and in the 1678 edition of the same dictionary it is defined as follows: "Inversion or changing: In Rhetorick it is a mysterious saying, wherein there is couched something that is different from the literal sense."[6] If the lexicographers generally subscribed to the conventional way of defining allegory in terms of the existence of two orders of meaning, the rhetoricians, regarding allegory as a trope, tended to hold the equally conventional idea that there is a great affinity between allegory and another trope, metaphor. Typically, Thomas Wilson discussed allegory in the following fashion:

> An allegorie is none other thing, but a Metaphore, used throughout a whole sentence, or Oration. As speaking against a wicked offendour. I might say thus. Oh Lord, his nature was so evill, and his witte so wicked bent, that he meant to bouge the ship, where he himself sailed: meaning that he purposed the destruction of his own country. It is evil putting strong wine into weake vesselles, that is to say, it is evill trusting some women with weightie matters. The English Proverbs gathered by John Heywood, help well in this behalfe, the which commonly are nothing else but Allegories, and darke devised sentences.[7]

The way Wilson phrased it creates the impression that allegory, metaphor, and proverb are interchangeable, and they form a deplorable proliferation of terminology We, however, understand that the fact of the matter is not so. Take the relationship between metaphor and proverb, for example. The expression "It is evill putting strong wine into weake vesselles" is very probably metaphoric but in order for it to be accepted as a proverb it needs to acquire some more qualifications. For one thing, it is understood by Wilson as referring to a specific second-order meaning ("It is evill trusting some women with weightie matters," for example) even though it could obviously be used to refer to a horde of other second-order meanings just as well. For another thing, such an understanding is known to and accepted by the public of a cultural community. One would welcome some kind of differentiation between allegory and metaphor after having been assured of their affiliation.

Puttenham has made a distinction between allegory in its broad sense and in its narrow sense. In its broad sense, allegory refers to the situation where expressions are used not in their ordinary meanings and thus function as a veil to the speaker's true intent; enigma, proverb, irony, hyperbole, periphrasis, and synecdoche are all grouped under the term allegory. In its narrow sense, an allegory is a continued metaphor:

> Properly and in his principall vertue *Allegoria* is when we do speak in sence translative and wrested from the own signification, nevertheless applied to another not altogether contrary, but having much conveniencie with it as before we said of the metaphore: as for example if we should call the common wealth, a shippe; the Prince a Pilot, the Counsellours mariners, the stormes warres, the calme and (*haven*) peace, this is spoken all in allegorie: and because such inversion of sence in one single word is by the figure *Metaphore*, of whom we spake before, and this manner of inversion extending to whole and large speaches, it maketh the figure *allegorie* to be called a long and perpetuall Metaphore.[8]

As metaphor is traditonally envisaged as the imposition of a similarity relation between two terms which are apparently not similar, Coleridge's definition of allegory can then be regarded as a synthesis of two familiar definitions of allegory, namely, allegory as a concrete image pressing for transmutation into an abstract concept and allegory as metaphor:

> We may then safely define allegoric writing as the employment of one set of agents and images with actions and accompaniments correspondent, so as to convey, while in dis-

> guise, either moral qualities or conceptions of the mind that are not in themselves objects of the senses, or other images, actions, fortunes and circumstances, so that the difference is everywhere presented to the eye or imagination while the likeness is presented to the mind.[9]

Contemporary generalizations on the meaning of allegory show very little refinement upon Coleridge's definition except, in a few cases, with added emphasis on the explicitness of allegorical intention within the text. By opposing allegory against what he calls "realism," which is defined as "palin, straightforward, univocal mimesis, innocent as far as may be of conceptual or typical suggestion,"[10] Graham Hough in effect repeats the idea of allegory as an encoded movement from image to concept and particular to general. An equally *déjà vu* impression will be derived from Northrop Frye's statement:

