

## MODERN RUSSIA AND THE CHINESE REVOLUTION: 1905-1911

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As C.E. Black has indicated, modern revolution is intellectual in its origins, being based on the expansion of new knowledge and thought.<sup>1</sup> Chinese intellectuals during the early 20th century, especially those who were alienated from governing circles, were deeply and ambiguously influenced by western knowledge and thought, and their minds were tantalised by the great new social and intellectual movements at work in one of the centers of European culture, Russia. The ultimate purpose of the Chinese revolution, in the radical intellectuals' view, was not "the driving out of the barbarian dynasty", but "the transformation of the people's livelihood and of national polity."<sup>2</sup> They compared the process of the Russian revolution, about which they committed themselves to the view that the right and welfare of the people were paramount, with that of a democratic republic, which was the ultimate goal for the revolutionary movement in China the same as in Russia. However, most Chinese reformists, following Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, whose propaganda at that time influenced them more strongly than any other single set of reform ideas, were convinced that a powerful state could breed good citizens. Based on observation of Russia's struggle in the first decade of the 20th century, they affirmed that the attempt to prevent the horrors of revolution must necessarily be a central goal. They believed that the chaos in Russia came from the demand for constitutional government which, above all other issues, was the crux of the difference between reformism and revolutionary ideas and actions. In this historical context, the Russian case was the only vehicle through which such ideas as populism, anarchism, socialism and constitutionalism could however cryptically, be conveyed by both camps in China.

It must further be noted that in China political and cultural chauvinism rendered most of the educated class unable easily to accommodate to the modern world, a difficulty supported by the government's rigid censorship, so that Chinese intellectuals could not freely give open expression to political and social ideas except by residing in the foreign concession of Shanghai and other cities. Thus, whereas the ideas which were dominant in the west had emerged from a fierce struggle among a large number of doctrines and attitudes, in China, on the other hand, because of the restricted environment, such doctrines tended to lodge themselves at first encounter in the minds of leading intellectuals and continued to obsess them, often simply to satisfy their need to have an ideological outlook.

Thus there was an enthusiastic conviction that every leading intellectual had a unique mission to fulfill if he could only know what it was. This ideological difference within the Chinese revolutionary party, was reflected in their incessant conflicts and divisions over methods, timing, and goals. Throughout these ideological divisions, however, Sun Yat-sen's idea was the only revolutionary view that was focused on the goal of joining a new China with the modern world. Moreover, it was the only doctrine based on faith in political and social revolution. It easily gained a dominant

influence in the minds and hearts of the young Chinese intelligentsia. But, in the broad sense, he never resolved the party's theoretical ambivalence and the vital struggle with the reformist camp. This eventually eroded the influence of the Chinese revolutionary party on the eve of the 1911 Revolution, which so decisively shaped modern China.

## 1. The Russian Experience as a Model for China's Transformation

### *a. The Constitutional Movement*

In 1905, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, a genius of propaganda, declared: "Ah, Revolution has come to Russia! Ah, The world's only (true) autocracy has not escaped a great revolution".<sup>3</sup> His loathing of monarchic absolutism was fervent, yet he did not want a violent cataclysm. He thought that it might be inevitable, that it might come, but he was frightened of it. He was convinced that the increasingly acute struggle in Russia was mainly caused by the influx of liberal ideas from western Europe after the Napoleonic wars, the frustration of premature hopes for liberation, and the government's repressive response. But this crisis, he believed, could be resolved by building up a constitutional government in which the parliament, whether called by the old regime or by a reformist regime, would work for the legislative fulfilment of the people's demands,<sup>4</sup> and ultimately, would serve as the means of transfer of power to the people.<sup>5</sup> He too believed that the main lesson to be learned from this revolution was the need to struggle for a constitution.<sup>6</sup> If the Russian people succeeded in this demand, the Russian revolution would be a potent factor in stirring up China's constitutional movement and imbuing it up with enthusiasm and ideological influence. One may ask: In what way did the Russian revolution of 1905 contribute substantially to the development of the constitutional movement in China, a movement which seemed to the reformists better suited to preserving the traditional Chinese society? Or, as regards the period after 1905, since the constitutional movement did not draw people away from allegiance to the Manchu's repressive government, was its influence therefore no more than a bubble upon the mainstream of China's transformation?

Between 1898 and 1905, the dream of "reform from above" had never disappeared. Within the category of thought represented by the phrase, "li-hsien chiu-kuo" (save China by establishing a constitution), one can trace the line of development to the conception of the parliamentary institution held by the leading reformists of the late 19th century. They considered it a means of creating national loyalty, as Yen Fu indicated in 1895: "How can we induce our people to think of China as their private possession? Let us establish a national assembly at the capital and have all the provinces and prefectures nominate representatives. In this way one will instill in the people loyalty and love for China".<sup>7</sup> Hopeful of a change in government policy, a number of ardent reformists, such as Ch'en Ch'iu and Cheng Kuan-yin, recommended to the throne proposals intended to create a sense of literati opinion.<sup>8</sup> However, the Empress Dowager Tz'u-hsi, the real ruler of late Ch'ing dynasty, was never really converted to Western constitutionism on the ground that it was opposed to the rule of the Manchu government.

For the majority of the younger reformists, the year 1905 marked a decisive break with the past. It created a greatly strengthened revolutionary movement, and the leaders of the Revolutionary Alliance enthusiastically turned to the credo which predicted the eventual downfall of centuries of autocracy and the establishment of a democratic order. What seemed to be the most immediately and acutely critical issue, as the editor of *Wan-kuo kung-pao* (the Globe Magazine or the Review of the Times)<sup>9</sup> sharply wrote, as much in China as in Russia, was the problem of social and economic backwardness which – rather than the tyranny of the absolute monarchy – as the chief cause of China's ills.<sup>10</sup>

Such an emphasis on the equation and comparison of China and Russia, both chained to absolute monarchy and socio-economic backwardness, was widely expressed in the writings of contemporary journals, whether moderate, such as *Hsin-min ts'ung-pao* (Renovation of the people), or radical, such as *Chekiang Tide*. One will find warnings and concrete suggestions urging constitutional reform based on Russia's situation scattered throughout the writings in the *Wan-kuo kung-pao*. As Count Tolstoi, Jr. and also his translator, Dr. Young J. Allen, wrote:

“Russian has not made any progress for a thousand years... As for its moral level, in that too it is behind its neighbors... Now in Russia, there are the conservative, Kadet, Revolutionary, and Nihilist parties. In the past, the Conservative Party held absolute control of the country. Later there has been a constant shift of power between the Conservative Party and the Kadet. In Europe, all the newly risen states have gone through times similar to the one in which Russia is now... If the Tsar and noble class can satisfy the people's demands: establish a Duma and inaugurate a constitution,... Russia, will have a very promising future. If they still intend to cling to the autocracy of Peter the Great, Russia is doomed... The situation of Russia in the West is the same as that of China in the East. One need only change the name “Russia” into “China” and find that what has been said above is still perfectly applicable.”<sup>11</sup>

Dr. Allen's insightful, indeed prophetic, description of the Russian case offered to the Chinese constitutional movement a pattern to emulate. Its main impact was, however, to encourage the reformists to follow confidently the direction of Russia's development in the expectation that a widespread constitutional movement in China would similarly bring the fulfilment of their desires. It is not at all surprising that Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who promoted constitutionalist reform with increasing assurance, was so deeply impressed with this simple historical analogy and was particularly sensitive to Russia's situation. As he aptly remarks, “The Russian people did not know before 1901 that there was any such thing as the ideas of liberty and equality, so they were content with their old ways... But after these reforms,” Liang concludes, “the Russians cannot help but adopt the political system of Europe... Our China is like this too.”<sup>12</sup> At this point, of course, some may begin to detect what seems to be a fundamental cause of Russia's catastrophe of 1905. The fate of constitutional government in Russia, he stated and affirmed, depended on the outcome of the struggle between the liberal group under the protection of Svyatopolk-Mirsky and the conservative group supported by Pobedonostsev.<sup>13</sup> However, according to the Reuters report which he

referred to, reform circles were broken up and their supporters dismissed.<sup>14</sup> In Russia, the Revolution of 1905 did not break the tyrannical grip with which the autocracy still dominated the country. But the hope for aid from above in remodeling the existing order, was not immediately crushed. In the minds of Liang and his associates, the constitutionalists, the idea of trust in the benevolence of "enlightened rulers" remained alive. In fact what Liang and his associates particularly take note of was not the monarchy's self serving purpose in establishing a constitution which purported to represent a resolution of demand for political and social transformation. Rather, the Chinese constitutionalists stressed the value of the struggle in Russia and in China between the advocates of reform and revolution, and placed emphasis on the expectation of warding off violent catastrophe by establishing a national assembly. The failure of Russia's Revolution of 1905 did not depress them. It exhilarated them.<sup>15</sup>

