

TOWARD A NEW FORMULATION OF ALLEGORICAL DISCOURSE

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It is methodologically convenient to distinguish what may be called allegorical functions from formal features of allegory. The former are structural principles underlying an allegorical discourse, whereas the latter are surface manifestations of the principles. We hold a general consensus, vague as it is, about allegorical functions, such as hiddenness of meaning, double referentiality, embodiment of human significance. It is then expected that some artistic solutions should be capable of conveying those functions. Actualization occurs in the choice of those artistic solutions. If we compare an allegorical text with a non-allegorical text, we will notice the foregrounding of certain artistic devices at the expense of other devices. For example, ideas may be personalized, the presence of an expository structure in the way of summing up the "moral" of the narrative may be made prominent, multiple framing of the text to create different meaning chunks may occur, whereas efforts to establish verisimilitude, to round out the psychological dimensions of the characters, or to attend to vividness of detail may be less apparent. Whereas there is no infallible way of identifying an allegorical discourse, we still may let ourselves be alerted to the possibility of allegory when a discourse shows the conspicuous presence of the devices often associated with allegory, and when read as non-allegory it appears obtrusive, banal, or simply pointless, or incongruent with the rest of the text.

The nature of allegorical markers throws some light on the traditional critics' identification of allegory with metaphor, or for that matter, "extended" metaphor. The incongruity or obtrusiveness or pointlessness that calls for mediation in allegorical markers is comparable to what one school of theoreticians call "violation of selection restrictions," which obtains between the two terms of a metaphorical utterance. If a metaphor yokes together two dissimilar senses, so does an allegory. It is expressly the presence of two related and yet dissimilar "senses" that accounts for the marked metaphoricality or allegoricality at the level of the surface text. It should be noted that, unlike in most discussions on the subject, here we stress a distinction between the "senses" as analyzed within an explanatory scheme and the markers as manifested at the textual surface. The need for such a distinction is apparent when we scrutinize the following metaphor: "The ship ploughs the waves." The two "senses" are, one way of analyzing it, the ship in relation to the waves versus the plough in relation to the field, which, clearly, are not fully and explicitly manifested in the surface text. Strictly speaking, even in a metaphor like "eternity is a desert," the two senses are not "eternity" and "desert," but rather some selective denotations and connotations of the two terms evoked by the relation established between the terms. In the case of allegory, the need for such a distinction is even more obvious, if only because an allegory tends to be an extensive text, an "extended" metaphor. For one thing, the allegorical markers that correspond to the two senses can vary from being highly concentrated (such as a prologue or even a separate tale) to highly dispersed (such as talismanic names attached to characters).

In the surface text, the manifestations of the two senses are more likely to form into symmetrically corresponding pairs in a metaphor than in an allegory. In short metaphorical utterances like "Sally is a block of ice," or "deserts of vast eternity," there exist the clear contrastive pairs of "Sally" versus "ice" and "deserts" versus "eternity." A similar characteristic can even be found in a conceit, which is a metaphor that weaves throughout a fairly extensive discourse and thus in every practical sense an "extended metaphor." Witness Shakespeare's Sonnet 30:

When to the sessions of sweet silent thought
I summon up remembrance of things past,
I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,
And with old woes new wail my dear time's waste:
Then can I drown an eye, unused to flow,
For precious friends hid in death's dateless night,
And weep afresh love's long since canceled woe,
And moan the expense of many a vanished sight:
Then can I grieve at grievance foregone,
And heavily from woe to woe to tell o'er
The sad account of fore-bemoaned moan,
Which I new pay as if not paid before.
But if the while I think on thee, dear friend,
All losses are restored and sorrows end.¹

In this poem, the initial reference to the sittings of court ("sessions" and continued in "summon up") tends to give the subsequent expressions like "expense" (meaning "loss"), "grieve," "play," "losses," "restored," "tell over," and all those related to complaint a litigious coloring, even though these expressions, on their own, are able to form into a coherent "theme" without the added judiciary suggestion. The first two lines constitute a metaphor which establishes a clearly contrastive pair, namely, the summoning-up at "sessions" versus the act of remembering in the silence of thought. The contrast is then imposed on the remainder of the poem, resulting in making the poem read as if, on the one hand, it presented the narrator as thinking aloud about his unfulfilled life, and, on the other, it presented him as vociferously (witness "wail" and "moan") making an inventory of his grievances in court. Whereas it is possible in allegory to have the comparable phenomenon of one segment of the text imposing an allegorical orientation on the other segments of the text, we normally do not expect such a clearly manifested contrastive pair, if only because the "controlling" segment is rarely a brief metaphor.