> We have actual allegory when a poet explicitly indicates the relationship of his image to examples and precepts, and so tries to indicate how a commentary on him should proceed. A writer is being allegorical whenever it is clear that he is saying "by this I *also* (*allos*) mean that." If this seems to be done continuously, we may say, cautiously, that what he is writing "is" an allegory.[11]

And Tzvetan Todorov recapitulates the traditional formulation of the idea of allegory as follows:

> ... allegory implies the existence of at least two meanings for the same words; according to some critics, the first meaning must disappear, while others require that the two be present together. Secondly, this double meaning is indicated in the work in an *explicit* fashion: it does not proceed from the reader's interpretation (whether arbitrary or not).[12]

The above generalizations about allegory obviously just delineate loose boundaries for the concept. To say that allegory is an extended metaphor is itself a "metaphoric" statement, which often amounts to no more than the assertion that allegory expresses more than one meaning, and that a "vehicle-tenor" relationship analogus to that in a metaphor can be perceived in or imposed on these meanings. To say that allegory contains more than one structure of meaning or that allegory entails the coexistence of concept and image admits of myriad ways of manifestations in actual text, many of which conceivably fall outside the pale of our accepted idea of allegory. Even in the conventionalized idea about allegory there exists some discrepancy between the generalizations that are more or less axiomatic and those that are derived from the actual observation of texts. The discrepancy generally does not bespeak a fundamental difference but rather points to different emphasis. It is thus necessary to complement the above generalizations about allegory with generalizations derived from the observation of the texts which are traditionally accepted as exemplary allegories.

The late fifteenth-century morality play *Everyman* is indisputably one of the exemplary allegories. What accounts for its allegoricality is first of all its obvious

framing. An explanatory note precedes the play proper: "Here beginneth a treatise how the High Father of Heaven sendeth Death to summon every creature to come and give account of their lives in this world, and is in manner of a moral play."[13] Within the play there is further framing. The Messenger's speech can be regarded as prologue which foretells one important theme of the play:

> Here shall you see how fellowship and jollity
> Both strength, pleasure, and beauty,
> Will fade from thee as flower in May.
> For ye shall hear how our Heaven-King
> Calleth Everyman to a general reckoning. (p. 74)

The Doctor's speech at the end of the play can be regarded as an epilogue which spells out the didactic lesson of the play:

> If his [Everyman's] reckoning be not clear when he doth come,
> God will say, "*Ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum*!"
> And he that hath his account whole and sound,
> High in heaven he shall be crowned,
> Unto which place God bring us all thither
> That we may live body and soul together. (p. 103)

The drama proper, which depicts the protagonist Everyman's interaction with characters such as Death, Fellowship, Kindred, Kowledge, Beauty, and Good Deeds as a result of his answering the summons by Death, dramatizes the propositions in the rest of the play. The coexistence of a dramatic text and a non-dramatic text, with the former understood to be semantically equivalent to the latter even though they are formally different, is the first sign of allegoricality.

A case may be made that the drama proper can stand on its own as presenting a self-sufficient literary universe wherein the behavior and action of the characters are psychologically motivated and the overall action of the drama is logically connected. Each interactive situation produces its dramatic effect independent of its purported subordination to a didactic function. Take for instance the final dialogue between Everyman and Fellowship, who breaks his promise by declining to accompany the former on his journey to the grave:

> Everyman. Wither away, Fellowship? Will thou forsake me?
>
> Fellowship. Yea, by my fay! To God I betake thee.
>
> Everyman. Farewell, good Fellowship! For thee my heart is sore. Adieu forever — I shall see thee no more.
>
> Fellowship. In faith, Everyman, farewell not at the ending:
> For you I will remember that parting is mourning. (p. 83)