The striking fact is that after 1905, the revolutionary tide kept rising, and became even higher and wider than before. Although in the summer of 1906, the Hunan-Kiangsi border uprising, known as the P'ing-Liu-Li uprising, was suppressed by the Ch'ing government,<sup>16</sup> the year witnessed active opposition, and the revolution movement spread throughout the area to the north and south of the Yangtze River. During the years 1905 to 1907, anti-government activities spontaneously erupting in central China, and even occasionally in remote provinces such as Yunnan and Kueichow, numbered more than one hundred and sixty according to a conservative account.<sup>17</sup> Sporadic peasant disturbances kept the tension high in rural areas and offered, in a sense, increased opportunities to the reformists. Following the Russo-Japanese war,<sup>18</sup> the slogan "Japanese constitutionalism defeated Russian autocracy", won strategic acceptance among most of the articulate elements of the ruling class. Constitutionalist organizations, such as the *Yü-pei li-hsien kung-hui*, (the Association to Prepare for the Establishment of a Constitution by Chang Chien), the *Hsien-cheng kung-hui* (the Constitutional Government Association by Yang Tu), *Hsien-cheng ch'ou-pei hui* (the Constitutional Government Preparation Association, led by T'ang Hua-lung), *Tzu-chih hui* (Self-government Association, by Ch'iu Feng-chia), exercised a dominant influence on contemporary literati opinion. However, it should immediately be noted that the Manchu ruler's willingness after 1905 to approve a constitutional government proceeded out of considerations different from those of constitutionalists. What then was the government's main concern in looking favorably on constitutionalism? Obviously the court's aim was not, as Liang and his associates urged, the intention to imitate Japan in seeking, by adoption of political reform, military victory over an autocratic European power as Japan gained in the Russo-Japanese war. The principal reason for announcing preparations for establishing a constitutional government, was that, as the Russian and Prussian examples showed, constitutionalism could be useful for maintaining domestic order and authority. Furthermore, facing the flames of revolt which blazed throughout central and southern China, the government was perhaps convinced that a constitution would be an effective way of preventing a fatal revolution. As the Manchu governor Luān-fang reassured the court in a memorial of 1907, a constitutional regime would serve as a safety valve to protect the dynasty from the increasing danger of political explosion, and "the force of the rebel party's propaganda and agitations would automatically be destroyed".<sup>19</sup>

In Liang's mind, on the other hand, the strength of Japan's constitutional government was certainly not simply a matter of enhanced military power. Liang was surely much more concerned with China's general social and political transformation than with the single matter of military might. Was not the constitutional monarchy which he advocated after the Russo-Japanese war<sup>20</sup> deeply involved with a whole program of political, legal, and social reform? As already indicated, Liang had no confidence in the revolutionary vision of the future. There is, of course, an assumption throughout his thought that a "one to one" struggle between the revolutionaries and the Manchu government would become inevitable if not alternative were made available. The dream held by advocates of reform from above, that constitutional monarchy could offer a peaceful solution to China's problems, was never absent from Liang's mind.

It has long been recognized that the international situation, particularly after 1905, was increasingly precarious, a trend which has been assumed to be one of the driving forces for constitutional reform.<sup>21</sup> The Manchu government believed, as reflected in the telegram of Ch'ien Hsun who was minister to Holland, that if China carried out constitutional reform "the great powers will have respect for us, and our nation can rest on firm foundations".<sup>22</sup> It was, however, not improvement of its international standing but the reinforcement of domestic autocracy through constitutional reform that dominated the Manchus' attention.<sup>23</sup> In 1906, the Ch'ing government sent the second delegation headed by Tai Hung-tz'u (1853-1910) and Tuan-fang (1861-1911) to observe the constitutional government of twelve European nations. Russia, of course, was one of the key focuses of interest. (Bismark's Germany and Meiji Japan were also approved by the delegation sent abroad). According to Tai Hung-tz'u's diary, they enthusiastically solicited advice from Count Sergei Witte,<sup>24</sup> whose view to some extent contributed to the Ch'ing government's deliberations on the shaping of a constitution. It is thus interesting to observe that, given the traditional Russian autocracy, Witte's interest in constitutionalism was intimately linked with the aim of strengthening the Tsar's rule. Because, as Witte said, "If the Tsar's government falls, you will see absolute chaos in Russia, and it will be many a year before you see another government able to control the mixture that makes up the Russian nation",<sup>25</sup> In Witte's mind, according to Gurko, "the constitution was a very limited one in which control would still reside in the Monarch and a government appointed by him".<sup>26</sup> As a matter of fact, Witte urged it, in his own words, "as a physician would urge a patient to take a laxative".<sup>27</sup>

This context suggests what was the major concern of the Ch'ing government in eagerly seeking to intensify the power of the emperor through the so called "Principles of the Constitution".<sup>28</sup> Contrary to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's expectation, it would appear there are no grounds for supporting the idea that the Manchu government, like the Tsarist system at the turn of this century, could have effectively maintained a constitutional order nor have achieved a peaceful transformation of the national polity. Liang and his associates wanted a benevolent monarchy to endorse a constitutional government. We may wonder to what extent they were aware that their constitutional movement would be viewed as hostile to the autocracy's dominance. It would probably be fairly accurate to say, as Geoffrey Hosking analyzed the Russian case, that "the only alternative to this domination was usually held to be anarchy and dissolution".<sup>29</sup>

That view was in some measure shared by the throne and the reformists, even by those who, with Liang, were political refugees in Japan at this time.

### b. *The Anarchist Experiment*

Feng Tzu-yu (1881-1958), one of Sun Yat-sen's followers in Japan who later became an authoritative historian of the Chinese revolution, pointed out in 1906 that "The revolutionary storm in Russia (in 1905) has profoundly shaken the entire world. The Tsar has promulgated laws establishing a national assembly (the Duma), in which he has granted political freedom to the people. But the people's desires are not satisfied.... And since the Russian people have not yet attained freedom, internal policy will have to differ from that of other countries. In this sense, the Russian case can serve as an aid in giving direction to the revolutionary movement in China".<sup>30</sup> While the reformists and the conservatives moved within the orbit of constitutional ideas and relied on sporadic appeals to the throne, the revolutionaries broke new ground and trod the thorny path of anarchist experiment.<sup>31</sup>

Philosophical anarchism, if considered as the condition of a society without political authority in any form, can be traced back to ancient times in China.<sup>32</sup> But considered primarily as a form of social protest, in response to the accelerated pace of political and economic centralization brought on by the industrial revolution, the anarchism which appeared in late Tsarist Russia was a recent phenomenon there and in China.<sup>33</sup>

It must first of all be pointed out that the ideas of Bakunin and Kropotkin were the fountainhead of the Chinese anarchists' inspiration.<sup>34</sup> For both Bakunin and Kropotkin, the ultimate goal of the revolution was a stateless society in which no man would be master over his brother. But their personalities and approaches to the revolution were different. In contrast with Bakunin, Kropotkin opposed the use of violence in preparing for revolution. The place of terror in the revolution became a focus of heated disputes between them, and was later the main cause of schism within the Russian anarchist movement.<sup>35</sup> It would, indeed, be not exaggeration to say that the thought and feeling of those Chinese thinkers, such as Chang Chi (1882-1947), Liao Chung-k'ai (1878-1925), Liu Shih-p'ei (1884-1919), and Li Shih-tseng (1882-?), who had been fascinated with Russian anarchism, made little reference to this conflict and its profound influence on the Russian revolutionary movement, nor to the differences between China and Russia.<sup>36</sup>

As already pointed out, the nature of Russian anarchism is protest against the economic tyranny which came from industrialization and the political despotism of the autocracy of the centralized state. To achieve a stateless society where people were bound by cooperative effort and mutual aid, the anarchists believed, reliance would have to be placed on awakening forces of the workers and peasants. But, for many reasons, Russian anarchists never managed to obtain widespread support.<sup>37</sup> As in the case of China, one can hardly deny the essentially "radical" nature of anarchist ideas expressed in essays carried by the *Min-pao* and *Hsin shih-chi*. Liu Shih-p'ei, one of the founders of She-hui chu-i ch'iang-hsi-hui, (the Society for the Study of Socialism),<sup>38</sup> alleged that industrialization would bring concentration of wealth and

monopolies. The capitalists were protected and encouraged by the Manchu government; however, the laboring classes, he said, gained no benefit although they worked hard through the whole year and were forced to limit their living expenses to the level of marginal subsistence.<sup>39</sup> Liu thus came to conclude, "The evil of government is that those above oppress those below. The evil of private capital is that the wealthy control the poor".<sup>40</sup> It is within the setting of these ideas that we can understand Liu's declaration "Western civilization (Europe, America, and even including Japan) should not be a model for China" because it was infected with materialism and utilitarianism;<sup>41</sup> hence his suggestion, "Russia's three stages of development offer a guide for China" because hers was the strongest among the anarchist movements.<sup>42</sup>