The fact that metaphor tends to have clear correspondence between its two senses and their textual manifestations and that allegory usually lacks a likewise clear-cut correspondence affects the very way we talk about these two literary phenomena. Whereas it is often viable and fruitful to discuss a metaphor solely in terms of its textual surface, it is all but impracticable to do likewise apropos of allegory. Notice that when Max Black in his celebrated "Metaphor"² speaks of a metaphorical statement's contrastive pair of "focus" (that is, the word or words used

in a non-literal way) and "frame" (that is, the literal surrounding for the "focus"), he obviously addresses the contrast at the level of the textual surface. However, in discussing the working of allegory, we of necessity have to rely on the analytical constructs of "two senses," which do not neatly correspond to some bifurcate surface elements. Put most reductively, the two senses in some of Chuang Tzu's tales are statements on world view (or epistemology) versus imaginative fantasies; in *Everyman*, the inexorable fact that one has to account for his deeds in this life after death versus the story of how a fellow is variously disappointed and satisfied in seeking counsel and companionship before and during a trying journey; in Baudelaire's "Voyage," the narrator's mental state versus his journey.

It is in the very definition of Black's scheme of "focus" and "frame" that literalness (or non-literalness) forms the basis for differentiating the contrastive pair of textual manifestations in a metaphor. The question arises as to how we know which of the pair is to be taken literally and which non-literally. We generally have no problem in reading a metaphorical utterance like "Sally is a block of ice." Almost instinctively, we read "Sally" literally and "a block of ice" non-literally. Our processing cannot simply be attributed to the fact that "Sally" takes the position of a grammatical subject, for in encountering a sentence like "A block of ice is Sally," we would either read it as an inverted form of "Sally is a block of ice" or simply dismiss it as nonsensical. As a matter of fact, we find "Sally" unfitted for non-literal reading mainly because, compared with "a block of ice," it contains in its literal sense such scanty information (all that it tells us is that it refers to a female) that it holds out very little promise for productive non-literal exploitation. The implication here is that in a metaphor like "deserts of vast eternity," where "desert" and "eternity" are both rich in resonances, it is impossible to determine which is the "focus" and which, the "frame," in the absence of a larger context. In Shakespeare's Sonnet 30, we owe our knowledge that "sessions" rather than "sweet silent thought" in the line "When to the sessions of sweet silent thought" is to be read non-literally to the information provided by the rest of the poem.

In allegory, the need to "naturalize" obtrusiveness, incoherence, or pointlessness also gives rise to the problem of literal and non-literal reading. However, unlike in metaphor, the problem occurs when one is analyzing and reconstituting the textual data into the two senses. Once the two senses are established, what ensues will be the endeavour to justify their "related dissimilarity," which will trigger readjustments and modifications of the meaning in the components of these two senses. At this relatively later stage, what is involved is no longer a matter of literal or non-literal reading. Thus, the relations between the two senses in allegory and those between the focus and the frame in metaphor are quite different. Our received ideas of allegory dictate an asymmetry in the "value" of the two senses. One sense absorbs the properties attributed, in our vaguer moments, to the "hidden" or "allegorical" meaning, which is often described as having a lofty, serious content—as, for instance, referring to "transcendental reality," "moral significance," or "theological profundities." The "value" here, as part of a critical vocabulary, is not value as we believe it, but rather as it is understood according to some conventional system of describing discourses. A discourse on, say, basic moral issues is said to be more serious in its subject matter

(and loftier in its tone) than, say, a discourse attempting to capture a lyrical mood, even though the former may be totally uninspired and uninspiring. As a rule, the “hidden” or “allegorical” meaning is the “loftier” of the two senses. However, as regards the working of allegory, the issue of “loftiness” is not crucial; what really matters is the fact that the “hidden” or “allegorical” meaning tends to be the less specific, the more abstract of the two senses and thus functions to confer a note of generality on the other sense while itself receiving reification, rejuvenation, or, as frequently the case, surprising enrichment of meaning from the other sense. In this sense, the two senses show a relationship comparable to that between the focus and the frame in the metaphorical utterance, “Sally is a block of ice.”

