《Journal of Humanities East/West》
Vol. 18. December 1998. pp. 167-202
College of Liberal Arts. National Central University

Learning as a Master from a Master: "Chuang Tzu" in University General Education

*Kuang-ming Wu**

Outline

I. Education as Humanity: Its Importance

II. Education as Tradition: Its Impasse

III. Education as Co-Creation with Chuang Tzu: Its Feasibility

IV. Chuang Tzu-Education as Strategy

*Professor of Philosophy. Rollins College

Abstract

1. Education is transmission of past experience (tradition). But this is impossible, for experience cannot be transmitted by words, says Mr. Wheelwright in Chuang Tzu's story.

2. Words cannot express experience. So, words become inexpressible, self-subversive, self-incoherent, self-effacing, that is, "silent," to convey the inexpressible. How?

3. Such verbal inexpressivity evokes in silence. This amounts to a dialogue with silence, Mr. Chew Chipped with Mr. Royal Horizon, Jittery Magpie with Mr. Tall Tree.

4. Here the subjects talking intermesh with the objects talked-to and the subject matter talked-about. Such a strange dialogue ends up with a talk on a dream where the very subjects interchange, and interchange with the subject matters.

5. The subject matters are precisely the experience to be transmitted.

6. Therefore in the dialogues between words and silence, the "fire" of experience transmits from one "log" of generation to another. In fact, we have just inherited the Chuang Tzu tradition. For all this is what Chuang Tzu proposed.

This essay describes two points, both radical but not unreasonable, that general education is at the core of humanity, and that Chuang Tzu is at the core of education.

First, general education is at the core of humanity. Unlike animals that are born animals, it is peculiarly human of us that we must *learn* to become human.[1] We humans have two sorts of learning, learning how to make a living, and learning to live as human.

Learning to become human is education, more precisely, "general education." It is *studia humanitatis* (humanistic studies) of the Renaissance, to liberate us (hence, "liberal education") from the darkness of animalistic ignorance, to enlighten us into true humanity. Humanism, enlightenment, and liberal education constitute "general education." It is the core of education that educes our humanity as such, education without qualification, as distinct from "specialized" or "specialty" education.

"Specialty education"[2] trains us to make a living as a machinist, say, in order to live as human. It is a fundamental mistake, then, to put specialty education as an educational centerpiece, pushing general education to the margin because "it makes no money," as if we live for the sake of making money. To reverse the educative end-means relation this way is to devastate education.[3] General education is at the core of humanity served by all sorts of specialty education.

Secondly, Chuang Tzu, an ancient Taoist (between 399-295 BC), is at the core of education[4]; he shows us a dilemma in education and then shows us a way out. In a story of his, a Wheelwright tells his lord that experience is inexpressible in words, yet words are our only vehicle of expression. So, words must express experience inexpressibly, that is, self-incoherently, self-subversively. Self-effacing wording calls our attention to independently explore and experience, and we ourselves are thereby transformed. We grow cosmically.

Thus is shown that Chuang Tzu is our teacher par excellence. Nothing is more appropriate than to consider Chuang Tzu in general education. The following pages cover the above two points in four headings: (A) Education is essential for our becoming individually human. (B) Education is tradition--a

transmission of knowledge, past experience--yet such transmission is impossible. Chuang Tzu disarmingly shows us how this is so, and then (C) shows us that education is tradition-as-evocation. Tradition in this creative use is essential and feasible. We then (D) extrapolate from C a didactic strategy of its implementation. From now on, the term "education" refers to "general education."

I. Education as Humanity: Its Importance

Education is humanly essential. (1) We are human by becoming so, by virtue of learning from present and past experience. (2) Learning from past experience is education that is necessary for learning from present experience.

1. Education is essential to humanity, because humanity consists in becoming human, which education facilitates. In education persons grow neither by physiological nurture nor by psychological therapy; education educes oneself, eliciting human growth into oneself.[5]

Education of humanness has two routes: learning from present experience (contact with actuality) and learning from past experience (inheriting tradition), personal undergoing and book reading. The first route is up to the learner to accomplish[6]; the second is what education is for.

2. Two questions arise at once: How are these two learnings related? How can we best learn from our tradition? The second question is answered in the Sections below.

The first question is answered here. We need our tradition and culture (route two) to learn from our experience now (route one). As we cannot see without our eyes, so we cannot learn from our experience without a perspective of culture. We understand things in terms of logic and grammar,[7] a skeletal language that is part of culture.

Culture is that in and by which we live as human. Culture is tradition, our past that makes us human. Thus education in cultural tradition (past experience) is indispensable if we want to learn from our present experience. Tradition

gives us a framework and standard in terms of which we experience and learn.[8] A person without tradition subsists as an animal, humanly dead.

II. Education as Tradition: Its Impasse

Now we consider education-as-an-impasse: (1) Education consists in transmission of knowledge, which is past experience, and transmission of experience with words is impossible. (2) Chuang Tzu's story of the Wheelwright elaborates on this twofold point. Thus (3) education as knowledge-transmission, as tradition, is impossible.

1. This tradition-inheriting and culture-transmission, "education," is impossible. We need our past; we cannot have it. Why not?

Education is transmission of knowledge. To know something is to experience-it-now,[9] which is to be co-present with the thing to be known, to be con-temporary with it. But when the thing to be known has passed away into "past experience," it is no longer present-contemporaneous--with the knower. History cannot be repeated,[10] and its transmission, tradition, is impossible.[11]

2. Chuang Tzu's story of a Wheelwright describes all this.[12] "Duke Huan was reading in the hall, while a wheelwright was outside chiseling out a wheel. Wheelwright put aside hammer and chisel, went up and asked Duke, 'May I dare ask you what words you are reading, my Lord?' Duke said, 'They are the sages' words.' 'Are they around?' 'Already dead.' 'So, then, what my Lord was reading is dregs of ancient people.' 'I your Lord was reading. How dare you, a wheel-man, comment-at-will! If you have something to say, you may-say-it-and-go; if not, you die.' Wheelwright said, 'Allow me to look at it from my business. In chiseling a wheel, slowing down, it slips and won't stay. Speeding up, it sticks and won't cut in. Not slow, not fast, I get it in hand and answer in heart; my mouth cannot say it, yet the knack is there. I cannot tell it to my son, nor can he receive it from me. This is why I am old as 70 and still chiseling wheels. Ancient people with what they could not hand-down have died. So, then, what my Lord was reading is mere dregs of ancient people.'"

Three impossibilities are here: Neither (2.1.) experience nor (2.2.) its freshness and novelty can be conveyed (2.3.) by words.[13]

2.1. We live by conveying experience from the past, and *experience* can be "conveyed," if at all, not by such substitute as words but by experience alone.

However, experience cannot be duplicated.[14] Wheelwright gets it in his hands and responds in his heart; no other hands or heart can take the place of *his*. You cannot eat my dinner, sleep my sleep. We cannot inherit experience, for we cannot have the same experience of either other people or other time, much less the experience of other people of other time. "Inheriting past experience" is impossible; so is education..

2.2. Education is transmission of knowledge, tradition. Tradition is something worth handing down, standing out *unique*. That excellence is fresh and noteworthy requires no explanation; "I cannot tell it to my own son, nor can he receive it from me," said Wheelwright. He correctly asserted that "Ancient people with what they could not hand down to us have died."'Stale and excellent" is as contradictory as "stale and noteworthy."[15] Everyday comes a new day of new experience—"new" and "experience" are synonymous.[16] Monotony kills.[17] Experience is forever morning fresh[18]; noteworthy experience is always fresh and/or novel.[19]

2.3. Worse yet, we have to convey the message of experience by *words*, and experience cannot be conveyed by words, our only means of conveyance, a pathetically inept one.[20] "I get it in hand and answer it in heart, but cannot tell it to my son," confessed the Wheelwright.[21] Words skim on things' surface. An abstract, general word "water" conveys no irreplaceable experience of drinking that glass of water when I was thirsty that day, as Zen masters tell us.[22]

Hence, our paradox: We cannot repeat the irreplaceable, yet without such repetition we cannot convey. Collingwood's "reenactment" of history[23] is impossible; heritage is dregs of ancient people. But our humanity depends on the heritage of cultural tradition, a conveyance and reenactment of noteworthy experience. Our heritage (i.e., repetition) is that of experience yet is impossible.