It should immediately be noted that China's industrialization, under the general motto of "Self-Strengthening", still remained in the embryonic state.<sup>43</sup> The total number of factory workers, according to a rough estimate, amounted to no more than three-hundred thousand before 1911 and most of them were in Shanghai.<sup>44</sup> The social and economic situation provided no fundamental breeding-ground for a labor movement until 1919.<sup>45</sup> In fact, pre-revolutionary China, like Russia, was a land of peasants.<sup>46</sup> Toward the end of the 19th century, it was quite clear that the Russian countryside was in the throes of a serious crisis and there emerged an increased belligerency in the peasant temper. Russian intellectuals, whatever their specific views (Populism, anarchism, Marxism...), were convinced that the best way to alleviate this tension was to lift the masses to a better life. On the other hand, despite his heritage of rebellion, the Chinese peasant remained relatively peaceful during the early 20th century. C.K. Yang, an American-trained sociologist, in his study of 19th century China's mass actions (which appeared primarily in the countryside) has pointed out among the total of 566 incidents recorded in the *Shih-lu* (Veritable Records of the Ch'ing Emperors), only 90 were directed at the goal of Republican Revolution during the 16 year period of 1896-1911.<sup>47</sup> By contrast, in Russia, during the years 1905-1907 there were recorded, including all varieties, over 7000 instances of peasant unrest.<sup>48</sup> We are, of course, made aware that after 1905 Russian peasant society was deeply involved in a revolutionary tide while China's was at a state of relative tranquility.

Furthermore, in this context, it is interesting to note that in the budget of most Russian peasant households, payments for books and schooling were very much lower than the voluntary outlay to the church.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, it was only in a small proportion of Chinese peasant households that educational costs (for schooling and books) amounted to a large part of the family budget.<sup>50</sup> It may be assumed that throughout the period under study, peasants of both countries had hardly been flooded with new ideas through the channel of the printed page. However, it may be further assumed that a cluster of liberal or revolutionary ideas might have been imported to Russian villages by peasant-workers returning from the city, if even so limited in quantity; while in Chinese peasant society during the pre-revolutionary period, no outside sources stimulated such an encounter. Rural China, as F.W. Mote indicates, "grouped into a small families and forged into lineage chains" was "committed to order, and profound disorder was the exceptional consequence of extraordinary circumstances".<sup>51</sup> In other words, it still remained in its conservative, stable world. It is ironic to note

that Yang Tu-shen, an ardent Chinese populist, who attempted "going to the people"<sup>52</sup> and appealed to the people's "feeling" to destroy the existing order, as suggested by Michael Bakunin, eventually became bogged down in the same broken wave as had the Narodnichestvo (the Populist movement) in Russia.

It is thus interesting to observe that within this context Liu Shih-p'ei and his wife Ho Chen hoped that the Russian anarchist movement could be linked with the development of revolution in China, beginning with what they identified as three stages: speech and discussion, followed by a state of political activity, and climaxed by a period of assassination.<sup>53</sup> They admired the Russian revolution because its "revolutionary" ideas (although the Lius did not point it out clearly, it is safe to say that they actually meant "anarchist" ideas) had spread widely throughout the country, "unlike the French Revolution which was a bourgeois revolution and the American Independence movement was the result of a merchants' revolution", and they predicted that if the Russian revolution were to succeed, it would bring happiness to the people much more widely than the French or American had.<sup>54</sup> What then must be done? According to the freest play to individual initiative, in keeping with anarchist ideology, they recognized acts of political assassination as valid in the revolutionary struggle while at the same time inspiring the people to move nearer to mass insurrection. However, the question is, as already indicated, what was to be done if rural China were unable to provide a breeding-ground for their plan and actually proved unsuited to become a cradle of revolution? Perhaps it may be concluded that the anarchist movement faltered because it was much more a feeling in the minds of Chinese anarchists and their sympathizers, a sentiment of protest, and not a developed ideology. Wu Yuch, who was described in Martin Bernal's pioneer study as having "entirely absorbed the Russian revolutionary tradition",<sup>55</sup> is a remarkable case. What he emphasized in anarchist ideas was not the painstaking long-range pursuit of its central goals, social justice and social equity, but rather was condemnation of the Manchu government as a monster evil and approval of individual violent action because "we are in the period of assassination",<sup>56</sup> the more assassinations, the better. The Chinese anarchists would not face up to the problem of peasant unresponsiveness to their call. The result of their individual violent actions, as Sun Yat-sen indicated, was only weakening of the revolutionary movement and postponement of the goal of a democratic republic.

## 2. Two Roads toward Sun Yat-sen's New China

No thinker in the early 20th century has had so direct, deliberate and powerful an influence upon the Chinese revolution as Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925). He belonged to a generation which cultivated radical emotions more intensely and deliberately than its predecessors; as he said in 1922, "I am a coolie and the son of a coolie. I was born with the poor and I am still poor. My sympathies have always been with the struggling masses".<sup>57</sup> The social and cultural dislocation and confusion of 19th century China thus excited his anger and prompted his troubled consciousness to confront the problems of a vast country. The formative, psychologically most interesting early years of his life, were spent in the impoverished milieu of rural China, and after this he was emotionally and intellectually fascinated by Western civilization (he was educated in



Hawaii, Hong Kong, and Macao):<sup>58</sup> these two different experience together set the ultimate goal for his strenuous efforts to revolutionize the Celestial Kingdom. A contemporary leading Chinese historian has compared the difference between Sun and K'ang Yu-wei, saying:

1. Sun emerged from an old agricultural family in which existence was a struggle and thought was simple; he could hardly have avoided the pressure of tradition several thousand years old. Nevertheless he was comparatively free from the constricted views typical of Neo-Confucianism. Even after the age of twelve or thirteen he showed an active and inquiring mind and he was not embarrassed to talk of becoming Hung Hsiu-ch'uan (the leader of the Taiping Rebellion during 1860s) the Second. By contrast K'ang Yu-wei from early boyhood was trapped by Neo-Confucianism and aspired to become, in the traditional sense, a sage.
2. From the beginning Sun received a modern Western, scientific education and had direct contact with European culture. His thoughts concentrated upon immediate practical aspects of political and social problems. K'ang received an old-fashioned and characteristically Oriental education... His acquaintance with Western culture was only indirect. K'ang's opinion, when people first encountered them, appeared to be fresh and original; but actually he never freed himself from traditional assumptions which hampered his power to deal with changing times and new circumstances".<sup>59</sup>

For a quarter of a century Sun concentrated his entire being upon the establishment of a new China, and, towards the end of his life, achieved it.

What then are the basic ideas of Sun's new China? Through what means did Sun and his followers believe they could accomplish their ultimate purpose of revolution? As already indicated, among the ideological shifts that marked the evolution of Chinese intellectuals during the turn of 19th and 20th centuries, Sun Yat-sen's ideas constituted the only revolutionary vision of the future that could go beyond the overriding motto of "wealth and power" to modernize China. This was because it was the only ideological scheme based on a grand blueprint of political revolution and social revolution, the two means considered necessary not only to enrich the state and increase its strength, but also to seek social justice and social equality. Sun and his followers promoted a revolutionary tide in China after 1905, because they met certain specific ideological needs and even more because they appeared to offer a general guide to a solution of China's problems. At this point, however, we find that two contrasting dimensions may be discerned in Sun's thought: a "capitalist-oriented democracy" in his program for political revolution and a "socialist-oriented welfare program" for social revolution.