For an effective formulation of the way the two senses in allegory work on each other, one can very well borrow Max Black’s interactive view, which he uses to describe how metaphor works.

Black’s “More about Metaphor” is a restatement of his celebrated article “Metaphor.” In this more recent work, Black complains that most works in metaphor focus their attention on what metaphor *is* to the neglect of how it *works*. To rectify this imbalance, he sets out to shift the emphasis from conceptual to functional analysis. In this study he conceives of a metaphorical statement as having two subjects: the primary subject and the secondary subject. The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing. Take Wallace Stevens’ line, “Society is a sea,” for example. “Sea,” the secondary subject, signals a system of relationships or an implicative complex in the sentence. The sentence is not about the sea. In Black’s view, “The metaphorical utterance works by ‘projecting upon’ the primary subject a set of ‘associated implications,’ comprised in the implicative complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject.”³ He stresses that some form of isomorphism needs to be set up between the two subjects: “The maker of a metaphorical statement selects, emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes features of the primary subject by applying to it statements isomorphic with the members of the secondary subject’s implicative complex” (In Ortony, p. 29). The relationship thus established, an interaction between the two subjects will occur, that is, both will reciprocally cause each other to foreground certain relevant features: “the presence of the primary subject incited the hearer to select some of the secondary subject’s properties; and invites him to construct a parallel implication complex that can fit the primary subject; and reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject” (In Ortony, p. 29). Black himself provides an illustration by analyzing the metaphorical statement, “Marriage is a zero-sum game.”⁴ First, he spells out the implication complex as follows:

- (G1) A “game” is a contest;
- (G2) between two opponents;
- (G3) in which one player can win only at the expense of the other.

Obviously, the very traits of a game selected to form the implication complex have already registered the influence of the primary subject (“marriage”), for the number of the contestants is specified as two. The claims about “marriage,” in turn, systematically correspond to the key claims about the game, namely “contest,” “opponents,” and “winning”:

- (M1) A marriage is a sustained struggle;
- (M2) between two contestants;
- (M3) in which the rewards (power? money? satisfaction?) of one contestant are gained only at the other's expense.

A comparable interaction is operative between the two senses in allegory. There is also a form of isomorphism between the two, which, working as an enacting mechanism, commands that one read one in terms of the other. The two senses can be conveniently regarded as two systems, whose textual manifestations are two texts to be reconstituted from the original, unitary text. The more unspecific of the two senses functions as the primary subject in metaphor as opposed to the other sense which functions as the secondary subject. In fact, we will henceforth call the two senses the primary subject and the secondary subject, for two major reasons. First of all, the new terminology will be free of unwanted associations and methodological clumsiness linked to the various labels for them. For one thing, "allegorical meaning," "undersense," "secondary meaning," and "primary sense" all vaguely refer to our adopted "primary subject" while containing special meanings of their own which bespeak a different understanding of the concept of allegory from ours. For another, more often than not, they are unscrupulously used, shifting, unpronounced, from reference to a particular sense within an allegorical text to reference to an overall sense of the text (that is, the total sense derived from the interaction of the two senses within the text). Secondly and more importantly, the new terminology will highlight the interactive relationship between the two senses.