3. Let us note the problem, why Wheelwright said what he said,[24] in three points: One, tradition is a handing down of past experience worthy of note, that is, excellent novel freshness, yet experience cannot be conveyed, and freshness handed down is fresh no more. Two, words are unable to convey experience, yet words are all we have for conveyance. Three, we are human because we hand down and learn from noteworthy experience conveyed by words. These three points together spell "impossibility," yet there is no escape from it. We call this impossible project "education."[25]

III. Education as Co-Creation with Chuang Tzu: Its Feasibility

How can we get out of this impasse? Chuang Tzu shows us such a way out (1) by his self-effacing usage of words. (2) We must read "behind the lines" by (2.1.) taking the words with textual-critical seriousness, (2.2.) for our dialogical exploration on (2.3.) what they mean to us in life. (3) The result is objectifying everything, even dialogical partners. (4) This intersubjective inter-objectification is "education."

1. Back in 2.1. in Section B, we thought aloud that experience cannot be expressed, but can be "conveyed" only by experience--by new fresh experience, we must now add.[26] If experience is inexpressible, it is silent. Chuang Tzu's words echo this silence, co-reverberating in self-involved inconsistencies, round-like, fugue-like. Chuang Tzu says, "The Great One's teaching is like a form to shadows, a voice to echoes."[27] Those educative words call the hearer-reader's attention, to find one cross-connection after another, all the reader's own, composing a book peculiar to herself. The reader is now the book she reads; the reader-book is the book of tradition, of experience, and of nature.[28]

All this while, we must firmly remember the sober truth that words are no experience but, in Wheelwright's words, mere "dregs." These dregs-of-experience can evoke in us an experience like the one they point to. After all, Wheelwright's warning against words was cast in words. Self-effacing wording spells "signifying silence."

Inadequate words should become wordless-silent to convey. Words must express silence by saying A and not-A, to affirm and deny something in the same breath, namely, to contradict itself. Contradiction happens both when what is said is denied, and when what is said denies its existential base, our commonsense judging that such "platitude" or "tautology" needs hardly be said. The book of Chuang Tzu is packed with affirming denials, throwaway non sequiturs, ambiguities, platitudes, and tautologies. They express nothing, a silence.

Chuang Tzu speaks nothing, and the *word* "nothing" (*wu*) does it, for saying it deposits something (a word), and its meaning "nothing" denies it. Here the saying contradicts the meaning. It says nothing by saying "nothing"; it is a silence that speaks.[29] Here the saying is an act that does-not. *Wu* is *wu-wei*. As saying "*wu*" (nothing) affirms nothingness, so "*wu wei*" (non-doing) effaces itself into effortlessness, fulfilling the self. Words are Wheelwright's precious "dregs of ancient people" that transmit to us that words do not transmit. All words in the Chuang Tzu are the self-effacing word "*wu*" writ large to transmit this ironic truth of silence. This transmission is tradition. Chuang Tzu created the Chuang Tzu-tradition by and of kicking the tradition, a resonant silence of irony.[30]

But then, what is it that distinguishes such silence by intentional futility of contradiction, from a simple straight silence? The answer is simple. The former significant silence calls and orients our attention to experience things ourselves; the latter one does not. Tradition in self-effacement calls our attention. Intentional superfluity is the name of the tradition; we can then inherit it, and that is education.

2. This description charts both the why and the how of teaching the tradition. To explicate the how, we must look into the subtle scheme of this superfluity, by watching Chuang Tzu.

Chuang Tzu used those inept powerless words, ancient and his own, not to convey but to evoke, that is, to provoke his reader's awareness, and open us into our own present experience of fresh actuality. Children can be induced to play

with blocks irrelevant to arithmetic, and *during* their spontaneous playing come to count and add on their own. Likewise, we can be induced by ancient sayings to play with our living, and come to live on our own with cultural decency and our own creativity.

So, "useless dregs" of words by the dead great can be of great use. "Ways, things, to their utmost, /No saying, no silence, suffice to carry. No speech, no silence, /Here is the utmost in discourse," says Chuang Tzu.[31] Thus we must take expression as saying nothing, "nothing" as expressing something, i.e., use speech as silence, silence as speech. We must learn words, then *use* them as pointers to what they are *not*. They "raise one corner" for us to "return with three" more, to borrow Confucius.[32] Words serve as muffled metaphors mutely appealing. One who has eyes to see must see it for oneself. What this "it" is is what education aims to induce.[33]

We read Chuang Tzu's dialogues among sages and allegorical subjects (2.1., 2.2.). Pursuing them, we find that these dialogues make up the "music of nature" (3.). This is how we learn from others' experience to learn ours now. And this is "education" (4.).

2.1. Ancient words as "dregs" mean they are handed down as "dregs" of our tradition to raise "one corner." We must raise *this* corner of the ancient words "with accuracy"[34] before we can be evoked to "return with three" more, even to reject the words as "dregs of ancient people." This is how, as now dead, the ancient wisdom is useful today. Experience educes growth, but not when our teacher stands in our way. The true teacher is then a dead one, and ancient sayings are useful when they are "dregs."[35]

Therefore, *textual* studies must be pursued with rigor, questing for textual authenticity. The long tradition of commentaries is indispensable. Japanese commentaries[36] help put in manageable order the confusing riches of ages of Chinese commentary accumulation. English translations help sort out *different* genres of interpretations.[37]

Equipped with sinological apparatuses, we open the book of *Chuang Tzu*,

and something unmanageably fresh and alive strikes us. This old book has nothing moldy. It seems to laugh at us, telling us that we are moldy, throwing at us things *we* do not understand. Our textual-critical condescension thinks that the text must be corrupt,[38] but the more we clean up the text, the less we understand it.

The best we can produce is a series of evasive sentences weaving out some tottering sense, showing how more reflective of our pet thinking they are than what Chuang Tzu may have had in mind. And so we do our conscientious best to brush away *our* cobwebs, our own "dregs" accumulated by centuries of repeated readings and copyings, and make clear what "shockers" Chuang Tzu may have for us.

The shocker we find is made of two ingredients, message so distant from our common sense that it hurts, and contradiction or silly tautology that needs hardly be said. All this while, the overwhelming sense of spontaneity bubbles forth out of the blue out of these "atrocious words." They jump at us with so much implication.

So we dig at their implications; we live with the stories, sentences, phrases, and notions. No matter how much we dig out, however, we still see problems beckoning for more hermeneutical probes. The book reflects a *t'ien ch'ih*, "heavenly pond."[39] Its bottom we can see, but once we go in, it recedes as we go deeper forward.[40]

2.2. Thus we must take these studies of Chuang Tzu-tradition as an initiation, not culmination, of our project of new experience; ancient words are no fetish for keepsake but a ferry to *our own* unsuspected meaning-realm, a pointer to novelties today.

Otherwise, we will be in trouble. Worshippers of tradition are as mummified in traditionalism as persons without tradition are animals. As we fail to use the tradition in our creative ways, past excellence turns into "ancient dregs" to turn *us* into "dregs now," clogging our growth.[41]

Ancient words must instead turn tacit, in silence to evoke our heuristic

perspective *for now* to experience actuality as *we* think the ancients told us. Then we see how it turns out. With Chuang Tzu we must begin our creative exploration.

For instance, we can view actuality from Chuang Tzu's "equality of things" his Monkey-story says. The monkeys rejected Uncle Monkey's initial nuts-offer of "morning three, evening four" in favor of Uncle's another offer, "morning four, evening three." Chuang Tzu then urges us to consider the Heavenly Balance.[42] Should we, however, join the monkeys as *today's* economists may propose? Would Chuang Tzu smile and regard us as "monkeys"?