#### *a. Political Revolution*

As a revolutionary Sun disapproved of a strictly political seizure of power by a national revolution aimed only at the single purpose of driving out the Manchus, an

approach which he thought obsolete, narrow-minded, and calculated to capture power from Manchu autocracy without altering its foundation. Instead he set about to create a political party dominated by the new view of political transformation. The central goal for Sun's new China was "min-chu li-hsien" (constitutional democracy). He believed that it could be reached by a three-stage program to the fulfillment of which all the energies of the revolutionaries must be bent.<sup>60</sup> The first stage would be "chün-cheng" (government by military law), its main work being to eliminate "the accumulated evils" of the Manchu regime along with the government itself. Here we find Sun's most vehement statement of democratic protest against the authoritarian repressions of the Manchus, broadly imbued with the anti-Manchuism of the Kuang-fu hui (Restoration Society).<sup>61</sup> As indicated before, in the Chinese revolutionaries' definition of nationalism they assert that it has two distinct objectives — anti-Manchuism and anti-imperialism. As for nationalism, it seemed in early 20th century China to be the strongest factor in the existing complex of interests, sentiments, and ideas which bound men into political groups. However, it must further be noted that for Sun anti-Manchuism was one source of his first formulation of the principle of *min-tsu chu-i* (nationalism), he by no means considered that the aim of the Chinese revolution was limited to the overthrow of the Manchu government, as the Kuang-fu Hui advocated.<sup>62</sup> His ultimate political goal was not only to oppose the monopoly held by a Manchu minority (what he called *min-tsu ke-ming*, national revolution), but, he further aimed to establish a democratic republic. This intent was also expressed by Wang Ching-wei, one leading revolutionary theorist of the T'ung-meng Hui, who said, "a state is governed by law".<sup>63</sup>

It is thus interesting to observe the next two stages which, Sun believed, could insure the development of people's democratic consciousness and the establishment of a constitutional order. Sun placed considerable stress on the second stage, the so called stage of "*hsün-cheng*" ("political tutelage", or government by a provisional constitution) when "the people were to elect local officials" and "all rights and duties of the Military Government... shall be regulated by the provisional constitution". After six years, political development would advance to the stage of *hsien-cheng* (government under the constitution), when "people shall elect the president, and elect the members of parliament to organize the parliament. The administrative matters of the nation shall proceed according to the provisions of the constitution".<sup>64</sup> Here again, we find that the stress on political form is entirely consistent with Sun's whole revolutionary outlook. These and many other considerations led him to the view that the only political form appropriate to a modern China is some form of democracy.

However, it remains to inquire why Sun formulated a three-stage program for the development of constitutional democracy (*min-chu li-hsien*). In speculating on the implicit reasons for this planned transition, one is aware that Sun was, after all, concerned with the level of the people's intellectual development as a prerequisite for democracy (What Yen Fu and K'ang Yu-wei called *min-chih*, rule by the people). It is interesting to note that Yen Fu, K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and even some members of the T'ung-meng Hui like Chang Ping-lin, all agreed that the Chinese people were not yet qualified to establish a democratic republic. The difference is, Yen and K'ang chose "constitutional monarchy" because they believed that China's transforma-

tion could be effected only through the power of a pre-existing state structure, and while the Manchu state was by no means an ideal vehicle, nevertheless it was the only vehicle available. Liang also envisioned a period of "enlightened despotism" during which the Chinese people would prepare for democratic government.<sup>65</sup> Practically realization of the ideas of these three thinkers, whose temperaments were basically conservative, would depend on the cooperation of the bureaucracy and nobility, and failing that, their ideas would perhaps be transformed into an uncertain hope for adding a liberal dress to the reform of despotism.

In all of this we are made acutely aware of Sun's overwhelmingly revolutionary approach to political transformation. Certainly he did not consider that the notion of "National power", as formulated in China's orthodox political philosophy, and represented by the Legalist slogan, the so called "enrich the state and strengthen its military power", should be the overriding concern of China's modern political development. What impresses us about the dominant goal of political revolution, as conceived in Sun's view of a new China, is precisely the increase of the whole nation's power, not only that of the government but, equally important, that of the people. His ideal type of democracy is, of course, based on the actual example of the United States in the contemporary world. According to Sharman's account, that American enthusiasm for the republican form of government had impressed his boyish mind seems an "inescapable conclusion"<sup>66</sup>. In 1904 he still held this attitude, as he said, "America is the leader of Western civilization, a Christian people, the teacher of our future new government."<sup>67</sup> What is more, America's case helped to crystallize in Sun's mind the fundamental notion that her democracy was created in the flames of revolution. However, the most striking fact is that, when discussing revolution as the primary force for achieving constitutional government, he and his followers nevertheless used the Russian case to develop their views. As Sung Chiao-jen commented on the Russian Revolution of 1905, "the people used two tactics against the government: revolution and demands. The success of the demands depended on the strength of the revolutionary efforts, but even so the government only acceded to 30 or 40 percent of them".<sup>68</sup> Therefore, Hu Han-min concluded that "without a decisive struggle between the people and the government, nothing could be achieved but paper reforms. In China, where the government was not nearly as perceptive or flexible as the Russian, demands would be even more certain to fail".<sup>69</sup>

### *b. Social Revolution*

as already indicated, Sun and his followers did not intend that establishment of a democratic constitution under the slogan of *min-chu li-hsien* should be the end of the Chinese revolution. In 1906, he said at the *Min-pao* anniversary gathering in Tokyo, "We not only want to create a democratic state, but we want to make a socialist State certainly this is what the West has not yet attained."<sup>70</sup> One finds here an extraordinary stress on the role of "social revolution" in his attempt to modernize China. We should especially note that at that time there existed a novel international situation in which many countries, such as America, England, Germany, and Australia, were flooded with social movements, whatever their professed commitment to so-

cialism. However, the fact was that Sun was unable to find among these any ideal type of socialist country which could facilitate his conceptualizing of social revolution in China. Nevertheless Sun found that the Russian revolution could, by a somewhat forced analogy, serve as an example. Accordingly, in the words of Chu Chih-hsin (1885-1920), who was a contemporary revolutionary theorist influenced by Marxism, "both political and social revolutions will be conducted together".<sup>71</sup>

It might be pointed out, incidentally, that Chernyshevsky, the most influential spokesman of the Russian Reform epoch, and Lenin, the powerful theorist and activist of Russian Marxism, both maintained that the social revolution must come first.<sup>72</sup> This coincidence of conviction between these two men, who certainly had different ideas of Russia's future, occurred for the common reason that they both believed intolerable economic crises had already appeared within a fully matured capitalist economy. It is interesting to note that in Chu's mind, the economic factor was the crux of the difference between the Chinese and the Russian social revolutions. Chu argued that the traditional Chinese policy had intended to "honor the peasant, and despise the merchant", with its main purpose being to restrain the excessive accumulation of wealth, so that wealthy people were historically remote from government service. Moreover, the Chinese government, at least the inner court, had no inseparable connection with the broad ranks of the nobility or gentry, unlike the Tsarist government in which political and economic power were in the hands of the nobility, clergy, and landowners, as he understood it. Therefore, according to Chu's typology of revolutions, in China, the target of social revolution (the bourgeoisie, with emphasis on the capitalists) was not the same as the target of political revolution (the Manchu ruler); while in Russia in both aspects of revolution, the targets could be considered the same. All this would suggest that, at least in the case of Chu Chih-hsin who was deeply influenced by Karl Marx, while the motive of social revolution was to cure the evils of capitalism by finding the example of Russia for the "scientific socialism", that was unsuited to placing a dominant role in the Chinese context.<sup>73</sup> At this point, Chu's contemporary, Feng Tzu-yu, also embraced the notion that social revolution should be undertaken in China, but he refused to think that China should go through the agonies of capitalism. Therefore he believed that China was in a unique position to ride the inevitable trend of socialism and to become a socialist model.<sup>74</sup> For both Chu and Feng, progress in social revolution was synonymous with progress on the path leading to the final triumph of socialism, which, of course, was to be the high road to a modern China.

It might be noted at this point that as socialists, Chu and Feng endorsed Marx's view of private property and the laissez-faire competitive system (Chu recognized that these phenomena had appeared in China) as the fountainheads of social injustice, but they did not believe in the essential role of class struggle and exploitation of interests in preparing the way for social revolution. Their prominent contemporary and leader of the revolutionaries, Sun Yat-sen, and also identified himself as "extremely socialist" but he criticized Marx's view of the dynamic significance of class conflict in social history,<sup>75</sup> and further denied that serious competition (or class conflict?) had existed between the capitalist and the working classes in China.<sup>76</sup> Sun might have recognized competition, or struggle, as an unavoidable component of

human activity, but, in essence, he made an effort to show that only cooperation could ensure the progressive evolution of human society.<sup>77</sup> What is probably more accurate to say is that Sun and his followers had no notion of applying the Marxist-type of social revolution to China; if Lenin rebuilt Russia with Marx's doctrine, could Sun's followers drag at the tail of the Russian Communists as Mao tse-tung did later?