Quite in the manner of its counterpart in a metaphorical statement, the primary subject in an allegory lays out the boundaries for the possible reading of the secondary subject, selecting, suppressing, and organizing the motifs in the latter. The secondary subject, in turn, acts on the primary subject by circumscribing and specifying its possible meaning and function. Take Baudelaire's "voyage" for instance. The statement in the primary subject that the story in the poem is about the mental state of the narrator has the immediate effect of redirecting our attention from the question as to the physical probability of the mutilation scene, or for that matter, the very voyage itself, to the question of how the grisly scene is made analogous to the narrator's professed guilt and self-hatred. The particulars of the mutilation scene, however, also contribute to our grasp of the mental state of the narrator, that is, the visceral nature of the horror, specially manifested in the description of the castration, which tends to induce us to attribute sexual guilt as among the central causes of his mental disturbance. Such mutually qualifying, clarifying, and enriching operations exist between the primary subject and the secondary subject in all allegories.

If the account for how metaphor can with some modification be used to explain the working of allegory, as we have done, an important difference between metaphor and allegory needs to be pointed out. Unlike the primary and the secondary subjects of a metaphor, which are usually manifested in words or short phrases, the primary and the secondary subjects in an allegory should be considered as manifested in two complex texts, each with a vast number of components existing in a complex network of relations. One consequence of this is that the working out of a system comparable to metaphor's implication complex is a considerably more onerous task. Another

consequence lies in the fact that as texts they have what may be called excess elements whose function is to contribute to the immediate completeness of the one text—most frequently in the secondary subject—and which recalcitrantly resist being squeezed into the framework laid out by the other text. For example, even in a meticulously worked-out allegory like *Everyman*, one can find elements superfluous to the allegorical function of the play. One example is the rough humor derived from the undue haste with which the protagonist's friends abandon him. (Rough humor of course has been noted as characteristic of many a morality or mystery play.) What this points to is that allegorical response to an allegorical text does not constitute the totality of the reading experience.

Furthermore, compared with the two terms of a metaphorical statement, which tend to have simple correspondence to some verbal expressions, the primary subject and the secondary subject in an allegorical discourse are essentially two logical constructs, whose manifestations may take diverse forms and in manifold relations. In rare cases, the primary subject and the secondary subject may appear in an allegory as two distinctive texts, for instance, one being a prologue and the other the narrative proper. However, in most cases, they are bodied forth by an admixture of elements reflective of different possible worlds (historical characters amidst animals capable of human speech, for example) or different literary conventions (realistic fiction and medieval romance, for instance) in one narrative flow, thereby forcing one to adopt an "allegorical" angle of reading and coming up with various configurations of the motifs that ultimately fall into the primary subject and the secondary subject construction. The myriad externalizations of the allegorical structure are further complicated by the fact that the relation between the primary and the secondary subject is relative rather than absolute. If a unitary text can be analyzed into the two components of a primary subject and a secondary subject, within each component one may further discern the subdivisions of a primary and a secondary subject.

As the possible realizations of the allegorical structure are various and diverse, an adequate discussion of allegory as a theoretical structure has to take into consideration allegory as accomplished texts. For a suggestive illustration of the allegorical manifestations, we will examine portions of the *Ching hua yuan* (*Flowers in the Mirror*) by Li Ju-chen (c. 1763-1830),⁵ and *Psychomachia* by Prudentius (348-c. 410).⁶

The last five chapters of *Flowers in the Mirror* (Chapters 96-100) illustrate how components of non-allegorical narrative can have their own self-sufficiency as prominently allegorical tales. The narrative at this point describes military campaigns launched to dethrone the Empress Wu of the T'ang dynasty so as to restore her son the Emperor Chung-tsung. As the story goes, the Restorationists have to conquer four passes before they can get to the capital city of Ch'ang-an and bring their uprising to a successful end. Each pass presents a unique obstacle owing to its peculiar fortification and army formation. The naming of the passes and the particular kinds of military disposition they have give rise to an allegorical effect. The two-character name of each pass can be easily perceived as standing for a one-character word: for example, *yu-shui* for *chiu* (wine). Thus the passes are actually the Pass of Wine, the Pass of Lust, the Pass of Richness, and the Pass of Anger. When it comes to describing the military

dispositions, the novel has ingeniously availed itself of the conventions of the military romance in vernacular literature. *Chen* (military formation and fortification) has often been presented in military romance vaguely and mysteriously as something between a labyrinth and an enchanted enclave, and it is in this manner that the Formations of Wine, of Lust, of Richness, and of Anger are described. The episode about the Restorationist general Wen Hsiao's foray into the Formation of Wine exemplifies the unique way a formation is presented, which ultimately exerts an allegorical function.