We now want to have Chuang Tzu (between 399-295 BC) talk with Mencius (c371-c289 BC). They were contemporaries yet neither referred to the other. Intrigued, I managed to find some oblique references in Chuang Tzu's writings to Mencius.

We can imaginatively overhear Chuang Tzu and Mencius[43] debating over whether or not things are in heavenly balance, equal. Mencius said that of course things' inequality (*wu chih pu ch'i*) describes their situation,[44] yet went on to point out our sharing of common standards for tastes, shoe sizes, and so on.[45] Chuang Tzu boldly argued for things' equality (*ch'i wu*) in Chapter Two by this title, yet in its latter half [46] passionately talked about how different the criteria of preferences are among different species of beings. As our Lady Beautiful strolls by, birds, deer and fish flee away.[47]

What is going on here? Are things many or one? Is the "one" of things really "many"? Or are both united in a further Yin-Yang sort of unity? How does this further "one" obtain? Is this further "one" itself one or many?[48]

2.2.1. Such approach of "interpretations, free for all" may encourage floods of confusion. What, then, are *mistaken* interpretations? To answer this question is to shut the floodgate to arbitrariness. Simply put, "mistaken interpretations" are ones out of literary (not literal) context in the *Chuang Tzu*. Two examples suffice.

Our first glaring example of wrong practice popular today is to quote some

sayings from here and there to make up the "cosmology of Chuang Tzu," then another bunch of quotations for his "metaphysics" or "ontology," then another for his "ethics" or "view of life," another for his "fatalism," "relativism," or "stoicism," and so on. Two mistakes are here: One, the practice tears quotations out of *their* respective original contexts; two, this practice imposes *our* interpretive frame foreign to them. Our commonsense principle of interpretation,[49] "Let the text speak for itself," is violated.

Our second less apparent example, yet no less a mistake, is an interpretation based on half etymology, half guesswork, and both *out of context*. A small phrase, "*t'ien fang*" (nature let-go-of)[50] is routinely taken as "*t'ien fang*" (nature imitated). This interpretation is based purely on similarity in shape and sound between the two characters "*fang*" (let-go, imitate), and invites three misgivings.

One, it is contrary to Chuang Tzu's overall intention, for "imitation" (artificial striving after inauthenticity) is precisely what he opposed. Two, the two words are contrary to each other, for "letting go" is spontaneity, while "imitating" suppresses it. Three, the interpretation is self-contradictory, for "imitating nature" (imitating spontaneity) kills nature and spontaneity.

If we drop this forced substitution of *fang*-imitation for *fang*-let-go, letting "nature let-go" be "nature let-go," then we can see how this understanding agrees with the literary context there of letting the animals freely roaming out in the wilderness.

Chuang Tzu's usage of *fang* could be meant as a tacit contrast to his contemporary, Mencius. Mencius used *fang* to mean "losing," as in "losing a dog or a chicken," to lament those who know how to go look for their dog or chicken when it is lost (*fang*), but not when their own heart-mind is lost (*fang hsin*). Mencius was there urging our moral striving and training.[51] Chuang Tzu may be here using "*t'ien fang*" to flatly oppose such moralism, proposing spontaneity that fulfills moral ideals unawares.

Now, all this imaginary Chuang Tzu-Mencius dialogue I admit is a speculation, but unlike the above two examples of mistaken interpretations, it is

an interesting, instructive, and *appropriate* one, awaiting further textual confirmation.[52]

Such discrimination among diverse interpretations is what we must do to pursue textual accuracy. Our principle here is contextual coherence.

2.3. We have so far considered understanding what Chuang Tzu says. For what those sayings *mean for our life*, we can extend our scrutiny on *fang* by listening in for an imagined conversation on it. We follow that clue on Chuang Tzu's possible challenge to Mencius' usage of "*fang*."

Mencius urges us to look for our lost mind-heart. Chuang Tzu may retort that when one loses one's mind, one loses attentiveness that "minds oneself" enough to go look for the "lost mind," for something lost cannot look for itself. A joke originates here, "Of all things that I have lost, I miss my mind most."[53]

Then, Mencius may say that *his* saying is precisely the Wooden Bell[54] to townspeople to awaken their mind-hearts. And the conversation goes on. We may note that this Bell is in China a metaphor for "teacher." Mutual awakening is education, which is what has hopefully happened here. Textual consideration on "*fang*" now has surprising relevance to life.[55]

And then, we hear Chuang Tzu musing aloud that Mencius' goodwilled urging betrays a daunting imposition of his "holier than thou" subjectivity. Such imposition may have caused the above-mentioned existential incoherence-imitation of nature that kills nature, calling to those mind-lost people to look for their minds. There must be a better way. So Chuang Tzu puffs out some parables for subjectivity-free authenticity.[56]

First, talkative Mr. Chew Chipped asks serene Mr. Royal Horizon[57] a series of important questions, step by step inching up to the root of things-what things all approve of is, whether Horizon knows that he does not know,[58] whether things have no knowledge. Each time Horizon bluntly answers, "How would I know?" Mr. Horizon then continues, "For no one knows whether the so-called 'knowledge' is really no-knowledge, or the so-called 'no-knowledge' is really knowledge."[59]

Then, Mr. Horizon elaborates on another intriguing reason, concrete and irrefutable, for his radical ignorance: Each species of animals, differing from humans, have their own differing standards of value and preference that facilitate their respective survival. Differing criteria of validity, same directive of preference and survival. In response, Mr. Chipped presses Mr. Horizon about whether the Ultimate Person would also be concerned with benefit and harm as every living being equally would. Mr. Horizon says that the Ultimate Person is cosmically freer than being concerned with such "buds" of benefit-and-harm.

Then suddenly we overhear Mr. Jittery Magpie chatting with silent Mr. Tall Tree about the Holy Person.[60] Tall Tree cautions Magpie on how vastly beyond their comprehension the Holy Person is, and promises some mindless (*wang*) words, asking Magpie to listen mindlessly (*wang*).

This "*wang*" that I translated as "mindless" is intriguing. I chose "mindless" for three reasons. (a) My translation includes three others so far, "reckless," "with abandon," "careless."[61] (b) Chuang Tzu may have insinuated a literal meaning of that character made of "*wang* (devoid of)" and "*ju* (you)." Thus Tall Tree may be promising Magpie a talk mindless of "you"-the-listener, and wanting Magpie to listen mindless of "you"-the-talker. Tall Tree wants to give its listener Magpie a listener-free talk and asks Magpie for a talker-free listener.

This promise and this request constitute an existential oddity. How could I speak to my speech partner to mind-no "you" the speech partner? This mutual pretension, a mutual minding of mindless-"*wang*," expresses a playful dialogue, for mutuality is in the dialogue as pretending is in playing.

Moreover, the word "*wang*" reminds us of its almost-homonym, "*wang*," meaning plain "forgetting," literally, "losing (*wang*) heart-mind (*hsin*)." This reminder makes my third reason (c) for translating "*wang*" as "mindless," i.e., to side-glance at "forgetting." The same strange dialogical pretension holds in both mindless-*wang* and forgetting-*wang*. No one can tell someone to forget the "teller," for telling impresses on one to remember the teller; much less can one tell someone "told-to" to forget the listener oneself, for telling about oneself

impresses one to remember oneself. Only playful dialogue can succeed in such mutuality of playful incoherence and become self-less, that is, listener-less, talker-less.[62]

Thus, not being a madman's disorderly (*loan*) talk, mindless (*wang*) talk is one mindless about you-the-listener or you-the-talker.[63] This playful dialogue liberates us from our hang-up on subjecthood, resulting in authenticity that is both objective and self-less. This is a new mode of release from oneself. I cannot try to rid me of myself; the project defeats itself. Chuang Tzu tells me instead to let you become mindless about me, as I do about you. Then both you and I will be released from our preoccupation with subjectivity. This is a brilliant dialogue-liberation from self-centeredness.