It is thus interesting to ask, what constructive path to social revolution did Sun think China should be following? In the West (including Russia), serious conflict between the hedonistic and selfish capitalists and the exploited working class was seen as leading to society's growing debility.<sup>78</sup> But, in China, Sun believed that between these two classes there was no cleavage. He asserted that in the progress of human society, mutual support — not mutual struggle — has had the leading part. Then, how does he differ from the West in his conception of social revolution? Fundamentally, one may say that Sun's view of the social revolution is preventive, defensive, focused on the future but not on past and present conditions. Here, Henry George's *Progress and Poverty* provided Sun with a preconceived plan to reinforce his commitment to a defensive social revolution. Like the Social Revolutionaries in Russia, Sun eagerly reiterated George's "socialization of land" as the heart of the T'ung-meng Hui program.<sup>79</sup> However, as Ts'ui Shu-ch'in, who held a doctorate from Harvard University and later became the leading theorist of the Kuomintang (cited as KMT, which is the successor to the T'ung-meng Hui), and Harold Schiffrin, a leading Western scholar on Sun's life and thought, have pointed out, Sun's policy, namely *t'u-ti kuo-yu* (state ownership of land) was intended for urban rather than agrarian land.<sup>80</sup> It must immediately be noted that Liang Ch'i-ch'ao did not agree that China should carry out social revolution, and that the policy of state ownership of land was the crux of the disagreement in Liang's debate with the revolutionaries.<sup>81</sup> While it is beyond the scope of this study to discuss Henry George's influence on Sun's land policy and debate between the reformists and the revolutionaries, it seems unfair to imply that Sun's major concern was only on urban land, because it is clear that his deep consciousness of rural China had already been expressed in his earlier works.

In 1894, in a letter to Li Hung-chang (1823-1901), who was a Grand Secretary during the late Ch'ing, Sun presented a plan for the economic development of China, in which he said: "The improvement of agriculture is even more urgent... Since our country has attempted to adopt Western knowledge, I have never heard anyone speak of the imitation of Western agricultural methods". His methods for this purpose were as follows, "A department in charge of agricultural administration can make the people work hard; special researches on agriculture can improve plant and animal husbandry; and agricultural machines can save human labor. These three procedures should be studied and imitated by our country in order to raise the yield of the land."<sup>82</sup> Even until 1924, Sun appears not to have abandoned his deep concern for the crisis in rural China; in fact he was even more acutely aware of it. As he said: "Although China does not at present have great landlords, nevertheless almost 90 percent of Chinese peasants have no land... The commodities which they produce are mostly seized by the landlords. This is a very great problem; we ought to use political and legal means to resolve it immediately."<sup>83</sup>

Thus we are again confronted with the problem already posed as early as 1905

in Sun's and his followers' view of Chinese social revolution. Can Chinese peasant society provide fertile soil for socialism, or, in other words, for social revolution? Why do they feel this strong need that socialist solution of problems regarding rural land, production, and distribution, be accompanied by a political revolution, or be included in the tide of revolutionary activity? If they were primarily engrossed in the task of lifting China from its weakness and backwardness to a position of wealth and power, and beyond this, to a modern democratic and "socialistic" condition, why was rural China not able to become a central revolutionary base for their plan?

There is, of course, no easy answer to these questions. However, if one forcefully illustrates the analogy between China and Russia, one may observe some clues. As indicated already, the chaos in the Russian countryside was more serious than China's. In terms of land and production which were the pivotal factors in the agrarian problem, Russia fell short of China. According to a rough account written in 1905, the land holdings of almost two thirds of the Russian peasant households were below the Russian national average size, and held their allotment-land in many scattered strips.<sup>84</sup> While rural China has always been beset with the problem of land shortage, in the 1910s, there was an average of roughly 0.51 acre per capita (in Russia in 1905, the corresponding figure was 4.32).<sup>85</sup> However, land productivity per acre in China, in the case of rice and wheat -- the staple foods of the Chinese people -- were higher than in Russia and even than in the United States.<sup>86</sup> It is, of course, true that this factor greatly assisted the Chinese peasants' struggle for existence. It must further be noted that Wang Yeh-chien pointed out in his excellent study that throughout the last two decades of the 19th century, the Chinese land tax had decreased enormously, ranging from 4 percent to 2 percent of production in most provinces in China.<sup>87</sup> It is within a historical setting dominated by agrarian questions that, in the period 1921-1925, the Chinese peasant's average tax burden consumed no more than 6 percent of his income,<sup>88</sup> while in Russia in 1913, it reached 18 percent of total income.<sup>89</sup>

In this context, however, it is interesting to observe what seems to be a fundamental response to revolution in rural China. The peasants in Szechwan, one of the base areas of the Chinese revolution, were able, by stable land rent and high crop prices,<sup>90</sup> to maintain or improve their lives even on the eve of the 1911 Revolution, as revealed in local gazetteers: "At present the price of rice is several dozen times of that in former times. However, even the poor people all eat polished-rice. The maize, wheat, potatoes and sweet potatoes which they harvest are used to feed pigs or are transferred to other places to be sold".<sup>91</sup> "Generally speaking, country life is simple and city life luxurious; life in former times was frugal and in present times extravagant".<sup>92</sup> It is no surprise that when the "*Pao-lu yun-tung*" ("Protect the Railway Movement") -- a prelude to the 1911 Revolution -- emerged in Szechwan, the peasants showed no burning enthusiasm to respond to this dissident action.

Here we find, then, the very crux of the difference between the peasant societies of Russia and China. On the one hand, the Russian peasants assumed the good intentions of the Tsar and feared the populists' opposition to the myth of the ruler. But rural Russia was still afflicted with woefully abysmal poverty, and so long as the Russian peasants remained without effective political representation during this stage of reform,<sup>93</sup> this combination of circumstances was certain to arouse burning agitation

among the peasants. On the other hand, Chinese peasant could concentrate on agricultural production without fear of impoverishment, and did not anticipate that the state would greatly increase their tax burden.<sup>94</sup> Living within a subsistence economy, Chinese peasants' attention was exclusively focused on their efforts by "sweat and blood", to earn a better life. It was the struggle for this primary objective which led the Chinese peasants, to some degree, toward political apathy and ignorance of public affairs, even until the eve of the Communist revolution in the 1940s.<sup>95</sup> It is also in this respect that Chinese revolution of 1911 was unable to have as profound influence as the Russian revolution of 1917 had, due to the fact that rural China was for economic reasons, unsuited to become a cradle of revolution, and not simply on account of the revolutionary leaders' neglect of developing the peasants' revolutionary consciousness.

In the last analysis, these observations are by no means intended to diminish one's awareness of China's agricultural crises. These crises, such as the inability of traditionally organized agricultural production to meet market forces and the increasing concentration of arable land in the hands of landowners,<sup>96</sup> are vast topics which go far beyond the scope of this study. Chinese revolutionary leaders are acutely aware that solution of these crises required nothing less than a social revolution in China, and it was to the promotion of this revolution that they turned their attention after 1911. For many of the younger generation of Chinese radicals, it was precisely the slogans of anti-feudalism (i.e. opposition to landowners) which were to represent the central theme of the peasant revolution.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. C.E. Black, "The Nature of Imperial Russian Society", Donald Treadgold, ed., *The Development of U.S.S.R.* (Seattle, 1964), 182. Also, see C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, 1966), 63-64, 69.
2. The Manifesto of the Tung-meng Hui, 1905, in Ssu-yü Teng and John Fairbank, eds., *China's Response to the West* (Cambridge, 1954), 227.
3. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, "O-lo-ssu ke-ming chih ying-hsaing" (The influence of the Russian Revolution of 1905), in *Hsin-min ts'ung-pao* (hereafter cited as *HMTF*), 61: 25 (Feb., 1905).
4. Liang, "Hsien-cheng ch'ien-shuo" (Brief introduction to constitutional government), in *Yin-ping-shih ho-chi*, compiled by Lin Chih-chün, (Shanghai, 1936), *wen-chi*, t'se 8, 31-32.
5. Liang, "Kuo-hui chih-tu ssu-i" ("A personal opinion on parliament"), in Lin Chih-chün, *op. cit.*, *wen-chi*, t'se 9, 1-2.
6. Liang (pseud. Yin-ping), "Hsü chi O-kuo li-hsien wen-t'i" ("More on the issues of establishing a constitution in Russia"), *HMTF*, 60: 76 (Jan., 1905).
7. Yen Fu, "Chiu-wang chueh-lun" ("On our salvation"), in Chien Po-tsan et al., *Wu-hsü pien-fa* (The reform movement of 1898), V. II, 64.
8. See Sun Hui-wen, "Wan-Ch'ing ch'ien-ch'i pien-fa lun chetui hsi-fang i-hui chi-tu ti t'ai-tu ho chün-chu li-hsien chu-chang ti hsing-ch'eng" (The attitude of re-