Prompted by the taunts from the enemy camp, the hot-tempered Wen Hsiao gallops into the formation. Once inside, what greets him is, instead of a forest of swords and spears, a bucolic world of almost somnolent tranquility:

... all that he saw was the shadows of the willows and the bright shades of the flowers, the verdant hills and the emerald streams, a rich growth of trees and grass, and fragrant plants everywhere, and fine steeds neighing proudly in their midst. Wen Hsiao descended leisurely from his horse, and had almost forgotten he was in the battle-field.⁷

As he strolls around, he smells the enticing fragrance of wine in the air. He first encounters some scholars drinking in a self-consciously refined manner. He then chances upon some drunk derelicts abandoning themselves to all kinds of vulgarities. As he walks on, he further spots a student selling a gorgeous garment for the price of a pot of wine. In time, he finds himself overwhelmed by the temptation of the fragrant wines. With literally all of the world's famed varieties of wines—some newly brewed and some well-aged—available, he is seized with the urge to taste them all at once. Consequently, he hops from tavern to tavern. At one point he even violates the foremost code of conduct for a soldier when he gives his renowned two-edged sword as a pledge to a wine seller in order to quench his insatiable thirst. Indeed, he soon feels guilty about succumbing to drinking, but it takes him only a moment to come up with this universal rationalization: "Just as well as give way to my capacity and drink a few more bowls. I'll start being abstinent again tomorrow" (Chang, p. 33). After having drunk a bowl each of one hundred or so varieties of wine in a tavern, he collapses upon leaving the tavern and dies.

The Restorationists have made several attempts to break the formation, or the enchantment, but they all fail. They succeed only after they learn to wear a charm and, most importantly, to swear abstinence before making their way into the formation.

The storming of the Pass of Wine is then, among other things, a self-sufficient allegory on the vice of drinking. Similarly, the storming of other remaining passes are respectively self-sufficient allegories on the vices of lechery, covetousness, and bad temper. As a "scholar-novelist," Li Ju-chen repeatedly demonstrates his predilection for playfulness in *Flowers in the Mirror*, and one senses playfulness in the very economy he manages to achieve by making battle scenes of what one would call a military romance function also as allegories on the four Chinese proverbial vices of *ch'iu* (wine or drinking), *se* (lust or lechery), *ts'ai* (riches or covetousness), and *ch'i* (anger or short temper).

In "The Storming of the Passes of the Four Vices," the primary subject and secondary subject structure does not have a clear-cut corresponding construction at the textual level; instead, the structure is manifested in a strand of narrative with unmistakable allegorical markers. By contrast, *Psychomachia* by Aurelius Prudentius Clemens exemplifies a by far more clear-cut manifestation of the allegorical structure in its textual composition. The text is divided into a preface and a narrative proper, which correspond to the primary subject and the secondary subject.

The preface has its own construction of a primary subject and a secondary subject. It recounts the Biblical story of how Abraham, accompanied by his house servants, liberates his nephew Lot from his pagan captors, how upon Abraham's triumphant return Melchisedech offers him bread and wine, and how Sara, sterile up to then, is visited by angels and following that gives birth to a male child. In the concluding passages of the preface the narrator provides a theological interpretation of the above events, which assertively treats what is purportedly historical as merely a metaphor for some mental and spiritual, and therefore timeless, truth:

. . . we must watch in the armour of faithful hearts, and that every part of our body which is in captivity and enslaved to foul desire must be set free by gathering our forces at home. . . . Then Christ himself, who is the true priest, born of a Father unutterable and one, bringing food for the blessed victors, will enter the humble abode of the pure heart and give it the privilege of entertaining the Trinity; and then the Spirit, embracing in holy marriage the soul that has long been childless, will make her fertile by the seed eternal. (Prudentius, pp. 278-79)