3. In the above two dialogues small talkative Chew Chipped and Jittery Magpie, ask, the encompassing Royal Horizon and silent Tall Tree, teach. Silence envelops both subjects and subject matters, and teaches. Such strange interchanges between words and silence inter-objectify dialogical subjects into subject matters of the dialogue. To be turned into subject matters is to become self-lessly self-aware and distinct. To become distinct is to stand out from others as oneself, to become oneself. This sort of disarming dialogue between asking and silence educes oneself. It is education.

In this dialogical ambiance of self-less spontaneity, something objectively significant appears. This something significantly *objective* concerns the subjecthood of the talker and the listener. And this is the core of education.

Chuang Tzu's two rounds of talks are most objective on three counts. One, dialogue can become a listening and a looking in terms of a partner, then in that of another partner, and so on, a communal *nonpartisan* inter-looking at and inter-listening in. Two, as the talk becomes a listener-less talk to talker-less listener, and that among *non-human* beings, it is the really "objective talk" among subject matters. Three, in these "dialogues among nature-objects" subject matters are the subjects inter-talking; subjects *intermesh* with subject matters.

Understandably, in this context of radically intersubjective and

inter-objectifying dialogues, there is no question of winning an argument, for the "winner" is no longer the "correct one." They intermesh to inter-evoke. The talkers are now the talked-about: "You and Ch'iu[64] are dreams and I, who say you are dreams, am myself a dream."[65]

And then, to culminate all this, "Chuang Chou"[66] the very author of these dialogues is himself turned into their subject matter; he is reported to have dreamed to be a butterfly. Awakened, Chou was sure *he* had had a dream. Then, on second thought, he was not sure. Was he "Chuang Chou" having dreamed to be a butterfly, or a "butterfly" currently dreaming to be he?[67]

Now, isn't this an "objectivity" in which subjects and objects intermesh? I a subject talking becomes via the talk an object talked to and a subject matter talked about. I interchange among these three, thereby stand out as someone-something.

4. Here subjecthood inter-grows with the world around; we "thing things" (wu wu)[68] to "change with things" (*yü wu hua*). Chuang Tzu says.[69] To intermesh with things is to become subject matters with the subjects; it is to be co-present among subjects and subject matters. This co-presence is experience, which is now being transmitted by this intermesh. "Logs catch fire; the fire goes on."[70] As the subject matter enters the subject, Chuang Tzu-dreamed-wondered becomes I-dream-wonder. Thus the "fire" of experience goes from one "log" (Chuang Tzu) to another (myself),[71] and I gain the insight ancient Chuang Tzu gained for me.[72] Now the tradition transmits. It is education.

Thus I come more and more to be myself, different from others. Thereby I come to realize that actuality is existentially peripatetic, pulsating around, literally "ambi-guous,"[73] walking around *into* one another to enrich one another, thereby each becomes more of itself, more distinct from others. This is a "Supreme Swindle" (*ti kuei*), Chuang Tzu said.[74]

This is partly what "talk on a dream" means. First, *dream* is a radical changeover of subjecthood together with its standard of reality. No one can

judge a realm in which one resides, much less oneself, to be a "dream," for the "dream world" has its own criteria of reality, and so does the "waking world." Their respective residents have no way of judging *between* the two worlds. They are mutually independent.

Then, awakened, a *talk* on a dream is our walk-around between the two worlds to realize that we cannot judge between the two worlds, and that that is the Way of the World. Now we *can* declare, while "awake," "You and I are dreams," with a grain of facetious self-awareness, and the self is born with the world.[75] Dreaming-awakening dialectic is self-objectification.[76]

Here is a dialogue of silence, *wu*-like, where mythological figures evoke, *wu-wei* fashion, self-educement. To talk about something brings it about, objectifies it. Dialogues objectify their participants, mutually educe selves. Dialogical objectification does not turn its participants into objects to kick around, but lets them come to be themselves, objectively out there. Being dialogically initiated into this interdependent Way that makes for independence makes us world-wise, self-authentic. This initiation initiates education, an educement of the self, a worldview, and the world.[77]

"Every note is special in music," said cellist Terry King. Mr. Education would chime in, saying, "Every individual comes to stand out as a special note and grows into itself, precisely within the cosmic music where each special note of existence blends into all others." The world is the music of grand Heavenly Pipings (*t'ien lai*)[78] among all, each singing the world in the world itself singing.[79]

This cosmic music co-resonating everywhere is itself an open invitation to join in, from one self (and many selves) to another. It is an invitation to mutuality toward self-mutation and maturation, by an invitation to tradition, our common past experience, one of which is education in our grand Chuang Tzu tradition. For all above is what the ancient words of Chuang Tzu told us and provoked us to. Here students transform their teachers and we transform the subject matters taught as they transform us.

We have chanted this Chuang Tzu's music of mutuality everywhere--interchanges with the Classics (in time), of subjecthood in dream (in space), among subjects and subject matters (in dialogue)--educing their distinctions. Such cosmic dialogue induces individual self-educement; it is the objective efficacy of education.[80]

IV. Chuang Tzu-Education as Strategy

All above dialogues with Chuang Tzu leads us to consider concrete strategy for general education, especially in Chuang Tzu.

1. The sensitive reader must have by now realized that all above description of education is an extrapolation from Chuang Tzu. Unbeknown to himself, Chuang Tzu was a supreme educator of all ages, on a par with Confucius, Buddha, Jesus, and Socrates. This sensitive reader must have also noted, by reading the "how" in Section C (sub-section 2) above, that in Chuang Tzu the how and the what intertwine, that we have already considered strategy in education that is Chuang Tzu's. Education is to educate; in education the what is the how.

Our playful dialogue with ancient Chuang Tzu on playful dialogues gives us a clue on how to use our tradition for education. The first step is negative. We should forever alert ourselves *against* taking ancient sayings as the last words to cherish and emulate, on pain of our turning moldy dregs now, for *they* are "dregs of old."

Our second positive step is that ancient words should initiate our exploration. Radical ambiguity of Chuang Tzu's words opens many diverse interpretations; each of us explores in the direction *each* thinks his words point to. All translations, claiming to be based on commentaries, differ among them. Each of us differently explores "in Chuang Tzu's directive." We begin *with* Chuang Tzu.

Chuang Tzu's words are a launchpad to catapult us into our own playful exploration, subverting our subjectivity, transforming the landscape. Chuang Tzu's self-recursive inconsistency prevents us from finishing our pursuit at

connecting one end of his saying or notion with the other. Our quest is delightfully endless. Our itinerary charts *our* growth in discernment, unawares.

2. We have so far considered, first, an impasse in education transmitting the past's un-transmittable experience, then, Chuang Tzu's brilliant suggestion of indirective evocation by internally incoherent conveyance (expressions) that, finally, fruitfully facilitates our learning from our own experience. Its principle is, "We begin our independent thinking *with* Chuang Tzu." Learning independence with our master of independence is true education. Let us see how this is so in Mozart and Beethoven, the Confucians, and the Taoists.

Mozart "learned as a master from a master," laboriously exploring Bach's fugues. Thus was produced "Six Preludes and Fugues for Violin, Viola, and Cello" (KV 404a), where Bach is unmistakably felt yet the composition is distinctly Mozart's; Bach was ingested and transformed into Mozart's music.

Moreover, Haydn's "Russian Quartets" (Op. 33) deeply moved young Mozart who soon assiduously "expanded" them into Mozart's own "Haydn Quartets," where "Mozart completely found himself." The set, dedicated to Haydn, was such a breakthrough that yet continued Haydn's tradition, that Haydn exclaimed to Mozart's father, "Before God and as an honest man, I tell you that your son is the greatest composer known to me, either in person or by name."[81] Later, Beethoven's String Quartet in A Major, Op. 18, No. 5 exuviated from Mozart's String Quartet (K464) in the same A Major, one of the Haydn Quartets.[82]

Here then is a line of the Haydn-Mozart-Beethoven tradition of creativity, continuity in distinctness. Here each later master learned from his earlier one, each in his own unique manner; with their respective masters they all began their own creations.[83]

This stirring story of Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven is but one of many reenactments in "education in tradition" *everywhere*,[84] of which the ancient delightful Chuang Tzu-like educement is a prime example in China. Chuang Tzu's internal incoherence afforded vast room for creative learning. Thus came the tradition of kicking the tradition to begin producing excellence with the tradition.