- formers, in the early stage of the late Ch'ing period, toward Western parliamentary institution, and the formation of proposals for constitutional monarchy), in *Kuo-li pien-i kuan kuan-k'an*, (Bulletin of National Institute of Compilation and Translation), V. III, No. 2.
9. *Wan-kuo kung-pao* was essentially created by two missionaries, an American Baptist Dr. Young J. Allen, and a Welsh Baptist Dr. Timothy Richard, in order to enlighten the Chinese, particularly the gentry, whose violent hostility to Christianity and the West was causing great concern to the missionaries. In this journal, evangelism was mixed with secular news and general information from both China and the West. For the discussion of this journal, see Martin Bernal, *Chinese Socialism to 1907* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 32-48, esp.. For a biography of Allen, see Warren A. Gandler, *Young J. Allen* (Nashville, 1931); also Knight Biggerstaff, *The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 160-161. For Timothy Richard, see his autobiography, *Forty-five Years in China* (London, 1916); and W.E. Soothill, *timothy Richard of China* (London, 1974); also see Ch'i-yun Ch'en, "Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's Missaionary Education: A Case Study of Missionary Influence on the Reformers", *Harvard Papers on China*, XVI (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 66-125.
  10. Young J. Allen, "Political reform in China", *Wan-kuo kung-pao* (hereafter cited WKKP), V. XVI, No. 7, whole No. 187 (Aug., 1904).
  11. Count Tolstoi, Jr., "O-kuo pien-ko chih hsien-chuang", (On the situation in Russia), *WKKP*, V. XVI, No. 12, whole No. 192 (Jan., 1905).
  12. Liang, "Shih-chiu shih-chi chih Ou-chou yü erh-shih shih-chi chih Chung-kuo", ("19th century Europe and 20th century China"), *Ch'ing-i pao* (China Discussion), 93: 4b (Oct. 3, 1901).
  13. Liang, "O-kuo li-hsien cheng-chih chih tung-chi", ("The impulse toward constitutional government in Russia"), *IIMTP*, 58: 73-76 (Dec., 1904).
  14. Liang, "Wu-hu! O-kuo chih li-hsien wen-t'i", ("Alas! the issue of establishing a constitution in Russia"), *IIMTP*, 59: 61 (Jan., 1905).
  15. Yü-chieh, "Lun Chung-kuo hsien-tsi chih tang-p'ai chi Chiang-lai chih cheng-tang", ("On Chinese present political factions and the future political parties"), in Chang Nan & Wang Jen-chih, eds., *Hsin-hai ke-ming ch'ien shih-nien-chien shih-lun hsüan-chi*, ("Selected essays from the decade preceding the 1911 Revolution"), (Peking, 1960) V. II, 613-14.
  16. Charlton M. Lewis, *Prologue to the Chinese Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 185-196.
  17. Quoted by Li Wen-chih, comp. *Chung-kuo chin-tai nung-yeh-shih tzu-liao* (Materials on the agricultural history of modern China), Peking, 1957. It should be noted that this estimate is incomplete.
  18. For the general discussion, see Chang Yü-fa, *Ch'ing-chi ti li-hsien t'uan-t'i* ("Constitutionalist groups of the late Ch'ing period"), (Taipei, 1975), Chs. 1-6; Chang P'eng-yuan, *Li-hsien-p'ai yu Hsin-hai ke-ming*, ("The constitutionalists and the 1911 Revolution"), (Taipei, 1964), Chs. 1-3; Samuel C. Chu, *Reformer in Modern China: Chang Chien, 1853-1926* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965),



- 59-68.
19. *Tung-hua hsü-lu*, Kuang-hsü reign, Ch. 208, p. 10, memorial of Aug. 26, 1907.
  20. *HMTP*, No. 82 (May 5, 1905).
  21. E-tu Zen Sun, "The Chinese Constitutional Missions of 1905-1906", *The Journal of Modern History*, 24:3 (Sept., 1952), 252-53.
  22. *Ch'ing-chi wai-chiao shih-liao* (Documents on foreign relations of late Ch'ing), Kuang-hsü reign, Ch. 203, p. 17. Quoted by E-tu Zen Sun, *op. cit.*
  23. The telegram sent by Ch'ien to the Hague Tribunal stated that China must establish a constitutional government in order to save itself.
  24. Tai Hung-tz'u, *Ch'u-shih chiu-kuo jih-chi*, (Dairy of a mission to nine nations), (Peking, 1917), 1-15. After the return of the mission, they collected written works on constitutional government in the compilation *Lieh-kuo cheng-yao* (Governments of the various nations), 133 chuan.
  25. Witte to an Associated Press correspondent, quoted in Baron Rosen, *Forty Years of Diplomacy* (New York, 1922), 240. The quotation is from H.D. Mehlinger & J.M. Thompson, *Counte Witte and the Tsarlist Government in the 1905 Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), 327.
  26. V.I. Gurko, *Features and Figures of the Past: Government and Opinion in the Reign of Nicholas II* (Palo Alto, 1939), 451. Quoted in Mehlinger & Thompson, *op. cit.*, 311.
  27. Herman Bernstein, *With Master Minds* (New York, 1913), 29-30. Quoted in Mehlinger & Thompson, *op. cit.*, 327.
  28. With regard to the content of this Principles, see *Tung-hua hsü-lu*, Kuang-hsü reign, Ch. 219, 1-7. Also see *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), V. XI, 396-398.
  29. Geoffrey A. Hosking, *The Russian Constitutional Experiment: Government and Duma, 1907-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 1.
  30. Feng Tzu-yu, "Min-sheng chu-i yü Chung-kuo cheng-chih ke-ming chih ch'ien-t'u", ("The principles of people's livelihood and the future of the Chinese political revolution"), *Min-pao*, No. 4 (May 1, 1906), 97-98.
  31. The Chinese anarchist movement and its ideas have been discussed by Robert A. Scalapino and George T. Yu, *The Chinese Anarchist Movement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961); Martin Bernal, "The Triumph of Anarchism over Marxism, 1906-1907", "The Mary Wright, ed., *China in Revolution: the First Phase, 1900-1913* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 97-142; Michael Gasster, *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911* (Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press, 1969), 155-189. These authors have explored its origins, development, and the relationship between anarchism and Marxism-Leninism in China. My concern here is focused on the Russian ideas of the anarchist experiment in action. These ideas are not only the influence of Russian intellectuals, but that are, or appear to be, practical demands by China's situation.
  32. Hsiao, Kung-chuan, "Anarchism in Chinese Political Thought", *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, V. III, No. 3 (Oct. 1936), 246-263. He points out the direct origin of Chinese anarchism may be traced to the Taoist writings of *Lao-tzu* and *Chuang-tzu*. But the most remarkable expression of Chinese anarchism, he said, had been written

- during the turbulent years of Emperor Hsi-tsung (874-888), under the pseudonym Wu-neng-tzu.
33. James Joll, *The Anarchist* (Cambridge, 1980), 110-111.
  34. The translation of Bakunin's writings may be found in *Hsin shih-chi* ("New Century", hereafter cited as HSC, Nos. 9, 10 (Aug. 17, 24, 1907); the translation of Kropotkin including his theory, in HSC, nos. 12, 15, 16, 17 (1907); "Mutual Aid" in nos. 31, 32, 34-38, 44-52; "Law and Authority" in nos. 41, 47, 49, "The State, its Historical Role" in nos. 58-62, 66-83; his diary in nos. 102-8. All of these were translated from the French by Li Shih-tseng.
  35. See Paul Avrich, *The Russian Anarchist* (Princeton, 1967), passim.
  36. Liao Chung-k'ai (1878-1925), for example, published translation of the articles (written by Japanese writer Kutsumi Ketsuson, "O-Bei no muscifu shugi", "Anarchism in Europe and America," which first appeared as a chapter in *Shaki shugi kenkyu*, 2, April 15, 1906) dealing with anarchism in which he distinguished the two branches of anarchism, but no discussion of two opposing views between Bakunin and Kropotkin. See Liao, "Wu-cheng-fu chu-i chih erh-p'ai" ("Two branches of anarchism"), *Min-pao*, no. 8 (Oct. 1906), 131-38.
  37. The main reasons, according to Paul Avrich, including the political consciousness of the masses being still on a low level and the reluctance of most Russian to accept either Bakuninism or Kropotkinism. See Paul Avrich, *op. cit.*, 33-34.
  38. In 1907, Liu and Chang Chi founded the Society in Tokyo. Its program, Liu declared, was "not merely to carry out socialism but to make anarchism our objective". Liu, "She-hui chu-i chiang-hsi-hui ti-i-tz'u hui-chi", (The record of the first meeting of the Society for the Study of Socialism), *T'ien-i pao*, V. 6 (Sept. 1, 1907); also see Feng Tzu-yu, *Ke-ming i-shih*, II, 231-33; Hidemi Onogawa, "Liu Shih-p'ei and Anarchism", *Acta Asiatica*, No. 12, (1967), 70-99. For Feng's life and activities, see Howard Boorman, ed., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Part I, 98-100.
  39. Liu Shih-p'ei, "Lun hsin-cheng wei ping-ming chih ken", ("Modern government is the root cause of what ails the people"), *T'ien-i pao*, nos. 8-10 (combined issues, Oct. 30, 1907).
  40. Liu, "Wu-cheng-fu chu-i chih p'ing-teng kuan" ("Anarchism's concept of equality"), *T'ien-i pao*, no. 5 (Aug. 10, 1907); also see Chang Nan & Wang Jen-chih, *op. cit.*, II, 930.
  41. Ho Chen (Liu's wife) and Liu, "Lun chung-tsu ke-ming yü wu-cheng-fu ke-ming chih te-shih", ("On the advantages and disadvantages of racial revolution and anarchist revolution"), *T'ien-i pao*, nos. 6-7 (Sept. 1, 15, 1907), Chang and Wang, *op. cit.*, II, 956.
  42. Ibid.
  43. For a general discussion, see Albert Feuerwerker, *The Chinese Economy, 1870-1911* (Ann Arbor, 1969), Ch. 4. Also see Kung Chun, *Chung-kuo hsin kung-yeh fa-chan-shih ta-kang* ("An outline history of China's modern industrial development"), (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1933), Ch. 6.
  44. Wang Ching-yu, com., *Chung-kuo chin-tai kung-yeh-shih tzu-liao, ti-erh chi*,