If the passage is read outside the context of a morality play – if Everyman and Fellowship were momentarily assigned the particularity as well as the thematical neutrality of, say, John and David – it still generates interest by depicting a confrontation scene in which the heartless one first makes his intention unmistakably absolute and then expresses his condolence with unruffled suavity. while the heart-broken one makes sure to let his bitterness known, yet consciously within the bounds of civility. It is in the loose sense that the drama proper, which is otherwise (more exactly, *literarily*) self-sufficient, is forced to function as the "dramatization" of the general ideas in the prologue and the epilogue that the drama proper is considered as saying one thing while meaning another. We can say in the same vein that the fact that most of the dramatis personae such as Death, Everyman, Fellowship, Beauty, and Discretion are literarily self-sufficient characters and yet also represent general concepts renders them particular instances of saying one thing while meaning another. It is interesting to point out that "Everyman" in the following speech of Death exactly contains two meanings, the first one being "every man," and the second being a particular character registering the traits of "every man":

> Everyman will I beset that liveth beastly
> Out of God's laws, and dreadeth not folly.
> He that loveth riches I will strike with my dart,
> His sight to blind, and from heaven to depart,
> Except that Alms be his good friend,
> In hell for to dwell, world without end
> Lo, yonder I see Everyman walking; (p. 76)

Strictly speaking, neither the embodiment of a Christian doctrine nor the employment of personification is the essential characteristic of allegory even though both are among the most striking traits of *Everyman*, which by consensus is an allegory. A readership whose concept of allegory is derived from the abstraction of the thematic as well as the formal structure of some particular texts such as *Everyman* may understandably equate allegory with the utilization of the device of personification to illustrate a Christian doctrine. Such a view will receive reinforcement by works of similar nature such as John Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*. Personification looms large in *Pilgrim's Progress*. The very nomenclature of the characters encapsulates their spiritual or psychological traits and their capacity, as in the case of Wordly Wiseman, Pliable, Hopeful, Faithful, Talkative, Byends, Ignorance, Piety, Prudence, Charity, Giant Despair, Evengelist, Interpreter, to say nothing of Christian. Equally conspicuous is the rendition of Christian doctrine. The text is rife with biblical allusions such as the Slough of Despond, the Valley of the Shadow of Death, Vanity Fair, Hill Difficulty, the battle with Apollyon, the heavy burden of sin, the sky of promise. The overall action is about the progress of the soul.

In any case, if the earlier readership tried to provide a shorthand definition of the formal structure of allegory by calling it an extended metaphor, the modern readership is eager to shortcircuit the problem of the mode by reducing allegory to personification. William Empson defines his ambiguity of the third type this way: "An

ambiguity of the third type, then, as a matter concerning whole states of mind, occurs when what is said is valid in, refers to, several different topics, several universes of discourses, several modes of judgement or of feeling."[14] He then assigns "an allegory [which] is felt to have many levels of interpretation" to the domain of the third type of ambiguity.[15]

Evidently he regards "allegory" as an innocuous term. What does he implicity accept as the meaning of allegory? It may be inferred from his comment on George Herbert's "The Temple." The poem expresses the narrator's bitterness over his being repeatedly disappointed--or perhaps misunderstood--by Hope:

> I gave to Hope a watch of mine; but he
>   An anchor gave to me.
> Then an old prayer-book I did present;
>   And he an optik sent.
> With that I gave a viall full of tears:
>   But he a few green eares:
> Ah, Loyterer! I'le no more, no more
>   I'le bring
> I did expect a ring.[16]

In an elliptical way Empson describes the poem as "[keeping] the symbols apart with the full breadth of the technique of allegory."[18] What keeps the symbols apart -- more accurately, what brings "symbols" such as "watch" and "anchor" into a relationship— is of course the bartering act that relates the I-narrator to Hope, which, upon final analysis, is a manifestation of the mechanism of personification. Thus what Empson refers to as the "full breadth of the technique of allegory" must be the use of personification.