Chuang Tzu was reputed to have written Seven Inner Chapters, compact, profound, and evocative. They aroused kindred spirits to produce "Outside Chapters," then "Miscellaneous Chapters," and they together came to be bound into a volume titled the "Book of *Chuang Tzu*." This volume in turn stirred forth the *Lieh Tzu*, then the *Huai Nan Tzu*, each of which was a composite of writings by respective kindred spirits. The history of its later evocations continued: the eccentric Seven Bamboo Sages, even passionate Wang Yang-ming, and the list goes on.[85]

This "spirit" of free roaming Chuang Tzu so much inspired the Chinese literature and writings in general, that our contemporary Confucian Antonio S. Cua confessed spontaneously in his personal letter to me, "Every Confucian is a Taoist at heart." Chuang Tzu forms a vital undercurrent in the Chinese elan of life. His spirit is to "learn as a master from a master," a master-student producing something as excellently unique as a master-teacher did.

It is thus that Confucius so learned from the tradition as to revolutionize the notion of "nobleman" (*chün tzu*) of blood into "nobleman of character"; likewise, Mencius so learned as to vitalize the vague notion of "humanness (*jen*)" into meaning the heart that cannot bear someone suffering (*pu jen jen chih hsin*); Chuang Tzu gave us the tradition that forgets admiring the tradition and begins with it. Chuang Tzu's story of old wheelwright tells us that book-learning kills. Here Duke Huan's subject taught the Duke that no one can teach even one's own son, much less can dead sages. Yet we are taught thus by this story that is a part of the towering achievements of the great dead. What irony!

Intrigued, we tried to untangle this whole tangle on education, and found a program of "Chuang Tzu-education": We "begin *with* Chuang Tzu," evoked by Chuang Tzu.[86] First, we consider what they mean, *after* textually-critically cleaning them. Then we discover instances of meaning-incoherence in them. Thirdly, we consider their significance for our life today, how their "nonsense" laughs at ours today. Finally, we see how they inspire new worldviews and new modes of life today, reverberating through history to sing the world in the world itself singing.

All in all, if general education educes our independent growth into cosmic historical humanness, and if Chuang Tzu is indispensable for our such growth, then Chuang Tzu is indispensable in general education. "Education in Chuang Tzu" is a model general education, which is in turn a model for education in any special field.

Notes

1. It is debatable whether animal "learning" is completely identical with human learning. In human learning reason infuses instincts; in animal "learning" reason is in a twilight zone *within* instincts. On balance, it is safer to say that humans learn while animals don't (at least not in a human sense, and the notion of "learning" properly originated within the human sphere), than to say that both learn in different senses.

2. "Specialty education" trains us in special techniques—engineering, banking, etc. We may dispute over what such education covers, but can agree that "general education" is, in contrast, for an educement of humanness.

3. It is as mistaken as putting all efforts at inventing "the fastest and most cost-effective therapy" in the world at the cost of the patients' comfort, healing and survival, the single central concern of medical enterprise.

4. To claim that Chuang Tzu (between 399-295 BC) is at the core of education does not exclude but in fact welcomes other great educators into the core, such as Confucius, Buddha, Socrates. That this follows from education as *mutuality* of self-educement is one of the themes the following pages explicate.

5. Self-educement happens by adding inducement by others, much as we draw water from a new well by adding water to it. Individual authentic human selfhood is educed by adding our common tradition, our noteworthy past experience. Education is an inducement of internal educement by our objective heritage. How? By "learning like a master from a master" (this essay's central thesis). Such learning does not happen by simple addition, however, that is, not by simply repeating, or stuffing into us, past achievements of the ancient great. So, here is the problem: We must, yet cannot, add "tradition" to our education.

6. This essay omits "apprenticeship." We have no apprenticeship for the art of living well as humans, although living well must be related somehow to apprenticeship in technical skills, as Chuang Tzu's story of the wheelwright shows. Chapter 19 titled "Attaining Life (*ta sheng*)" consists in one story after another of divine artistry and artisans. Technical skill must be metaphorically and intimately related to living well. Technical special education has deep humanistic significance for general education, which must take on itself the mission to tell special educators so and humanize technical education. But the entire theme is itself so technical and complex that it lies outside this essay.

7. "Logic and grammar" are related. Logic is grammar of thinking as grammar is logic of speaking; thinking is silent speech as speaking is thinking aloud. Both thinking and speaking are transmitted in and by culture-tradition. No person is human without all this.

8. Animals eat; we humans have Chinese dinners, French dinners, and American dinners. We learn from culture how to eat. Similarly, *how* to see, hear, and behave we learn from our tradition. It is true that cultural tradition produced Hitler, because his trial at decimation of another race and culture came from his zeal for the Aryan excellence, something cultural. At the same time, cultural tradition condemns Hitler's brutal exclusive selfishness behind his advertised ideal, and proposes "enlightened inclusive selfishness" perhaps from the mercantile culture. It teaches us that buyers' prosperity redounds to prospering sellers; sellers must then be considerate enough to give buyers merchandise of "high quality at a good price." If we think this is common sense, "common sense" is another name for culture and tradition. Thus I learn from our culture and traditions even the frame and standard of my choice. How *best* to see, hear, and behave I learn from our culture. I need this standard in order even to kick it to create my own "preferred standard of excellence," my "style of life."

Learning can be inheriting of a particular cultural tradition; it can also be intercultural learning. We here consider the former interculturally. It is as refreshing to learning from Chinese Taoist Chuang Tzu with the benefit of Japanese and English scholarly writings on Chuang Tzu, as it is to learn from Shakespeare with Chinese and Japanese scholarly writings to benefit from. Cf. Notes 36 and 37. On

intercultural learning per se, see my "World Inter-Learning: Global Agenda for the Teaching of Philosophy," a chapter in *The Teaching of Philosophy on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century*, edited by J. D. G. Evans and Ioanna Kucuradi, FISP-UNESCO, 1998, pp. 155-177.

9. Someone may claim that our concrete knowledge of water may require raw concrete experience of water (as in Helen Keller), but abstract knowledge can be transmitted without experience. This claim is false. All theoretical knowledge of logic and mathematics is obtained by undergoing exercises until a theorem, say, clicks in, that is, experienced in person. This is why computer does not "know" in a proper sense; it merely shuffles signs according to preprogrammed rules. After acquiring a theoretical knowledge (of addition, say), we may use that knowledge non-self-consciously; it becomes part of us. This fact does not alter the fact that all knowledge, concrete and theoretical, is experienced.

10. Collingwood said that history must be "reenacted." This procedure does violence to time, similar to turning back the clock to raise the dead, and leaving us forever unsure if what we supposedly "reenacted" is what it has really been, since the "re-" in "reenactment" presumes that we can recognize that what we reenacted is what we want, that we know what it is to be resurrected-reenacted--and *that* is what we do not know.

11. This seems to be one of the basic assumptions of deconstructionism. It then goes on to reject logocentrism (books, writing, reading) in favor of phonocentrism (speaking, listening, discussing). Chuang Tzu accepts the challenge, and goes a different way. Chuang Tzu accepts words, both written and spoken, but in a way that self-effaces words. Words expresses wordlessness, silence, in Chuang Tzu's hand.

12. *Harvard-Yenching Sinological Index Series: Chuang Tzu*, 13/68-74. (All Chinese translations are mine; I tried for fidelity to exhibit the original vibrant felicity). This is the story that concludes the Chapter (as many chapters do with short penetrating stories as this one) significantly titled "*T'ien Tao*," the Heavenly Way. Chuang Tzu seems to be saying that the Heavenly Way should be taught, but taught as *unteachable*. How the unteachable teaching happens is what Chuang Tzu is going to teach us. Incidentally, that the boss in a position to teach is being taught by the subject in a

position to be taught, happened before in Chuang Tzu, most significantly of which is that Kitchen Fellow teaching his boss Wen-hui Chün. The story begins Chapter Three titled "*Yang Sheng Chu*" (nourishing living lord).