- 1895-1914 ("Source materials on the history of modern industry in China, 2nd collection"), Peking, 1957.
45. There is still, to my knowledge, no thorough study of this question in the period of 1905-1911. Jean Chesneaux, *The Chinese Labor Movement, 1919-1927* (Stanford; Stanford Univ. Press, 1968), may be useful as reference, but for a more detailed study in this period see Chao Ch'in, "Hsin-hai ke-ming chien-hou ti Chung-kuo kung-jen yün-tung", ("The Chinese labor movement before and after the 1911 Revolution"), *Li-shih yen-chiu*, no. 2, 1959.
  46. In China, a careful study of the agricultural population was made in 1928, which indicated that the agricultural population amounted to 345,780,000 persons, or 80 percent of the total population in 1917. See D.K. Lieu and Chung Min-chen, "Statistics of farm land in China", in *Chinese Economic Journal*, V. II, No. 3 (March, 1928). But their estimate is considered too low. In Russia, on the eve of W.W.I (1914), two-thirds of total employment was still in agriculture, with 18 percent of population living in urban areas (although some of them still maintained vital connections with the villages). See M.E. Falkus, *The Industrialization of Russia, 1700-1914* (London, 1972); another study illustrate that the rural population of Russia in 1914 was more than 84% of the total. See S. Dubrovskii, *Stolypinskaya Zemel'naya reforma* (1963), 410, quoted by Teodor Shanin, *The Awkward Class* (Oxford, 1972), 19.
  47. C.K. Yang, "Some Preliminary Statistical Patterns of Mass Actions in 19th Century China", in Frederic Wakeman, Jr. and Carolyn Grant, eds., *Conflict and Control in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 174-210.
  48. S. Dubrovskii's article in *Sel'skohoziastvennaia entsiklopedia* (Agricultural Encyclopedia; Moscow, 1932), I, 86-103. Quoted by Lazar Volin, *A Century of Russian Agriculture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 96.
  49. An estimation of 109 peasant households in the guberniia of Kostroma (200 miles northwest of Moscow) in 1909, shows the expenditures of education and religion as follows:
 

Schools . . . . .	11 rubles 76 kopeikas
Books . . . . .	34 rubles 49 kopeikas
Payments to the clergy . . . . .	588 rubles 53 kopeikas

 See Geriod Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime* (New York, 1938), 257, 310.
  50. For a detailed discussion see Hsiao-tung Fei, *Earthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yunnan*, (Chicago, 1945), table 15, 86-91.
  51. F.W. Mote's chapter three, "Political Structure" in Gilbert Rozman, ed., *The Modernization of China* (New York, 1981), 96.
  52. Yang Tu-sheng, "Hsin Hu-nan" ("New Hunan"), Ch. 5, in Chang Nan & Wang Jen-chih, eds., *op. cit.*, V. I, 612-649. For a discussion in Chinese see T'an Pi-an, "O-kuo min-tsu-chu-i tui t'ung-meng hui ti ying-hsiang" (The influence of Russian populism on the Revolutionary Alliance"), *Li-shih yen-chiu*, (Historical Research), V. I (1959), 39. In English, see Martin Bernal, *op. cit.*, 119-120.
  53. Ho & Liu, "She-hui chu-i.....", 154-155; also see *Hsin chih-chi*, no. 22 (Nov.

- 1907), 4.
54. Ho & Liu, "Lun chung-tsu ke-ming....", Chang & Wang, eds., II, 952.
  55. Martin Bernal, *op. cit.*, 122-123.
  56. Wu-Yüeh *i-chu*, "Wu-Yüeh's posthumous letters", 7-8, in *Min-pao*, No. 3 (April, 1906).
  57. Interview by Rev. William Cater, D.D., *New York Herald*, Sept. 10, 1922. Quoted by Lyon Scharman, *Sun Yat-sen: His Life and Its Meaning* (New York, 1934), 4.
  58. With regard to his education, see Lyon Scharman, *op. cit.*, 3-27; Harold Schiffrin, *Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 10-21.
  59. Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928*, tran. by Ssu-yu Teng & Jeremy Ingalls, (Princeton, 1956), 146.
  60. In the T'ung-meng Hui Manifesto, Teng & Fairbank, *op. cit.*, 228-229.
  61. Li Tse-huo, a contemporary Marxist historian, points out the Kuang-fu Hui represented by Chang Ping-lin, expressed a simple, narrow-minded peasant class ideology of anti-Manchu revolution. See Li Tse-huo, *Chung-kuo chin-tai ssu-hsiang shih-lun*, ("A historical discussion of modern Chinese thought"), (Peking, 1982), 298-299. However, we do not find further convincing evidence that the masses of Chinese peasants were involved in revolutionary activities, or participated in the Kuang-fu Hui. As a matter of fact, the strong feeling of anti-Manchism appeared in the circle of Chinese overseas students rather than inside China.
  62. See Sun's speech on the first anniversary of *Min-pao*, Oct. 17, 1906, "San-min chu-i yü Chung-kuo min-tsu chih ch'ien-t'u"), ("The Three People's Principles and the future of the Chinese nation"). Chün-tu Hsueh notes that Sun objected to including the term "anti-Manchu" in the T'ung-meng Hui's name; it means that he did not agree with those revolutionaries who advocated a more extreme anti-Manchuism. See Chün-tu Hsueh, *Huang Hsing and the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 42.
  63. Wang Ching-wei, "Min-tsu ti kuo-min", ("The Nationalistic citizen"), *Min-pao*, No. 2, 18 (Jan. 22, 1906).
  64. The Manifesto, Teng & Fairbank, *op. cit.*, 229.
  65. Liang said, "While democracy offers the best method of saving the times, the spirit of the people today is still unenlightened and we must first rely on the power of the sovereign to change it. This is what he (K'ang Yu-wei) means by the faith". See Ting Weng-chiang, ed., *Liang Jen-kung hsien-sheng nien-p'u ch'ang-pi'en ch'u-kao* (First draft of a chronological biography of Liang Ch'ich'ao), Taipei, 1959, 24-25.  
The best brief survey of their ideas is in Hsiao Kung-chuan, *Chung-kuo cheng-chih ssu-hsiang shih*, Vol. VI. Its first part has been translated by F.W. Mote, under the title, *A History of Chinese Political Thought, Vol. I* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). The rest of its translation is forthcoming. For Liang's statement on enlightened despotism, see "K'ai-ming chuan-chih lun", *HMTP*, No. 73, 1-24; No. 74, 1-15; No. 75, 1-50; No. 77, 1-10.