When the narrator in Baudelaire's "Un Voyage À Cythère" proclaims that the mutilation scene is an allegory, he in effect establishes a connection between that portion of the poem with a network of literary phenomena either as texts or discourses on texts. The connection tends, for one thing, to upset the very autonomy of the passage. The drama of the grisly grotesquerie is no longer to be taken as meaningful in its own right; rather it derives its meaning from being a "metaphor" for the mental state of the narrator, pretty much in the sense that the drama proper of *Everyman* is the "dramatization" of some general beliefs. However, one notices that the passage is markedly different from earlier allegories – those called personification allegory – in that within the episode the character in suffering remains anonymous, to say nothing of going by tell-tale names, and that its relation to the rest of the poem is anything but obvious--hence the need for a drastic evocation of "allegory." To those whose idea of allegory is confined to personification, the episode is preferably called a "symbol."

Since Romanticism, an additional element has entered into the concept of allegory, a desire to pose it against symbol. Goethe is the first to make a distinction between allegory and symbol. He points out in his *Maximen* that "allegory changes a phenomenon into a concept, a concept into an image, but in such a way that the

concept is still limited and completely kept and held in the image and expressed by it," but symbolism "changes the phenomenon into the idea, the idea into the image, in such a way that the idea remains always infinitely active and unapproachable even though expressed in all languages."[17] A strong dose of value judgement is in evidence in this new juxtaposition. Allegory has been set up as a literary correlative of what the Romantics (and our contemporaries with a romantic turn of mind) have revolted against, namely, mechanicalness, rationalism, disjunction of form and content, and dogmatism. The Romantic revolt against allegory should be understood in the larger context of its revolt against the cultural paradigm of the Age of Enlightenment. Within the literary form purportedly capable of indirect referentiality a dichotomy has been made, with whatever is construed as reflective of the Englishtenment "pejoratively" referred to as "allegory," and whatever is perceived as in keeping with the Romantic poetics referred to as "symbol." An inevitable confusion ensues. Whereas "allegory" understood as a historical genre may merit distinction from "symbol" (that is, the latter being Romantic and post-Romantic allegory), as a theoretical mode it may well intersect with the domain of symbol. The result of such confusion is reflected in the absence of a real distinction between allegory and symbol.

Coleridge's exaltation of symbol at the expense of allegory is typical of such statements:

> Now an allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language, which is in itself nothing but an abstraction from objects of the senses: the principal being more worthless even than its phantom proxy, both alike unsubstantial, and the former shapeless to boot. On the other hand a symbol ... is characterized by a translucence of the special in the individual, or of the general in the special, or of the universal in the general; above all by the translucence of the eternal through and in the temporal. It always partakes of the reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part in that unity of which it is the representative.[18]

Reminiscent of Coleridge, W.B. Yeats says:

> A symbol is indeed the only possible expression of some invisible essence, a transparent lamp about a spiritual flame; while allegory is one of many possible representations of an embodied thing, or familiar principle, and belongs to fancy and not to imagination: the one is a revelation, the other an amusement.[19]

The Romantic view of symbol is obviously very tendentious. It postulates the existence of a transcendental truth, a total, unified, and universal meaning to which symbols lead. Along this line of thinking, there exists a "sympathy" or "elective affinity" between a symbol and the truth it stands for. A poetic genius is capable of happy symbols, thus obliterating the gap between truth and its presentation. By contrast, allegory functions by setting up an arbitrary sign to refer to a specific, hence exhaustible, meaning. Repeating such a view, Hans-Georg Gadamer in *Truth and Method* (Wahrheit und Methode) says: "Symbols and allegory are opposed as art is to non-art, in that the former seems endlessly suggestive in the indefinitenss of its

meaning, whereas the latter, as soon as its meaning is reached has run its full course" (quoted by Paul de Man).[20]

The comparison between symbol and allegory has recurred with impressive frequency in critical discourse. However, the two terms are employed in a manner that fails to give one a clear idea of what actual texts either refers to. They thus function as two concepts in a vacuum, two disembodied voices, tentatively manipulated by critics with the purpose of expressing or calling forth some variety of literature of which they have a hint. Such discourse in fact bears very little on the study of allegory. It assigns allegory a special meaning and sets it up as a strawman in order to enunciate a particular aesthetics. Instead of seeking answers to the problems of allegory in such a discourse, one should value it as reflective of a cultural attitude. Paul de Man appropriately provides a critique on such an attitude:

> The romantic thought is marked by a conflict between a conception of the self seen in its authentically temporal predicament and a defensive strategy that tries to hide from this negative self-knowledge. On the level of language the asserted superiority of the symbol over allegory, so frequent during the nineteenth century, is one of the forms taken by this tenacious self-mystification. Wide areas of European literature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries appear as regressive with regard to the truths that come to light in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. For the lucidity of the pre-romantic writers does not persist. It does not take long for a symbolic conception of metaphorical language to establish itself everywhere, despite the ambiguities that persist in aesthetic theory and poetic practice. But this symbolical style will never be allowed to exist in serenity; since it is a veil thrown over a light one no longer wishes to perceive, it will never be able to gain an entirely good poetic conscience.
> ("The Rhetoric of Temporality," p. 191)

Allegory, like most literary concepts, is, at some levels of its manifestation, culture-bound, and it indeed calls for study within the context of a particular culture. However, as the Romantic exploitation of the term makes it clear, a capricious use of a term within a culture may appear perfectly natural and acceptable to the member of the given cultural community, thus opening up a host of false issues. A scrutiny of the concept in more than one cultural system for mutual rectification at least has the potential of screening out the culturally based attribution of meaning and function of an arbitrary, unjustifiable nature. Further, even where the discourse on allegory is plausible, a particular culture may have developed a particular set of conceptual categories for discussing the literary phenomenon, with the consquence of emphasizing as well as neglecting some points. Thus to examine allegory from the perspectives of more than one cultural system has the advantage of overcoming what might be called cultural blind spots.

NOTES

1. *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Seuil, 1968), p. 117; Translation, here and after, mine.
2. Jean Pépin, *Mythe et allegorie: les origines grecques et les contestations judeo-chretiennes* (Aubier: Editions Montaignes, n.d.), p. 85.
3. *The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian*, trans. H. E. Butler (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1959), III, p. 327.
4. For a Fuller treatment of this aspect, see Joshua McClennen, *On the Meaning and Function of Allegory in the English Renaissance* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1947).
5. In McClennen, p. 3.
6. In McClennen, p. 3.
7. *The Arte of Rhetorique*, ed. S. H. Mair (Oxford, 1909), p. 176, quoted in McClennen, p. 4.
8. *Arte of English Poesie*, ed. G. D. Willcock and A. Walker (Cambridge, 1936), p. 178, quoted in McClennen pp. 5-6.
9. *Coleridge's Miscellaneous Criticism*, ed. Thomas M. Rayson (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1936), p. 30.
10. *The Critical Quarterly*, 3, No. 3 (1961), 202.
11. Nothrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), p. 90.
12. *The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre,* trans. Richard Howard (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1973), p. 63.
13. *Everyman*, in *An Anthology of English Drama before Shakespeare*, ed. Robert B. Heilman (New York: Holt, 1952), p. 73
14. William Empson, *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (rev. ed. 1947; rpt. New York: New Directions, 1966), p. 111.
15. *Seven Types*, pp. 112–13.
16. Quoted in *Seven Types*, p. 118.
17. Quoted in René Wellek, *A History of Modern Criticism. 1750--1950*, I (New Naven: Yale Univ. Press, 1955), p. 211. Goethe's distinction of symbol and allegory is also discussed in Karl Vietor, *Goethe the Thinker*, trans. Bayard Q. Morgan (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1950), pp. 174–77.
18. *The Statesmen's Manual* in *the Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*, ed. Shedd (New York: Harper, 1853), I, 437.
19. W. B. Yeats, *Essays and Introductions* (New York: MaCmillan, 1961), p. 116.
20. Paul de Man, "The Rhetoric of Temporality," in *Interpretation: Theory and Practice*, ed. Charles S. Singleton (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 174.