13. Interestingly, Plato in the person of Socrates produced a fable of the dialogue between an Egyptian god Theuth and the king. Theuth offered his invention of the letters, praising them as the medicine of memory and wisdom. The king replied that, neglecting our inner remembrance, the letters serve at most only as an aid to recollect knowledge *already* possessed, and deceive those transmitted into believing that they possess knowledge they lack. The letters say not a word, unable to reply, discriminate whom to transmit, or defend themselves (*Phaedrus*, 274-275). Socrates' disparagement of written letters complements our negative description here of reading written words. (J. Wright's translation of this portion of the *Phaedrus* is still one of the most charming. It appears among others in *Five Dialogues* of *Plato Bearing on Poetic Inspiration*, with an introduction by A. D. Lindsay, London & Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, and New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1910, pp. 270-277. I was put off, for instance, by R. Hackforth's rather flat and matter-of-fact translation of *Phaedrus*, Cambridge University Press, 1952. The literary cut, clarity, and drama of the original is smoothed away by the translator's condescending accommodation to modern wording.)

14. Scientists love to try at this impossibility, calling it "repeatable experimentation." Everyone knows, however, that no experiment exactly replicates the previous experiment. We merely tolerate a certain amount of variation within limit, and sometimes these slight variations can be crucial in truth-discovery and disaster-prevention. More intrinsically, replicated experience-experiment "scientific success"--is no longer an experience. "Repeated experience," if at all possible, is "contrived, concocted experience," which is a fake, a contradiction.

15. Still, that excellence requires novelty may raise some eyebrows. After all, "excellence is timeless" and "the old classics are eternal." But we must be careful about what these phrases mean. They mean that the classics evoke in us fresh excitement and novel insights *every time* we read them, *for ages* without going stale. "Old" in "old excellence" means the inexhaustibility of "stamina," as it were, of the excellence to

elicit fresh excitement. "Old excellence" means excellence for a long time without going stale, not "stale excellence" that is an oddity verging on contradiction.

In other words, mere repetition of past excellence, however excellent, kills its outstanding uniqueness. And yet, to inherit the tradition is to inherit past excellence. It means to *continue* the happening of unique freshness just as the one those Great Dead sages effected. But is there any other continuance of happening than repeating the happening? "Continuity of freshness and novelty" seems as contradictory as "repetition of the irrepeatable."

16. Boredom of the assembly-line workers tells us that an absolutely regimented life (not regulated life, which invigorates) is death. All work and no play make a dull Jack; all repeats and nothing-new spells death.

17. Whether or not experiencing monotony is a novel experience, falls in the category of the liar's paradox, experience of death, and self-deception. I do not know how to answer it here. Fortunately, experiencing monotony is seldom "educative experience" we are considering here; the so-called "plateau in learning" differs from monotony, which stops learning.

18. Walking, writing, eating and driving a car may be experience embodied and made tacit, a twilight zone between consciousness and unconsciousness, but not quite identical with turning "stale," though it could. Fortunately we are considering here culture and tradition as *noteworthy* experience deserving of handing down, a proper sphere of "experience."

19. Inheriting the tradition of freshness and novelty by definition cannot be a mere repetition of the past, nor can it be a complete indifference to the past, for the new needs the old to certify itself as "new." Thus the new cannot continue as new, nor can it dispense with the old. Experience can neither do with nor do without the past. But one thing is certain; the past experience cannot be inherited by posterity.

20. Chuang Tzu shares with his shared (with Buddhism and Shintoism) brainchild Zen many paradoxes, one of which raises its ugly head when both capitalize on our raw contacts with the immediacies of daily experience, the very stuff of actuality of which

our life is made--breathing, sleeping, walking, sitting. Both elaborate on these raw contacts as if they were exotic and special, out of this world.

"How could the daily ordinary ongoing be the exotic? We need an explanation," we say. Chuang Tzu scholars and Zen masters kindly explain. Then we ask again, "Why explain what's already going on in life (scientists are odd balls, too, to think of it), and then explain such your explanation (religious people join in the oddity here)? Your explanation itself is so odd that it requires explanation." Now here is the self-regressive dilemma: We can neither continue explaining on pain of increasing the oddity of explanation, nor stop explaining on pain of leaving unexplained things crying out for explanation. Perhaps neither Chuang Tzu nor Zen is explainable. But then, no one will get them unless explained; they must be "transmitted." Chuang Tzu's joking self-mockery on "ancient sagely dregs" is really a serious self-corrosive paradox about words as indispensable dregs.

21. Even the very power of poetry consists in broken wording, and this semantic brokenness shows how inadequate our words are.

22. Vital statistics in a community or of a battle captures neither the heartfelt experience of that child's birth nor the heart-rending experience of his death. Words are statistics, and both are "dregs" of unspeakable experience now gone.

Words are, however, the only vehicle we have of expressing our past experience we want to transmit, as we have just done, and convey the past we must, as this very story of Wheelwright by Chuang Tzu, among others, that is our past, demonstrates.

23. As told by R. G. Collingwood in *The Idea of History*, Oxford University Press, 1946.

24. Actually, Wheelwright said that not even his humble art of wheel-making could be transmitted; not even specialty education is possible. He may have implied, "much less the noble art of person-making (general education)."

25. In order to be human, we must transmit what cannot be transmitted, for (2.1.) experience is exclusively personal, (2.2.) excellence is incurably fresh, and (2.3.) our only vehicle of conveyance, language and words, is unable to express the freshness of

actual experience. Education tries to transmit past experience by words, which cannot convey experience. We have a problem here, then.

We are human by becoming human through education. Education is transmission of knowledge. Knowledge is presence with something to be known. To be present is to experience. Experience is not expressible in words, for they cannot bring us fresh raw presence. Thus, education as tradition, as transmission of knowledge--presence with past experience--is impossible. Education is impossible yet is essential to humanity.

26. But "same experience" is a tricky notion, for "sameness" assumes comparison, and we do not know how to compare two "experiences," let alone many, which are respectively radically subjective. Whatever we reenacted, re-experienced, is irrevocably ours, our own fresh experience. To read about the past experience of the sages is to reenact it, to re-create it, to create it anew in our own way. To inherit the tradition is inevitably to renovate it; later in Section D we will note how Confucius and Mencius, two avid tradition-promoters, revolutionized the ancient notions of "nobleman" and "humanness." Besides, how do we even begin to "experience" past experience of the sages? Experience does not happen by fiat; it must be evoked and undergone by being called attention to it-in-general-terms. And here is where words can serve us. Experience can be described in non-experiential generalities to call and orient our attention.

27. *Chuang Tzu*, 11/63. I said my thought is an "echo" to Chuang Tzu because he may have meant teaching to be echoes to the students' questioning; I developed his thought in the direction he must have intended, as his subsequent sentences point to. Chuang Tzu's entire section here, 11/63-66, is so profound and ambiguous, however, that three reliable English translations mutually and instructively differ--Watson (p. 124), Graham (p. 150), Mair (p. 101).

28. I have meditated on what "reading" can mean in *The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990. See Index on p. 504 under "read," "reader." This point has much to do with the talker-less listener-less talk to be talked about later in this essay.

29. The word is a Janus-like door that hermeneutically swings in two opposite directions, "yes" (depositing) and "no" (denying). Each is a dead end, however, being blocked by the other. In the meantime, this word "nothingness" that unites saying and meaning, presides over all this, telling all tales that are no-tales of idiots, signifying nothing.

    The word "*wu*," "nothingness," powerfully expresses how powerless words are. Words' powerlessness can turn into a powerful silence that calls forth *our* creation.