The narrative proper takes the form of a heroic epic, beginning with an evocation—only to Christ in this case rather than to the muse—to be followed by a succession of battle scenes. There are seven main battles which form a single warfare between the virtues and the vices. The first two combatants are Faith and Idolatry. Faith, "trusting in a stout heart" and in her "sudden glow of ambition, burning to enter fresh contests," rushes to the battle with "her rough dress disordered, her shoulders bare, her hair untrimmed, her arms exposed" (Prudentius, p. 281). Even though meagerly armored, she has no difficulty in finishing her opponent with quick dispatch:

But she, rising higher, smites her foe's head down, with its fillet-decked brown, lays in the dust that mouth that was sated with the blood of beasts, and tramples the eyes under foot, squeezing them out in death. The throat is choked and the scant breath confined by the stopping of its passage, and long gasps make a hard and agonizing death. (Prudentius, p. 281)

In the next battle glowing Chastity subdues Lust by smiting her right down with a rock. Then armor of calm Long-Suffering turns out to be so impenetrable that tempestuous Wrath commits suicide out of desperation. Pride charging on horseback falls into a pit dug by Deceit and is then beheaded by Lowliness. In the following battles, Soberness destroys Indulgence, Good Works conquers Greed, and Faith, once

more, comes forth to slay Discord-Heresy, who has earlier dared to wound Concord. Finally, all unite to complete the building of the temple of God wherein Wisdom resides and reigns.

Psychomachia typifies allegory in its most explicit form, which has given rise to the label, "naive allegory." The allegorical function of characters, events, textual segments have been explicitly and repeatedly pointed out within the text. Unlike the allegory on the norms of conduct in "The Storming of the Four Passes," whose purported reflection of Confucian and Taoist ideologies requires the active effort of the readers to bring it out, one needs no knowledge of the Pauline Epistles on the struggle between the spirit and the flesh to make the connections between the combat of the virtues against the vices in *Psychomachia* and its Christian significance. The connections are provided in the text, first in the preface and then in the narrative proper (one needs only to point out the significance of Faith being presented as doing the first and the concluding battles).

As a naive allegory, *Psychomachia* further typifies, in an extreme way, the characteristics of allegory at the level of manifestation. Early in the preface, we find a strategy at work: a relationship of the primary subject and the secondary subject is imposed on some motifs which otherwise would not form into such a relationship. By asserting a link between Abraham's liberation of Lot and riddance of captivating vices in general, and between the blessing from the priest Melchisedech and that from Christ, the preface forces these paired motifs to interact with each other and to yield a kind of isomorphism. A comparable mechanism is at work between the preface and the narrative proper. This kind of allegorization has the effect of not only foregrounding the thematic aspect of the text but repeating the theme at several levels or in different areas of concern.

The imposition of an allegorical structure of a primary and a secondary subject is inevitably reflected in the very construction of the fictional universe perceived in terms of the three-fold coordinates of character (in the inclusive sense which stresses character as the agent of action), time, and space. Allegorical function, on the one hand, places constraints on the possibility of characterization and the structuring of time and space and, on the other hand, provides motivation to make good for what would otherwise pass for deficiencies in character, and fictional time and space.

First of all, take for example the characterization of Faith in her combat with Idolatry in *Psychomachia*. The conceptual meaning of "faith" requires its personification being invested with the psychological trait of "trusting in a stout heart." Such a trait is then translated into action: she goes to the combat unarmored; in her eagerness for glory and battles, she "takes no thought to gird on arms or armour" (Prudentius, p. 281). Obviously the behavior as described can just as well be indicative of imprudence, but the fact that here the character is specified as "Faith" directs us to a special meaning of the behavior and, in this sense, justifies it. And it is the allegorical function, too, that renders acceptable the vague, laconic "description" of the fight itself: "Lo, first Worship-of-Old-Gods ventures to match her strength against Faith's challenge and strike at her. But she, rising higher, smites her foe's head down" (Prudentius, p. 281). The question of why a single unarmored fighter can easily overpower a well-armored opponent with troops around her belongs to the