66. Scharman, *op. cit.*, 15.
67. Sun Yat-sen, "The True Solution to the Chinese question" (New York, 1904), reprinted in *Tang-shih shih-liao ts'ung-k'an* (Serial publication of historical materials on Kuomintang history), Chungking, 1944, 1:1-10. Wang Ching-wei states more clearly that "if China can imitate the three-power division of the American Constitution, she too will be able to bring forth the reality of democratic government". See Wang, "Po Hsin-min ts'ung-pao tsui-chin chih fei ke-ming lun" ("Refuting *HMTF*'s most recent anti-revolutionary article), *Min-pao*, No. 4 (May 1, 1906), 22-23.
68. Sung Chiao-jen (pseud. Ch'iang-chai), tr., "I ch'ien chiu pai ling wu nien Lu-kuo chih ke-ming", (The Russian Revolution of 1905), *Min-pao*, No. 7 (Sept. 5, 1906), 74.
69. Hu Han-min (pseud. Pien-chien), "O-kuo ke-ming tang chih jih-pao", ("The newspaper of the Russian Revolutionary Party"), *Min-pao*, No. 4 (May 1, 1906), 95.
70. Sun, "San-min chu-i yü Chung-kuo min-tsu chih ch'ien-t'u". ("The Three People's Principles and the future of the Chinese nation"), *Min-pao*, No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1906), 90.
71. Chu Chih-hsin, "Lun she-hui ke-ming tang yu cheng-chih ke-ming ping-hsing", ("The social revolution should proceed simultaneously with the political revolution"), *Min-pao*, No. 5 (June 26, 1906), 43.
72. With regard to Nikolai Chernyshevskii's thought, one may refer to Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution* (New York, 1960), 129-187; also see Alexander Vucinich, *Social Thought in Tsarist Russia* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1976), 62, 173. As to Lenin, see his pamphlet, *The State and Revolution*, which was completed in August, 1917; also see Donald Treadgold, *Lenin and His Rivals* (New York, 1955), 154-179.
73. Based on the analysis of Chu's article, Robert Scalapino and Harold Schiffrin pointed out that Chu replied heavily on Marxist terms. See their "Early Social Currents in the Chinese Revolutionary Movement", *JAS*, XVIII, 3 (May, 1959), 330.
74. Feng, "Min-sheng chu-i yü Chung-kuo cheng-chih ke-ming chih ch'ien-t'u", ("The Principle of People's Livelihood and the future of the Chinese political revolution"), *Min-pao*, No. 4 (May 1, 1906), 97-122. For the historical survey of his conception of socialism, see Feng, *She-hui chu-i üü Chung-kuo* ("Socialism and China"), Hong Kong, 1920.
75. Sun, "Min-sheng chu-i", (The Principle of People's Livelihood), in Chang Ch'i-yun, ed., *Kuo-fu ch'üan-shu*, 259-60.
76. Sun, "Cheng-chih ke-ming chih-huo i chih-i ho-ping te she-hui ke-ming", (After political revolution ought to continue a peaceful social revolution), in Chang Chi-yun, ed., *op. cit.*, 496.
77. Sun, "Min-sheng chu-i", (The Principle of the People's Livelihood), in Chang Chi-yun, ed., *op. cit.*, 496.
78. Taking a different view, Chu said, the Russians boasted that their economic structure had not fallen into the evils of the free-enterprise competitive system.

So Chu predicted that the further revolution (social revolution) was inevitable. It should be noted this understanding was based on a Japanese translation. Chu had no chance to visit Russia at that time. See Chu, *op. cit.*

79. Regarding George's influence on the SR in Russia, see Oliver H. Radkey, *The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism* (New York, 1958), 25-32, 84-85. As to China's case, see Harold Schiffrine's pioneer study, "Sun Yat-sen's Early Land Policy," *JAS*, 16 (1957), 546-564.
80. Ts'ui Shu-ch'in, "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Land Program and the Nationalization of Land," *Free China Review* (Taipei, Sept., 1952), II, No. 7, 7-11; Harold Schiffrin, "Sun Yat-sen's..."
81. See Chang P'eng-yuan, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao yü Ch'ing-chi ke-ming* ("Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the revolution in the late Ch'ing period"), Taipei, 1964, 242-251. In English, one may refer to Robert Scalapino & Harold Schiffrin, *op. cit.*
82. Sun, "Shang Li Hung-chang t'ung-ch'en chiu-kuo ta-chi shu" ("A letter to Li Hung-chang, painfully presenting a great plan to save the country"), in Chang Ch'i-yün, ed., *op. cit.*, 353-355. A partial English translation may be found in Teng & Fairbank, *op. cit.*, 224-225.
83. Sun, "San-min chu-i", in Chang Ch'i-yün, ed., *op. cit.*, 274.
84. See Teodor Shanin, *op. cit.*, 48. My estimate is based on the following table:
- | Land-allotment<br>per household<br>(1 desiatina = 2.7 acres) | Households | Percentage |
|--|------------|------------|
| Less than 5 desiatinas                                       | 2,669,000  | 23.8       |
| 5-10        "-   | 4,940,000  | 44.1       |
| More than 10    "-   | 3,591,000  | 32.1       |
| Total  | 11,200,000 | 100.0      |
85. The population of around 438,425,000, when the cultivated land was about 229,671,650 acres; see Otake Fumio, *Kinsei Shina keizaishi kenkyu* ("Studies on economic history of Modern China"), Tokyo, 1942, 228, 285. But, the coastal provinces and central China (Yangtze river area) had a lower average per capita. For example, in Chekiang in 1851 it is 0.25 acre, and 0.30 acre in Hupei. See Li Wen-chih, ed., *op. cit.*, 1st collection, 10, 60.
86. In terms of kilograms per acre, rice production in China is 67 but 47 in U.S.; wheat in China is 16 but 10 in Russia. These data based on a survey made during 1929-1933 by the Department of Agricultural Economics of Nanking University. See Nai-ruenn Chen, *The Chinese Economy under Communism* (Chicago, 1969), 6.
87. Wang Yeh-chien, *Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750-1911* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973), 127.
88. John Lossing Buck, *Chinese Farm Economy* (University of Nanking, 1930), 75.
89. Shanin, *op. cit.*, 22. There is convincing evidence that the Russian peasants were unable to pay the visible and invisible tax burden out of the income from the land. For example, in Tula in 1903, a peasant told to Madam Bers: "My little desiatina gave me... ten rubles, but I paid 25 rubles in taxes... Consequently,

- I work in vain". Quoted by Francis Watters, "The Peasant and Village Commune", in Wayne Vucinich, ed., *The Peasant in 19th Century Russia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 155.
90. Lu Shih-chiang, "Chin-tai Szechwan ti nung-min sheng-huo," (Peasant life in modern Szechwan), in *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History*, Academic Sinica, V. II (June, 1978), 187-224, 218-219.
  91. *Nan-ch'i hsien-chih*, The gazetteer of Nan-ch'i county), 1926 edition, Vol. 4, 13.
  92. *Ho-chiang hsien-chih* (The gazetteer of Ho-chiang county), 1929 edition, Vol. 4, 42.
  93. See Leopold Haimson, "Conclusion: Observation on the Politics of the Russian Countryside, 1905-1914," in Leopold Haimson, ed., *The Politics of Rural Russia* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).
  94. See Wang Yeh-chien, *op. cit.*, 113.
  95. C.K. Yang found in the late 1940s that much of the Chinese peasantry, including those dwelling in village near Nanking (then the nation's capital) remained generally indifferent to and ignorant of political affairs. See Ching-kun Yang, *A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1959), *passim*.
  96. It is true that the inequality of land ownership was more serious in Central and South China than in North China. In Hopei and Shantung, Ramon Myers pointed out the percentage of tenant did not rise until 1930s. See Myers, *The Chinese Peasant Economy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 221-224. Another investigation made in 1917 shows that 20.9% in Shantung were tenants, see Ch'en Tang-yuan, *Chung-kuo t'u-ti chih-tu* (China's land system), (Shanghai, 1930), 376-377. But in Kiangshu, according to the statistics of 1912, 31% of the farming population were tenants, see Ch'en Teng-yuan, 375-376. We have, in this connection, an interesting study made by a trio of Russian agrarian experts, Tarkhanov, Iolk and Volin, entitled, "Agrarian Relations in Kuangtung Province". Unfortunately, this study was destroyed in an anti-Communist book-burning in April 1927. See V.V. Vishnyakova-Akimova, *Dva Goda v Vasstavshem Kitae, 1925-1927 Vospominaniia* (Moscow, 1965). Quoted in Roy Hofheinz, Jr., *The Broken Wave - the Chinese Communist Peasant Movement, 1922-1928* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 37. But in another report in 1927, Tackhanov pointed out 85% of Kuangtung land was rented, while in Shantung, the figure was more like 5%. He also estimates probably 44% of the farm population were landed peasants. See "Minutes of the Central Land Committee Meeting", April 23, 1927, in Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying Howe, eds., *Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China, 1918-1927: Papers seized in the 1927 Peking Raid* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).