30. If asked how I got all this, I would reply that I got it from reading the *Chuang Tzu*. This answer brings us to sub-section 2 in this Section and Section D, on strategy. This movement completes the hermeneutical circle of two snakes biting each other's tails, one on the hermeneutic principle, another on its execution.

31. These are pregnant words that conclude Chapter 25 (25/80-81).

32. *The Analects*, 7/8.

33. Concretely, *how* do we weave words with wordlessness? Simply put, we should not take the word for it, but as saying what it does not mean. We read between, behind, and "*outside* the lines" (*yen wai chih i*) for what is unsayable and remains unsaid. This is, incidentally, already to anticipate the final Section D on educative strategy. The duplication is inevitable, seeing that education is strategy of education, that in Chuang Tzu to say something is to be and do so.

    Such is how the book of *Chuang Tzu* was written, and is why his words are alive in their fresh ambiguity. His words pique our curiosity with pregnant nonsense, meaningful meaninglessness.

34. That is, with as much "accuracy" as our textual-critical capability allows us to attain. There is no excuse for sinological sloth.

35. Chuang Tzu (6/43-45) has a mythological person's striking stages of learning from many ancient mythological figures. "Ancients" are long gone; "mythological figures" exist only in the learner's mind; "mythological learner" refers us to the listener-less talker-less talk where subjects talking intermesh with objects talked to and subject

matters talked about, as will be considered in 2.3. and 4. in Section C. This is education.

36. Fukunaga, Mitsuji and Akatsuka, Tadashi come to mind as two superb and diverse examples. (Fukunaga, Mitsuji, *Söshi*, 3 volumes (in hard cover), Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun sha, 1966-1967. Akatzuka, Tadashi, *Söshi*, 2 volumes, Tokyo: Shueisha, 1974-1977.) Incidentally, this note and the next show one benefit among others of intercultural learning even when inheriting a particular cultural tradition. Cf. Note 8.

37. Lin Yutang, Burton Watson, A. C. Graham, and Victor H. Mair have produced translations at once diverse and noteworthy. Burton Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, NY: Columbia University Press, 1968. A. C. Graham, *Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters and other writings from the book Chuang-tzu*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981. Victor H. Mair, *Wandering on the Way: Early Taoist Tales and Parables of Chuang Tzu*, Bantam Books, 1994. Being "recent" does not mean being "better," however. Lin Yutang's translations of Chuang Tzu scattered in his *The Wisdom of Laotse* (NY: Modern Library, 1948) and *The Wisdom of China and India* (NY: Modern Library, 1942), for instance, frequently splash with excellence. For more bibliographical information, see my *Butterfly*, op. cit., pp. 444-458.

38. A well-known sinologist, after having written extensively on Confucius, Mencius, and Lao Tzu, declared that he would not deign to touch Chuang Tzu, whose texts are corrupt beyond repair.

39. *Chuang Tzu*, 1/2, 13.

40. That butterfly-dream story (2/94-96) I lived with for three years, the fish-joy story (17/87-91) for two years, and the monkey-and-nuts story (2/37-47) for a year. At every "Eureka!" I shook my head with another shout, "There's more!" Before I realized it, I have pumped my five years into writing *The Butterfly as Companion*. The Second Chapter was and remains my delightful "killer."

41. As a Japanese saying goes, "(Bookish) reading of *The Analects* misses *The Analects (rongo yomi no rongo shirazu)*." Mencius also warned us (7B3), "Complete (blind) trust in books (the Classics) is worse than having not books at all (*chin hsin shu pu ju wu shu*)." Significantly, we have no comparable warning on the Taoist writings,

perhaps due to the fact that Taoist writings are too alive and provocative to be unquestionably swallowed, because they are self-incoherently silent, self-subversively empty. There is nothing to hang on to.

42. Ibid., 2/38-40.

43. Both were contemporaries yet neither made explicit references to the other. The temptation to imagine their *implicit* references to each other is irresistible. This is one example of yielding to the temptation of our creative imagination in class. This is one more example of how tradition, even through its ambiguity, stimulates our exploration.

44. *Mencius*, 3A4.

45. Ibid., 6A7, cf. 3A1, 4B28, 32.

46. These stories are from *Chuang Tzu* 2/52 till the end.

47. Chuang Tzu played with "one" and "three" in 2/51-55.

48. Later in sub-section 4, we shall see that this one-many unity is a musical one, the Heavenly Pipings (*t'ien lai*) internally inter-blending, inter-thriving among subjects and subject matters.

49. "Interpretation" is here taken as synonymous with "understanding." This principle is derived from that familiar slogan of phenomenology, "Let things appear of themselves" which is synonymous with another slogan, "To things themselves." This is also the basic hermeneutical principle, which is but our commonsense understanding of what "objectivity" should mean. On the relation between phenomenology and education, see Shaun Gallagher, *Hermeneutics and Education*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.

50. *Chuang Tzu*, 9/7.

51. *Mencius*, 6A11.

52. *How* do we know that a certain hypothesis is confirmed? The hypothesis is disconfirmed--it is easier to see, as we saw above--when it runs against the author's general thrust, the general sentiment in a literary context, and the drift of the text. If our hypothesis reinforces them it is a possible hypothesis. If new textual evidence is

found to support the hypothesis, it is confirmed. The example of "*fang*" is cited just to show how our fresh careful reading of the *Chuang Tzu* can arouse some exciting possibilities for class discussion, to educe our life discernment and analytical acuity. And our hypothesis can stimulate us to elicit further thoughts, as will be shown soon. All this shows how great a teacher Chuang Tzu is.

53. Such plausible interpretation awaits textual confirmation.

54. Cf. *The Analects*, 3/24.

55. We will soon come back to the important topic of self-forgetting (*wang*) and mindless (a different yet related *wang*) speaking and listening.

56. This series of parables and conversations begin at 2/64 till the end of Chapter Two.

57. *Chuang Tzu*, 2/64-73. Mr. Chew Chipped (*nieh ch'üeh*) must have chewed words so much as to have chipped words or teeth (the articulators of words). Mr. Royal Horizon (*wang ni*) may be the benevolent ruler of the limits of nature, or the Limits themselves who are benevolent rulers of the world. This is an excellent simile of conversation between words and actuality as a whole, a simile of our reflections on reality. Besides, textual difficulty here is minimal; its general drift of meaning is clear.

58. We remember this point was as far as Socrates went; Socrates *knew* that he did not know. Mr. Horizon was not even sure about that knowledge.

59. Now, what this last saying proffered as a reason for Horizon's claim to ignorance means, and *how* this saying constitutes such a reason, are legitimate questions for our further inquiry in classroom. Does Royal Horizon mean to say, "Great debate does not speak," "One who knows does not speak, one who speaks does not know" (*Chuang Tzu*, 2/59; 13/68, 22/7. *Tao Te Ching* 56), perhaps thereby claiming a sort of intuitive knowledge above ordinary knowledge? Or does he cast doubt over knowledge altogether?

60. Sudden change of scene from one story to another is intriguing; their only slender connection is description of Ultimate or Holy Person. Is this new scene part of Mr. Royal Horizon's talk? Or did *they* actually overhear the morning chitchats of Magpie

to a Tree on whose branch it was tarrying? A child mumbled to himself, "It's quieter when the birds sing, isn't it, Dad?" Magpie sang silence to silent Tree as it asked Tree something; Tree talked silence as it promised mindless talking and listening. Their dialogue was silence, in singing silence.

61. Watson (op. cit., p. 47) chose "reckless" (or "recklessly"), A. C. Graham (op. cit., p. 59) chose "abandon" (or "with abandon"), Victor H. Mair (op. cit., p. 22) chose "careless" (or "carelessly").