domain of *fictional* probability. The episode is justified, not on the ground of fictional probability, but by its allegorical intention to dramatize the assertion that faith necessarily overcomes idolatry. As far as characterization is concerned, the allegorical function tends to win respite from a rigid adherence to consistency of levels, or to put it another way, it tends to assert another convention of the criteria of consistency. Thus, humans, fauna and flora, and concepts are permitted to communicate and interact with each other as if they were all humans. Typically, in *Psychomachia* Job stands beside Long-Suffering as she fights, and Greed, apart from commanding a coterie of personifications such as Care, Hunger, and Treachery while struggling against yet another personification, Good Work, is also described as having destroyed "myriads of men" and tempted "the very priests of the Lord" (Prudentius, p. 313).

When it comes to "time," we notice that in *Psychomachia* no effort has been made to suggest either the duration of the battles or the temporal setting for the overall warfare. The absence effects a desired vagueness. In the case of "The Storming of the Passes of the Four Vices," time has a unique feature. Take, again, Wen Hsiao's venture into the enchanted Formation of Wine for instance. There are obviously two systems of time being presented, namely the "ordinary" time that Wen Hsiao experiences before his entry into the enemy camp, and what may be called the "magic" time subsequent to the entry. We learn that he gallops into the formation quite in the manner of a fiery warrior, but once inside, he finds himself in an unlikely land of idyllic leisure. Compared with the outside world, the time inside seems to move immeasurably slower. We see him leisurely hopping from one tavern to another, taking time to sample all the good wines of the world. The character Wen Hsiao does not experience any shift in his inner sense of time, but readers clearly feel the clash of two systems of time. Time in the formation, that is, the time in the "allegory," is thus like the time in a dream, or more appropriate to the immediate dramatic situation, in a hallucination.

If allegorical texts tend to be structured according to a special logic of time, they equally tend to manifest a special sense of space. The Formation of Wine in which Wen Hsiao traverses is presented concretely as a bucolic enclave, and as far as we adopt Wen Hsiao's perspective, a location with its solid physical actuality. However, as soon as we try to place it side by side with the world outside—the battlefield and the camps—the bucolic world becomes as ethereal as a fancy of the mind. In the case of *Psychomachia*, the place of action changes back and forth at great liberty. It has been noticed that while the place of action is generally presented as a field with the camp of Virutes nearby, the battlefield sometimes seems to encompass the whole world (for example, Greed slaughters among the peoples and seizes every race of men) and sometimes seems to be within the mind (for example, Pride brags that her forces occupy the whole man.)⁸

From a purely formal view, the allegorical employment of character, time, and space shares the same characteristics of fantasy in its violation of our sense of the possibility of ordinary reality. What sets allegory apart from fantasy is the structure of a primary subject and a secondary subject, whose presence is nonetheless marked by the "fantastic" formal elements. We may at times be uncertain as to whether a text is meant to be allegorical or fantastic until we reach some differentiating clues

in our process of reading. "The Storming of the Four Passes" and *Psychomachia* are clear-cut cases of allegory, not only because they all have tell-tale markers from the very outset of the text to call attention to a structure of the primary subject and the secondary subject, but also because the very content or theme of the primary subject is explicitly pointed out in the text itself, either in the form of a summary or "translation."

NOTES

1. In *The Complete Works of Shakespeare*, ed. Hardin Craig (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1961), p. 476.
2. Collected in Max Black, *Models and Metaphors* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1962).
3. "More About Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought*, ed. Andrew Ortony (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1979), p. 28.
4. In Ortony, pp. 29-31.
5. *Ching hua yuan* (Hong Kong: Chung-hua, 1958), 2 vols.
6. In *Prudentius*, trans., H.J. Thomas (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1949), I, 274-343.
7. For translation, I use H.C. Chang, "The Storming of the Passes of the Four Vices," *Allegory and Courtesy in Spenser: A Chinese View* (Edinburgh: Univ. of Edinburgh Press, 1955), pp. 24-25.
8. Stephen A. Barney, *Allegories of History, Allegories of Love* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1979), p. 64.