62. The above interpretations of "wu" and "wu wei," "fang," "t'ien fang," and Mencius, and "wang"'s many characters, senses, and inter-implications, would be strengthened by supportive interpretive authorities in history to those effect; I am still trying to find them. But even if I failed to find them, the above interpretations still stand valid until proven otherwise, for three reasons. (a) Above interpretations of key terms are contextually supported by the beginning of the Second Chapter of *Chuang Tzu*, and indeed its entire book, and derived therefrom. (b) It is not interpretive authority that validates an interpretation, but the other way around, as was shown above in our critique of "t'ien fang" as "imitating" heaven. (c) Unless an interpretation has its own textual-contextual justification, awaiting interpretive authority to confirm it would be mired in an infinite regress of forever confirming an interpretive authority with ever preceding ones. This procedural predicament amounts to a collapse of the project of confirmation.

63. I would have described the mindless talk as one "as if there were no one beside," were it not for its unfortunate connotation of "supercilious" in Chinese (*p'ang jo wu jen*).

64. "Ch'iu" may be "K'ung Ch'iu," namely, Confucius. If this is true, then, since Confucius is Teacher par excellence, Chuang Tzu may here be debunking the authority of the august teacher, initiating educative mutuality in time and a tradition of kicking the tradition.

65. I omit here all Chuang Tzu's fascinating ironic details of how each of us in a bewildering panorama of social engagements is a dream, each playing one's dreamy social role, even "interpreting their dreams in their dreams" (2/80-84).

66. "Chuang Chou" is Chuang Tzu's personal name; "Tzu" means "master" or "Mr." The

appearance of Chuang Tzu's name shows that Chuang Tzu is now the subject matter talked about.

67. This series of fascinating intersubjective and inter-objective dialogues, which concluded with the radical dream of the butterfly, conclude the fascinating Chapter Two of the book of *Chuang Tzu* (2/64-96). Cf. My *Butterfly*, op. cit., pp. 493 under "butterfly" and 495 under "dream."

68. This is Heidegger's favorite phrase also. Cf. My *Chuang Tzu: World Philosopher at Play*, NY: Crossroad and Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1982, p. 61, long note 1.

69. "*Wu wu*" appears in *Chuang Tzu*, 11/62, 20/7, 22/50, 75. "*Wu hua*" appears in ibid., 2/96, 11/54, 12/25, 13/14, 19/62, 22/78, 25/16 (cf. 27/17 where one word "wu" is used as an absolute verb).

70. *Chuang Tzu*, 3/19.

71. I experience not Chuang Chou dreaming to be a butterfly but I dreaming to be, say, a bird, with the same wonderment on interchange of identities. The same fire burns here on different logs. Kafka's hero's dream to be a green bug (in *Metamorphosis*) is a slightly different fire because Kafka's point was different.

72. Similarly, as Wheelwright taught his lord Duke Huan, he teaches me. As Uncle Monkey teaches monkeys, he teaches me. And so on.

73. "Ambiguity" is "*ambi-agere*," to drive around.

74. Ibid., 2/84, in the midst of that dream-talk, dream-walk. Here we understand Lao Tzu's "Tao can tao [as] not-always-Tao" that begins his *Tao Te Ching*, and Chuang Tzu's "Great Tao declares not" (2/59, 22/44-47). Tao can only be not-definitely told, that is, indefinitely alluded to. In this "not," in this "in-," is the Tao, ambi-guous, walk-around. While Lao Tzu has a mystique of ambiguity, Chuang Tzu's ambiguity is absorbingly interesting.

75. Thus awakened ambi-guity allows us to bypass the dreamer's paradox similar to the liar's.

76. Here the one differs from the other (*yu fen*), becomes more of oneself, because of the

other (cf. *wu hua*). "*Yu fen*" means "having separative distinction"; "*wu hua*" means "things (inter) changing."

77. This "education" fulfills the classical ideal of the Yin and Yang interaction, co-incidence of opposites toward their co-thriving. Their mutual negation promoting mutual affirmation is tacitly, meticulously, worked out in Chuang Tzu's phrases and stories.

78. The exquisite description, in poetic beauty, of Heavenly Piping (*t'ien lai*) begins at 2/3 and reverberates throughout Chapter Two of the *Chuang Tzu*.

79. Ibid., 2/1-9, and perhaps all the way throughout the entire Chapter Two. This may be the principle of humanization of science and technology, the point at which specialty education is united toward and fulfilled in general education.

80. Ibid., 6/36-45 describes an educative progress and is packed with mythological figures and allusions; it is tradition-loaded. Tradition "can be transmitted but cannot be received, can be had but cannot be seen" (6/29). That is education.

81. Mozart's "Six Preludes and Fugues for Violin, Viola, and Cello" (KV 404a) contains J. S. Bach's four Fugues (BWV 853, 883, 882, 1080), Adagio (BWV 527), two movements from Bach's organ sonata (BWV 526), and W. F. Bach's Fuga 8. This composition was beautifully performed by Grumiaux Trio in *Mozart: Complete String Trios and Duos*, Philips 454 023-2 (2 CDs). Bach can also be clearly heard in Mozart's Duos. The story of Mozart's "Haydn Quartets" is sensitively described in Charles Michener's "Mozart's 'Haydn Quartets'" contained in *Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart: The Six "Haydn Quartets,"* London: Sony Classics, SM2K 47219-2, 1953/1991 (2 CDs).

82. The similarity of these two quartets was claimed on 12/5/97 by members of the Orion String Quartet in residence at the Lincoln Center.

83. This Haydn-Mozart-Beethoven tradition is that of creativity. For their diverse continuity, see Charles Rosen, *The Classical Style: Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven*, W. W. Norton & Co., 1972. Such transmission of *diverse* creativity is much more than Socrates' planting of seeds of words, "written into the soul of the hearer," and

nourishing their tender growth in "the gardens of letters," thus "preserving this precious seed" (*Phaedrus*, 276; cf. Note 13 above.).

84. Beethoven learned from Mozart as Mozart did from Haydn and Heidegger did from pre-Socratics, each absorbing the past, ingesting it, then respectively creating new syntheses of their own. This is tradition and culture at work; it makes us, we become human by it. This is education.

85. Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) vehemently protested against "harmful meticulousness (if not pedantry)" of Chu Hsi (1130-1200) with a Taoistic force of irresistible oneness of mind and life, although Wang was also vehemently against Taoism. His very vehemence (on two fronts) may betray his heavy indebtedness to Taoism and Chu.

86. The strategy of implementing the principle of mutual evocation is easier said than done, however. The strategy was traced out as follows: *First*, we sensitized ourselves to internal incoherence in Chuang Tzu's expressions, beginning at single words such as "*wu*," "nothing" which uses something, the word and the notion, to point to its intended subject-matter, "nothing."

Then we looked at phrases such as "mindless (*wang*) listener-less talking and talker-less listening," a contradiction because talking and listening is possible only when it minds its dialogue partners. *Furthermore*, we noted how incoherently upside-down many of Chuang Tzu's stories are. In the story of Wheelwright he taught his lord Duke Huan his legitimate teacher. And the teaching was, "Do not read dead ancient words," yet this ancient story itself did come down to us today. *Finally*, we pondered on what all these self-involved disjoints mean, then applied our deliberation onto life, inter-objectification of dialogical subjects.

《莊子》與大學通識教育

吳 光 明*

摘 要

本文主旨在於探討《莊子》這部經典對大學通識教育之啓示。教育之目的爲傳達過去之經驗。但《莊子》書中的「輪扁」質疑這種可能性，輪扁認爲言語不能表達經驗。如果言語不能表現經驗，則言語就要成爲不可言，也就是自相矛盾而成爲以「沈默無言」表達不可言喻的經驗。這種所謂「不言之言」是一種以沈默激發領悟的教育方式。這是一種沈默的對話，如「齧缺」與「王倪」，以及「瞿鵲子」與「長梧子」的對話，都屬這種類型。在這種對談之中，對談者以及所談的題材完全融合爲一。這種奇異的對話方式可以表現爲一種夢境。在夢境中對話者及其題材可以互換而融合無間。雙方所談的題材即是經驗。在這種言語及沈默的互換融合之中，經驗由一世代傳到另一世代，猶如「火」從一「薪」傳到另一「薪」。莊子的思想傳統，對於上述各點都對我們有深刻的啓示。

*美國威斯康星大學退休講座教授